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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the present research is to study, "Changing 
Patterns of PoHtical Behaviour of MusUms in Uttar Pradesh since 1991". 
Keeping in view the intricacy of the objective of the present study, it is 
necessary to explain various aspects of political behaviour of Muslims of 
Uttar Pradesh. 
The chapter I of the thesis incorporates the geographical and 
ecological profile of the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh. It deals with the 
geographical features, climatic conditions, morphology of physical terrain 
of Uttar Pradesh, and demographical growth of Muslims, their ethnic and 
linguistic composition, their educational aspects. The historical growth of 
the present state of Uttar Pradesh and the historical background of 
Muslims since the inception of the state is also delineated upon. 
This chapter also includes the economic conditions of Muslims 
and the rise of political consciousness among them after the independence 
of the country. It an accepted fact, that the growth and the progress of a 
country is consequent upon the overall growth of its citizens. The concept 
of inclusive growth includes in its fold, both the majority and the 
minority communities living in the country. The Muslims are a minority 
community in India and in the state of Uttar Pradesh. It becomes 
incumbent upon the state to make its minorities feel secure and protected. 
It keeps the minorities away from the feeling of alienation, and makes 
them political active and contribute in the wholesome growth of the 
nation. This holds true for the Muslims as well. 
The chapter II of the thesis discusses the conceptual framework 
of the political behaviour. It also includes discussion about the different 
cultural orientations, different approaches to the study of political 
behaviour, and various factors influencing the changes in the trends of 
political participation. 
Chapter III includes the review of literature on the influence of 
various factors on political behaviour of Muslims. Methodological details 
of the thesis are also discussed in this chapter. In the methodology of 
thesis, a sample of 1200 Muslims was drawn randomly from the different 
parts of the state. In all 840 males were sampled, out of which 480 males 
were taken from urban areas and 360 from rural areas. Similarly, 360 
females were interviewed, out of which 240 were in urban centers and 
120 were from rural areas. 
To measure the political behaviour of Muslims, a questionnaire 
used by the Centre for Studies in Developing Societies (CSDS) in various 
pre-Poll and post-Poll surveys was used by the researcher. It contains 66 
questions and in all measured 17 dimensions of political behaviour. It 
also evaluates cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of the 
respondents. 
Data, thus, obtained from different groups of Muslims were 
analyzed in two phases on the bases of socio-economic variables like-
region, sex, education, age and income. In the first phase percentages of 
all the dimensions were calculated. In the second phase, Bar diagrams 
were made on the SPSS package. 
In the chapter IV of the thesis, the results and its discussions were 
incorporated. This chapter deals with five different aspects of socio-
economic status. It.included- urban -rural difference, education, level of 
income, age and sex difference that influences the political activities 
among Muslims. In the analysis it was found that the rural Muslims are 
more politically active then their urban counterparts. Educational and 
income difference were found to be a crucial factors in decision making. 
The role of sex and age in political involvement was also decisive. 
The political behaviour like - voting participation, campaign 
participation and level of political interest of rural Muslims are much 
greater than that of urban Muslims. It is found that the rural Muslims 
might be backward as compared to their urban counterparts in terms of 
political information level, symbol and heritage awareness and their 
exposure to mass media but as far as their involvement in political 
activities is concerned their attitude towards candidate (ATC) and attitude 
towards democratic system (ATS), political efficacy (PE) and political 
trust (PT) - all are much higher than that of urban Muslims. As a result, 
rural Muslims are more politically mobilized (M) than those of urban 
Muslims. 
Regarding voting preference (V.Pre) the overwhelming rural 
majority opted for party (74%) than candidate. In Party Affiliation, rural 
population is more outright and clear cut in making their minds than that 
of urban. Among urban Muslims' choice of party affiliation (P.aff) the 
Samajwadi Party (49%) has an edge over Bhaujan Samajwadi Party 
(27%) and Congress (24%)) but in the rural Muslims' psyche the congress 
still haunting as an initiator of Babri movement. As a result, only 19%) 
rural Muslims favour congress. As regard to, the Opinion Deciders (OD), 
opinions of friends(OD f), caste groups (OD c) and co-workers (OD cw) 
play heavily over the minds of Muslim voters in both rural and urban 
areas. Almost 75% voters in rural areas and 64% in urban make up their 
mind due to these factors. 
Regarding male-female differences among urban and rural 
Muslims. It was found that women voted less than men by 3.43% points. 
It is reasonable to expect as women are less active politically as compared 
to their male counterparts as they remain confined to domestic chores. 
The difference in campaign participation (C.P), communal activity (C.A), 
political action (P.A) and mobilization (M) between male and female is 
quite large. This shows females are discouraged fi"om actively 
participating in politics. In opinion decider (OD), males are more guided 
by friends (34.2%), caste groups (29.7) and co-workers (27.5) and 
females are dependent on family members (44.1) and spouses (41.3) in 
deciding about whom to vote. 
Differences in the political behaviour of urban and rural Muslims 
due to education showed that voting participation (60%), campaign 
participation (38.3%) along with political information index (43.0%) and 
political interest (36.2%) all were fairly higher among rural Muslims as 
compared to those of urban Muslims, with literacy level below high 
school. Only in two dimensions -symbol and heritage awareness (SHA) 
and attitude towards system (ATS) -the rural Muslims are lower than 
urban. The mobilization of Muslims in rural area is phenomenal with 
57.7% involved in this activity. 
The voting preference (V.pref) among urban Muslims is heavily 
loaded in favour of party than in candidate, with 77.5%) supporting party 
candidate. The party affiliation (P.aff) in rural Muslims shows a clear 
bias towards Samajwadi party. In opinion decider (OD) dimension, 
family members (fm) play a more meaningful role in urban area (12.0%) 
than in rural whereas in both the places the combination of friends, caste 
and co-workers play a decisive role in make up of mind for voting. 
When we analyze the political behaviour in rural and urban 
Muslims above high school, we fmd a lot many surprises in store, the 
political interest (PI) level has fallen up to 7% point. The mobilization 
(M) activity fell up to 4% point, only attitude towards candidate (ATC) 
and political trust (PT) shows an upward movement. The awareness about 
issues and problems (IPA) in both the rural and urban area has remained 
untainted by the increase in the level of literacy. 
In the category of Muslims' education above high school, urban 
preference for voting to party remains of same higher trajectory but 
among rural preference for candidate over party takes a clear precedence. 
Nevertheless, the preference for Samajwadi party remains intact as usual. 
In opinion decider (OD), yet another new trend is visible, in rural 
Muslims with education above high school, caste group (39.1%) plays 
decisive role in determining voting choice, whereas role of family 
member is almost negligible. Among the urban Muslims, the role of 
friend (34.5%) and co-workers (30.0%) takes an upper hand in opinion 
decider. 
When two groups aged between 36 to 50 years and above 50 
years were compared on the different dimensions of political behaviour. 
It was evident that both the age groups of urban and rural Muslims 
differed on various dimensions. Voting participation (VP) of urban 
Muslims increases from 50% to 53.1% with advancing age. The greater 
voting turnout among the older persons may also be as a result of "faith in 
parliamentary system". It was found that variation in age is not 
significantly related to campaign participation (CP), political interest (PI), 
political information index (PII). Overall the difference is insignificant 
but between rural-urban comparisons, it was found that rural masses are 
more active in all these activities. 
Advancing age was also positively related to mobilization (M) to 
attending meetings, contacting officials to influence decision. The mass 
media exposure (MME) was found to be less with advancement in age; 
this could be as result of elderly being less internet savvy and restricting 
to oral communication of information. In making voting preference 
(V.pre.) between party and candidate, it was found that party was given 
precedence over candidate in both the age groups of urban and rural 
Muslims. In making choice about party affiliation (P.aff.), Samajwadi 
Party (SP) was preferred by majority of Muslims cutting across the age 
divide and rural-urban difference. 
So far as opinion decider (OD) is concerned, family members 
(17.7%) and spouse (21.6%) played a decisive role among the urban 
Muslims between 36 to 50 years age group. Whereas, in above 50 years 
age group rural Muslims- the family members alone play a decisive role 
in 29.4%) of Muslims while caste group plays role in 28.3%) of rural 
Muslims. Spouses in rural masses, in both the age groups (3% & 3.8%), 
play almost second fiddle which verges close to insignificant 
contribution. 
When we compare political behaviour of urban and rural 
Muslims across lower, middle and higher income groups , it was found 
that the Muslims who are in the highest economic status classification in 
urban area vote somewhat less than those who have a lower and middle 
income status. But Muslims in the middle income group (57%)) in urban 
area vote 15%) more than lower income group (42%). 
In cognitive activities like- symbol and heritage awareness (SHA), 
attitude towards system (ATS), and mass media exposure (MME) the 
people of both rural and urban areas showed a positive relationship with 
income, i.e, with increase in income, these cognitive activities also 
increased. So far other forms of political participation were concerned 
there was no symmetrical impact of increase in income on these forms of 
behaviour. It was found that in urban area the activities like- political 
interest (PI), issue and problem awareness (IPA), attitude towards system 
(ATS), attitude towards candidate (ATC), political efficacy (PE) showed 
positive correlation with income. 
The Voting preference (V.Pre) for both rural and urban Muslims, 
in all the three categories was Party, not candidate; and Party affiliation 
(P.Aff), was found with Samajwadi Party (SP) to lesser or higher extent 
in all the three income categories. As regard to Opinion Decider (OD), 
urban Muslims find guidance in friends and spouse whereas the rural 
Muslims of low income groups find guidance in friends, caste group and 
co-workers whereas high income group find fi"iends, caste group and 
family members as ideal combinafion to help decide about whom to vote 
in elections. 
Chapter V deals with cultural orientations of political behaviour 
of Muslims. These orientations are classified into- cognitive, evaluative 
and affective types. Cognitive orientation is a very potent determinant of 
Political behaviour in which dimensions like -political informafion index 
(PII), issue and problem awareness (IPA), political interest (PI) and 
symbol and heritage awareness (SHA) were included. Since urban people 
are more literate as compared to rural people, and their exposure to mass 
media in urban centers are more than that of rural ones, so PII of urban 
Muslim was 29% and rural Muslims only 22%. 
Another dimension measuring cognitive orientation and which is 
directly influenced and determined by the level of education is symbol 
and heritage awareness (SHA), the urban Muslims had SHA of 28% and 
rural Muslims had SHA of only 8% which was abysmally low. 
Nevertheless, the rural Muslims had high issue and problem awareness 
(IPA) of 20% and high level of political interest (PI) of 22% as compared 
to issue and problem awareness (IPA) of 18% and political interest (PI) of 
14% of urban Muslims. 
To measure evaluative orientation anotlier set of four dimensions 
like- attitude towards system (ATS), attitude towards candidate (ATC), 
political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) were measured in both 
urban and rural areas. Urban Muslims had more positive and supportive 
attitude towards the democratic system of representation and governance 
as compared to rural Muslims which was 25% in urban and 21% in rural 
area respectively. The increase of 4% point in urban area could be due to 
the positive and more visible fruits of system in the form of better 
development and availability of economic opportunities. 
In the second dimension of evaluative orientation i.e. attitude 
towards candidate (ATC), rural Muslims seemed to take special and 
personal interest which was 25% point in contrast to only 12% of urban 
Muslims. It showed that rural Muslims had more positive attitude towards 
candidate and take the capability of candidate to perform into reckoning 
while making voting decision. 
The political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) both show leaning 
towards higher side. The political efficacy might be same (11%) in both 
rural and urban areas, but the political trust among the rural Muslims was 
much higher at 37% points than those of urban Muslims of 25% points, 
which shows strong commitment of Muslims vis-a-vis democratic 
institutions. 
For the measurement of affective orientation, four dimensions 
namely, voting participation (VP), campaign participation (CP), 
communal activity (CA), political activity (PA) among the Muslims 
residing in urban and rural centers were investigated. In all the four 
categories, the rural Muslims showed higher level of affective orientation 
than that of urban Muslims. Rural Muslims look politically awake as their 
overall affective orientation was high. Urban Muslims showed less 
interest in campaigning and communal activities than that of rural 
populace. This could be due to the life-style of urban people who remain 
less interested in affairs of others. 
In Chapter VI the political behaviour of Muslims had been studied 
in three phases. In the first phase urban Muslims were examined to find 
political behaviour on seven dimensions. Voting participation of four 
groups of urban Muslim males across high, middle and low income 
groups. It was found that with 38% of VP in lower income group, 42% of 
VP in middle and 40% of VP in higher income group, the general level of 
voting participation in group I was average. 
The group II category of Urban Muslims, on the contrary, showed 
very encouraging level of voting participation (VP). It consisted of all 
those Muslims in urban area who are above 50 years and educated up to 
high school. The increase in the age fi-om 36-50 to above 50 has brought 
about 4%) of increase in the voting participation of lower income group, 
6% of increase in the voting participation of middle income group and 
about 10%) of increase in the higher income group 
In the group III, urban Muslims with education above high school 
and age between 36-50 years were considered across high, middle and 
low income groups. VP was remained higher when education was high 
and income group was of middle category. 
In the group IV of urban Muslims with education above high 
school and age above 50 years in urban area, the results show a high 
voting percentage (VP) of 44%) for middle income group and lower 
voting percentage (VP) of 39%) for high income group and 40% of voting 
percentage for lower income group. 
An examination of political information index (PII) of urban 
males across high, middle and low income groups in four different 
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groups. The low income Muslims of group I had PII of 39%, which was 
lowest when we compare it with Middle and higher income Muslims. 
The middle income category presents a consistently increasing 
trend of 47% in the Group II and 49% in Group III, but the lower and the 
higher income category Muslims show a fluctuating trend, However, the 
Muslims of group IV, reversed the trend of previous three groups. In the 
Group IV the low income group Muslims, showed highest PII. 
The level of political trust (FT) among the Muslims of U.P 
showed a changing trend of increasing confidence on the government and 
political representatives of their respective constituency. As the income 
levels of Muslims living in the urban area, increased the political trust 
among them showed a positive effect. In the 1^ ' group the percentage of 
political trust (PT) for low income group was 32%, for the middle income 
category was 49% and for the high income was 53%, it presents a 
consistently increasing pattern. 
In the group II, III and IV the trend of political trust was almost 
similar to that of group I. This showed that with increase in Income of the 
people the political trust also increased. 
After investigating the level of attitude towards system, it was 
found that in the group I of Muslims, as the income level of Muslims 
increased from lower to high, their attitude towards system as well 
became more and more positive. 
The group II and group III of Muslims as well showed the 
similar pattern as that of the group I. The increase in the level of income 
led to the increase in the attitude towards system of the urban Muslims of 
U.P. 
In the IV group the trend changed. It showed increase in ATS as 
the income category of Muslims increased from lower to middle, but then 
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the attitude towards system shows a steep fall of 7 percentage point in the 
high income group. 
Investigation of the level of political efficacy of Muslims of 
group I showed steep rise from 30 percentage point to 44 percentage for 
the Muslims of middle income category. 
The 11 group Muslims as well showed the similar pattern as that 
of the first. In the III group the pattern of political efficacy (PE) remained 
similar to that of group I and group II. It showed that the increase in the 
level of income leads to increase in the political efficacy of the urban 
Muslims of U.P. In the group IV as well a similar pattern was found 
wherein with the increase in the level of income, the political efficacy of 
the Muslims increased as well. 
After examining the level of mass media exposure (MME) of 
Muslims, it was found that in the group I of Muslims, as the income level 
of Muslims increased from lower to higher, their mass media exposure as 
well became more and more positive. 
The group II of Muslims as well showed the similar pattern as 
that of the first. The increase in the level of income led to the increase in 
the mass media exposure (MME) of the Muslims of U.P. 
In the group III of Muslims, as the level of income increased the 
MME showed a steep rise of 17 percentage point from 33% to 50% as the 
income level rose from lower to middle. But for the higher income 
category, the level of MME fell to 1 percentage point from 50% to 49%) 
which is insignificant. 
In group IV as well a similar pattern was found wherein with the 
increase in the level of income from lower to the middle income category 
leads to steep rise in the MME from 39% to 46.5%. 
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After analyzing the level of mobilization (M) of urban Muslims, 
it was found in group I that as the income level of Muslims increased 
from lower to higher, their mobilization became more and more negative. 
The group II Muslims as well showed the similar pattern as that of 
the first. The lower income category of Muslims had the mobilization 
participation of 55% which reduced to 40% point as the level of income 
increased to the high income group. 
In the group III, as the level of income increased the mobilization 
reduced to 45% for the high income category from 59%) for the low 
income category. The group IV of Muslims as well showed a similar 
pattern of increasing mobilization level except for the high group of 
Muslims where the total mobilization level remained stable at 45%) mark. 
The pattern that is found is that with increase in age, and income level 
the level of mobilization also increased. 
Rural Muslims were studied in second phase on similar seven 
dimensions of political behaviour. Voting participation of rural male 
Muslims of group I showed that the Muslims of lower income group had 
a higher voting participation (61.5%) than the middle (50%)) and high 
income category (59.5%) of rural Muslims of U.P. It indicated that the 
level of income plays positive role for those Muslims who are in low and 
high income categories. On examining the group II it was found that the 
lower income category of Muslims had a higher voting percentage (64%o) 
than the middle (45.5%) and high income (49.5%)) category. On 
examining the group III it was found that the lower income group of 
Muslims had higher voting participation of 66% and the middle and the 
higher income category had 38% and 45%) of voting participation 
respectively. 
13 
Political information index (PII) of rural male Muslims in group I 
showed that low and high income groups had 61% and 62% of political 
information index (PII) respectively and 40%) of political information 
index (PII) for the Muslims in the middle income category. In group II of 
rural Muslim male, it was found that the higher and the lower income 
category showed higher political information index (PII) of 56%) and 
64%, however unlike group I, in this group the lower income group had 
highest 64% Political Information Index than those of higher income 
group unlike the case in group I.On examining the group III consisted it 
was found that it represented the trend of previous group wherein the low 
income category of Muslims had 59%) of PII which was 16% point more 
than those rural Muslims who were in the higher income category of 
43%. 
On examining the group I on attitude towards system, it 
was found that the high income category of Muslims showed 50%) of 
ATS, 31% for middle and 37% for low income category. The attitude 
towards system (ATS) in group II was lowest among low income group 
unlike the first group wherein it was the middle income category of 
Muslims in rural area that showed the lowest ATS. The group III of 
Muslims with education above high school and age from 36 to 50 showed 
similar trend as that of group I. 
On political trust (PT) among rural Muslims, it was found that 
low and middle income groups had 46%o and 38%o of political trust 
respectively and 57.5% of political trust for the Muslims in the high 
income category. In group II of rural Muslim males it was found that the 
high and the low income category showed higher political trust (PT) of 
54% and 50%, and like group I, in this group also the high income group 
had highest 54% Political Trust. The group III represented the trend of II 
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group wherein the high income category of Muslims had 58% of PT 
which was 24% point more than those rural Muslims who were in the 
middle income category. 
Political efficacy of rural Muslims in the low and the high 
income category was same at 40% point where as the political efficacy of 
middle income category of Muslims was at 25%). The group II also 
sliowed the similar pattern as that of the group I. In group III the low 
income category of Muslims had higher PE of 46%). And as we move 
from the low income to the middle income category, we noticed that the 
PE fell from 46% point to 30% point, but it increased to 38% from 30% 
as we move from middle income category to high income category. 
. It was found that low income category of Muslims had mass 
media exposure of 26%, which increased to 27% as we move from low 
to middle income group. The level of mass media exposure (MME) 
increased to 30% as we move from middle income to high income 
category. In the group II the low income category of Muslims had mass 
media exposure of 20%, the middle income category had MME of 25%) 
and the high income group had the MME of 28%). In the group III the 
level of mass media exposure increased with increase in the level of 
income. 
In group II the Muslims of low income category had 
mobilization level of 60 %. The group II as well had a similar trend in 
the level of mobilization as that of the group I, the Muslims of low 
income category had a mobilization level of 59%, the Muslims of middle 
income category had a mobilization level of 64%o and the high income 
category of Muslims had 55% of level of mobilization. The group III 
exhibited almost similar patterns and trend. As we move from low 
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income category to the high income category, we found that the level of 
mobilization also increased. 
In the third phase both urban and rural Muslims are compared to 
study party affiliation, voting preference and opinion decider aspect of 
political behaviour. An examination of party affiliation of rural and 
urban Muslims in the state of Uttar Pradesh showed that the Muslims 
with the level of education up to high school, whether living in urban or 
rural centers, had a strong predilection for Samajwadi Party (SP) as 46% 
urban and 61% rural Muslims supported it. The support for Bahujan 
Samajwadi Party (BSP) in both the areas-urban as well as rural- was 
almost '/4 of the total population, but the Muslim supporters for Congress 
Party were more than double in the urban areas than in the rural ones. 
In the group II the support for both SP and Congress was 
reduced and BSP was the real gainer. In group III the rural support of the 
Muslims for the Samajwadi Party (SP) marginally increased from 58% to 
60%. It seemed that this group of Muslims who were in the age group 
from 36 to 50 years, had a special liking for Congress party as in both the 
urban and the rural areas the support base for the Congress Party 
increased. 
Group IV consisted of Samajwadi Party (SP) supporter- in both 
the urban and the rural areas. So far as income groups were concerned, 
in both low and the middle groups, the majority of Muslims were 
Samajwadi Party (SP) supporters in first choice and the Bahujan 
Samajwadi Party (BSP) supporters in the Second choice. However the 
trend and pattern of party affiliation for those Muslims who were in the 
high income groups were more prone towards Congress. 
Voting preference (V.Pre.) among the Muslims in both the rural 
and the urban areas showed that in education, both the groups showed 
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preference for party than candidate. In the two divisions of age groups, it 
was found that most of the Muslims preferred 'party' than 'candidate' 
while voting in parliamentary and assembly elections. In the income 
category, the majority of Muslims in low income group, consisting of 
84% in the urban area supported 'party'. In the middle income category, 
it was found that 79% of Muslims living in urban area supported 'party', 
in comparison to those Muslims living in the rural area. 
After examining the role that various factors like family members, 
friends, caste groups, co-workers, and spouse play in shaping the opinion 
of the Muslim voters in the urban and the rural areas. It was found that 
friends, caste and co-workers play a significant and decisive role in the 
decision making of both the rural and urban Muslims. The role of family 
members was contributive in decision making of Muslims in urban area 
but not so in the rural area. With regard to the spouses it was found that in 
the urban area, their opinion has some role, however in the rural area, the 
role of spouse in decision making is negligible. 
Last part of the thesis incorporates suggestions along with 
conclusion of the present research. These suggestions may help the future 
researchers to carry on their research on similar topics with certain other 
aspects included, that may yield better results. 
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PREFACE 
The present study is planned to explore the Changing Patterns of 
Political Behaviour of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh since 1991. In it the 
researcher studied the different dimensions of political behaviour of 
Muslims. 
Political behaviour refers to any form of individual or collective 
involvement in the political process, or any activity for that matter that 
has political consequences in relation to government and its policies. 
Political behaviour is defined in this research not in the narrow sense of 
voting behaviour only. The term has been used here with broader 
implications including any behavioural activities such as working in 
campaign activities, discussing politics, contacting public officials etc. 
The emphasis of the present research was on the role and place of the 
Muslim in the India political system as demonstrated by the nature of 
their political activities. Hence, the present study is planned to understand 
the determiners of political behaviour of Muslims in U.P since 1991; The 
relevance of the year 1991 is to my humble view needs to be defined. In 
the national and the politics of Uttar Pradesh the year is significant as it 
was the watershed year that marked a quantum shift in the nature of 
Nations political psyche especially for the Muslims. It was the year just 
before the black day of - Babri-Masjid demolition- in which the secular 
credentials of the Indian nationhood was severely tested. It was also 
significant in the sense that the Hindu extremism in the form Mr.Advani's 
rath yatra and the Ram Janambhomi movement transformed the Indian 
political scenario. 
The whole research work has been divided into six different 
chapters. The first chapter of the thesis incorporates the geographical and 
ecological profile of the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh. It deals with the 
IX 
geographical features, climatic conditions, morphology of physical terrain 
of Uttar Pradesh, and demographical growth of Muslims, their ethnic and 
linguistic composition, their educational aspects. The historical growth of 
the present state of Uttar Pradesh and the historical background of 
Muslims since the inception of the state is also delineated upon. It also 
includes the economic conditions of Muslims and the rise of political 
consciousness among them after the independence of the country. It an 
accepted fact, that the growth and the progress of a country is consequent 
upon the overall growth of its citizens. The concept of inclusive growth 
includes in its fold, both the majority and the minority communities living 
in the country. The Muslims are a minority community in India and in the 
state of Uttar Pradesh. It becomes incumbent upon the state to make its 
minorities feel secure and protected. It keeps the minorities away from 
the feeling of alienation, and makes them politically active and to 
contribute in the wholesome growth of the nation. This holds true for the 
Muslims as well. 
The second chapter of the thesis discusses the conceptual 
framework of the political behaviour. It also includes discussion about the 
different cultural orientations, different approaches to the study of 
political behaviour, and various factors influencing the changes in the 
trends of political participation. 
The review of literature included in third chapter, is on the 
influence of various factors on political behaviour of Muslims. 
Methodological details of the thesis are also discussed in this chapter. In 
the methodology of thesis, a sample of 1200 Muslims was drawn 
randomly from the different parts of the state. In all 840 males were 
sampled, out of which 480 males were taken from urban areas and 360 
from rural areas. Similarly, 360 females were interviewed, out of which 
240 were in urban centers and 120 were from rural areas. 
To measure the political behaviour of Muslims, a questionnaire 
used by the Centre for Studies in Developing Societies (CSDS) in various 
pre-Poll and post-Poll surveys was used by the researcher. It contains 66 
questions and in all measured 17 dimensions of political behaviour. It 
also evaluates cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of the 
respondents. 
Data, thus, obtained from different groups of Muslims were 
analyzed in two phases on the bases of socio-economic variables like-
region, sex, education, age and income. In the first phase percentages of 
all the dimensions were calculated. In the second phase, Bar diagrams 
were made on the SPSS package. 
In the fourth chapter of the thesis, the results and its discussions 
are incorporated. This chapter deals with five different aspects of socio-
economic status. It includes- urban -rural difference, education, level of 
income, age and sex difference that influences the political activities 
among Muslims. In the analysis it is found that the rural Muslims are 
more politically active then their urban counterparts. Educational and 
income difference are found to be a crucial factors in decision making. 
The role of sex and age in political involvement was also decisive. 
When Muslim voters are compared on the basis of sex it is found 
that female political activity rates remain well below than those of their 
male counterparts. The results on education showed a curvilinear 
relationship i.e. turnout rises with rise in the level of literacy but 
decreases with a further rise in the level of education. The relationship 
between education and involvement in political activities holds a positive 
relation for such activities as taking interest in political matters, 
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discussing politics but not for such activities as voting or attending public 
meetings. 
Age as a socio-economic variable of political behaviour is very 
significantly related with political involvement. It is found that as people 
grow old, they vote in greater number because of their faith in system 
which they come to identify with as they grow old. Advancing age is also 
positively related with mobilization to attending meetings, contacting 
officials to influencing decisions. 
If we compare the voting participation of lower, middle and 
higher income groups of Muslims, it was found that beyond a threshold 
impact, the rise in the level of income is not significantly related to voting 
participation in urban area, however, in the rural area voting pattern 
shows a negative correlation with the income level. 
In fifth chapter various dimensions of the political behaviour of 
Muslims of Uttar Pradesh are brought to fore. Every political system is 
embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political actions. And 
Sidney Verba has classified these 'politically relevant orientations' as 
being of three type: "cognitive, evaluative, and expressive." To these 
writers these orientations comprise the 'political culture'. A society has a 
set of beliefs and behaviours towards political objects which are learned 
and shared. Individuals presumably have attitudes and beliefs about the 
actual nature of values and goals they prefer for the political system. To 
measure these three political orientations of Muslims different types of 
questions are asked. 
Cognitive orientation is a very potent determinant of Political 
behaviour in which dimensions like -political information index (PII), 
issue and problem awareness (IPA), political interest (PI) and symbol and 
heritage awareness (SHA) are included, cognitive orientation of urban 
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Muslims are higher than rural Muslims. Since urban people are more 
literate as compared to rural people, and their exposure to mass media in 
urban centers are more than that of rural ones, so PII of urban Muslim is 
higher than rural Muslims. 
Another dimension measuring cognitive orientation and which is 
directly influenced and determined by the level of education is symbol 
and heritage awareness (SHA). The urban Muslims have higher SHA. 
Nevertheless, the rural Muslims have high issue and problem awareness 
(IPA) and high level of political interest (PI) as compared to issue and 
problem awareness (IPA) and political interest (PI) of urban Muslims. 
To measure effective orientation another set of four dimensions 
like- attitude towards system (ATS), attitude towards candidate (ATC), 
political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) are measured in both urban 
and rural areas. The urban Muslims have more positive and supportive 
attitude towards the democratic system of representation and governance 
as compared to rural Muslims. The increase in urban area could be due to 
the positive and more visible fruits of system in the form of better 
development and availability of economic opportunities. 
In the second dimension of evaluative orientation i.e. attitude 
towards candidate (ATC), rural Muslims seem to take special and 
personal interest in contrast to urban Muslims. It shows that rural 
Muslims have more positive attitude towards candidate and take the 
capability of candidate to perform into reckoning while making voting 
decision. 
The political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) both show leaning 
towards higher side. The political efficacy is same in both rural and urban 
areas, but the political trust among the rural Muslims is much higher than 
XUl 
those of urban Muslims. Which shows a strong commitment of Muslims 
vis-a-vis democratic institutions. 
The third type of orientation concerns the extent of 'attention' to 
political matters. For the measurement of affective orientation, four 
dimensions namely, voting participation (VP), campaign participation 
(CP), communal activity (CA), political activity (PA) among the Muslims 
residing in urban and rural centers are investigated. The rural Muslims 
showed higher level of affective orientation than that of urban Muslims. 
Rural Muslims look politically awake as their overall affective orientation 
is high. Urban Muslims show less interest in campaigning and communal 
activities than that of rural populace. This could be due to the life-style of 
urban people who remain less interested in affairs of others. 
In Chapter VI the political behaviour of Muslims has been 
studied in three phases. In the first phase urban Muslims are examined to 
fmd political behaviour on seven dimensions- voting participation, 
political information index, political trust, attitude towards system, 
political efficacy, mass media exposure and mobilization. Rural Muslims 
are studied in second phase on similar seven dimensions of political 
behaviour. In the third phase both urban and rural Muslims are compared 
to study party affiliation, voting preference and opinion decider aspect of 
political behaviour. 
CHAPTER I 
CHAPTER I 
GEOGRAPHICAL AND ECOLOGICAL PROFILE 
Uttar Pradesh with land mass of 238,566 sq. km is the fifth 
largest state of the Republic of India .It is located in Central South Asia, 
in Northern India, between 23 52N to 31 28N latitudes and 77 3E to 84 
39E longitudes. It shares an international border with Nepal in the north 
and is bounded by the Indian states of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, 
Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand and 
Bihar from west to east. 
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Uttar Pradesh can be divided into two distinct Hypsographical 
regions: 
1. The Gangetic Plain in tJie centre ~ Highly fertile, alluvial soils. 
Flat topography broken by numerous ponds, lakes and rivers slope 
2m/km. 
2. The Vindhya Hills and Plateau in the south ~ Hard rock strata. 
Varied topography of hills, plains, valleys and plateau, limited water 
availability. The climate is generally tropical monsoon, but variations 
exist due to difference in altitudes. As can be seen from the physical 
features in the map: 
Gangetic Plain: 
It stretches across the entire length of the state from east to west 
.The entire alluvial plain can be divided into three sub regions. The 
eastern tract consisting of 14 districts are subjected to periodical floods 
and droughts and have been classified as scarcity areas. These districts 
have highest density of population which gives the lowest per capital 
land. The other two regions: - the central and the western are 
comparatively better with a well developed irrigation system, they suffer 
from water logging and large scale user tracts. 
The Gangetic plain is watered by the Yamuna, the Ganga and its 
major tributaries —the Ramganga, the Gomati, the Ghaghra and Gandak 
which bring along with it alluvial deposits from the Himalayas. Most of 
this area is a featureless, though fertile, plain varying in elevation from 
about 1000 feet in the northwest to 190 feet in the extreme east. The chief 
crop cultivated here are rice, wheat, millets, gram, barley. Sugar cane is 
the chief cash crop of the region. 
The Vindhya Hills and Plateau in the South: 
It is southern fringe of the Gangetic plane mainly consists of four 
districts: Jhasi, Jalaun, Banda and Hamirpur in Bundelkhand division, 
Mopa and Karchhana tehsils of Allahabad district, and the whole of 
Mirzapur district south of Ganga and Chakia tehsil of Varanasi district. 
The ground is strong with low hills which rise generally toward the 
southeast. The elevation of this region rarely exceeds 1000 feet. The 
Betwa and Ken rivers join the Jamuna from the south west in this region. 
It has four distinct kinds of soil, two of which are agriculturally difficult 
to manage. They are black cotton soil. Rainfall is scanty and erratic and 
water resources are scare. Dry farming is practiced on a large scale . 
Climate; 
The climate of Uttar Pradesh varies from moderately temperate to 
tropical monsoon in the central plains and southern upland region. In the 
plains, the average temperature varies from 12.5 C to 17.5 C in January to 
27.5C to32.5 C in May and June. The highest temperature recorded in the 
state was 49.9 C at Gonda on May 8, 1958^ 
Rainfall: 
It ranges from 40-80 inches in the east and from 24-40 inches in the 
west of Uttar Pradesh, and about 90% of rainfall occurs during south-west 
monsoon, lasting about June to Sept. with mist of the rainfall 
concentrated during these four months, floods are a recurring problems 
and causes heavy damage to crops, life, and property, particularly in the 
eastern part of the state. Periodic failure of monsoons results in draught 
conditions and crop failure . 
Morphology: 
Forests are generally concentrated in the Himalayan region, the sub 
mountain region and the southern uplands. In the Himalayan region, 
common species of trees include silver fir, spruce, deodar, and pine. 
Tropical deciduous forests of sal and tall grasses are abundant in the sub 
mountain region. The forests of the southern uplands consist mostly of 
scrub. Owing to variegated topography and climate, the sub mountain 
region of the state is rich in animal life. In this region tigers, leopards, 
elephants, wild boars, sloth bears and crocodiles as well as pigeons, 
doves, wild ducks, partridge, pea fowls, blue joys, quails and 
woodpeckers. Several species such as lions from the Gangetic plain and 
rhinoceros from the Tarai region have become extinct^ . 
Demography: 
Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state in India, even after losing 
Uttarakhand, with an estimated population of 186.7 million as of 2007 
and a Land area of 238,566 sq. km. One-sixth of the world's population 
lives in India and one-sixth of India's population lives in U.P. The 
population density of the state is 783 persons per km with Gangetic plain 
supporting over 70% of the state's population having an average of more 
than 1000 person / sq. miles, in contrast to southern uplands where 
density of population is less than half of those in plains . 
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Figure: 1.2 
Trend in Growth: 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the population of U.P was 
only 49 million and increased very slowly until 1951 (0.52% per annum) 
to reach 63 million. This was the period marked by high birth and death 
rates. The population increased rapidly in the next five decades due to a 
faster decline in the death rate compared to the birth rate. The population 
of the state increased fi-om 63 million in 1951 to about 166 million in 
2001 and 186.7 million by 2007^ 
An addition of 103 million in the last five decades compared to an 
addition of only 15 million in the previous five decades. The population 
is increasing at 2,19% per year (SRS-1998)*. This implies that the state at 
present is adding a population of 3.8 million every year and more than 11 
million every three years. The percentage of Muslim population to total 
population of the state is higher (15.9% in 1981 and 17.3% in 1991) as 
compared to percentage of the Muslims in total population of the country 
(11.4% in 1981 and 12.1% in 1991). Even the decadal growth rate of 
population among Muslims had been higher than Hindus. During 1981-91 
it was 23.1% for Hindus and 36.5% for Muslims^. As can be seen from 
the following table: 
Table: 1.1 
Population Growth rate - Hindus / Muslims- in U.P. 
Indicators 
Population: 1981 
1991 
Percentage of total population 
1981 
1991 
Percentage Decadal Growth rate 
1971-81 
1981-91 
INDIA 
Percentage Decadal Growth rate 
For the total population 
1971-81 
1981-91 
Hindus 
92,365,968 
113,712,829 
\ 
83.3 
81.7 
24.8 
23.1 
25.5 
25.5 
Muslims 
17,657,735 
24,109,684 
15.9 
17.3 
29.1 
36.5 
Source: Directorate of census operation, U.P. Census of India -1991. 
Ethnic and Linguistic Composition: 
The vast majority of the population belongs to the Aryo-Dravidian 
ethnic group. Hindus constitute more than 80% of population. Muslims 
are 18.5% (census of India, 2001)^ ° and other religious communities-
including Sikhs, Christians, Jains and Buddhists - together less than 1 
percent. Hindi is the official language of the state and Hindustani, the 
spoken language of the people. Urdu is the mother tongue of 18.5%) of 
Muslim population. Majority of which (between 25% to 50%) resides in 
12 Districts, namely, Rampur (49.14%), Moradabad (45.54%)), Bijnor 
(41.7%), Amroha (39.38%), 
Saharanpur(39.11 %),Muzaffamagar(39.09%),Balrampur(36.72%)Bahraic 
h(34.83%),BareilIy(33.89%),Meerut(32.55%),Siddharthnagar(29.43%),S 
hrawasti(25.60%)etc.(census of India, 2001)^\lf we look at percentage of 
Muslim voters in various assembly constituencies in the state .Following 
table is compiled in descending order : 
TabIe:1.2Percentage of Muslim Voters Lok and Vidhan Sabha Const. 
Constituencies 
(Vidhan sabha) 
Rampur 
Suar Tanda 
Amroha 
Sambhal 
Moradabad 
Tiloi 
Bijnor 
Moradabad Rural 
Thakurdwara 
% of Muslim 
Voters 
64.79 
56.89 
55.80 
55.43 
50.88 
50.78 
46.99 
46.69 
45.97 
Constituencies 
(Lok Sabha) 
Rampur 
Moradabad 
Saharanpur 
Amroha 
Meerut 
Kairana 
Bareilly 
Balrampur 
Sambhal 
% of Muslim 
Voters 
42 
40 
38 
37 
30 
29 
28 
28 
27 
Constituencies 
(Vidhan sabha) 
Moradabad West 
Kundarki 
Utraula 
Meerut 
Baheri 
Aligarh 
Afzalgarh 
Varanasi Cantt 
Bahjoi 
Kawar 
Bhojipura 
Muzaffarabad 
Seohara 
Bareilly Cantt 
Deoband 
Dhampur 
Domariaganj 
Kanth 
Etawa 
Khandhla 
Chandpur 
Bahraich 
Mujehna 
Mau 
Nanpara 
% of Muslim 
Voters 
45.92 
45.01 
44.83 
44.72 
44.09 
41.70 
41.60 
41.25 
41.21 
41.02 
39.89 
39.76 
39.43 
37.89 
37.71 
37.67 
37.60 
37.37 
37.20 
36.99 
36.93 
36.21 
36.19 
35.68 
35.40 
Constituencies 
(Lok Sabha) 
Padrauna 
Muzaffamagar 
Domariaganj 
Lucknow 
Kaiserganj 
Bahraich 
Saharanpur 
Hapur 
khalilabad 
% of Muslim 
Voters 
27 
27 
26 
23 
23 
23 
21 
21 
20 
Constituencies 
(Vidhan sabha) 
Saharanpur 
Hasanpur 
Muzaffamagar 
Thana Bhawan 
Shahjahanpur 
Khatauli 
Usehat 
Bilaspur 
Charda (sc) 
Nawabganj 
Pilibhit 
Garhmuktishwar 
Kaiserganj 
Badaun 
% of Muslim 
Voters 
34.50 
34.09 
34.03 
33.48 
32.74 
32.27 
31.91 
31.80 
31.78 
31.73 
31.68 
30.94 
30.92 
30.63 
Source: Political Representation of Muslims in India, Iqbai A.Ansari. 
UTTAR PRADESH ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCIES 
10 
PUNJABIJI^ 
vO 
*»w-v,v^ 2 
3 ^ 
HARYANA L 
' 385*1 
^^ ATlONAIxJ 
RAJASTHAN 
3 P l^ 
& 
yv^v 
^ T S K 
kL PRADESH ^ 
^TTARANCHALr 
^ i t V H 
^ H l 
MADHYA PRADESH ArW^^A,^ 
} 244 / 
JflH>VmSGARH 
e ^ 
^ f e BIHAR 
JHARKHAND 
UWESTBENGAli 
N 
Total Seats 403 
S 
GEN 313 
• SC 90 
Copyright (c) Election Commission of India 
Figure: 1.3 
11 
UTTAR PRADESH PARLIAMENTARY CONSHTUENCiES 
^ I M & H A U PR^ESH 
/ * ( 
I "9 r \ 
\77 r_^ r 
^~\.Av J '^' 
773*% 
\ ,y}'^ 72 
RAJAS THAN 5 ^ * ^ " " ^ 
^ 
d 
1 
2 / 
1 ' 
>4l i , 
« j 
\ " 
UTT/«ANCHAL /^ 
' V 
6 
A-^ V ' T ^N^ 
v_' J ^ i C ^^  VW 
~x V* * 1 ^>~.^'V^ t \^^^^^~"^ 
» ^ - ^ A^-^54 | X ^ a ' T r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
MSiDHYAPRADESH ^ ^ 
"X ^ r ? ^ 
^ r « 
y CHHATTISOARH 
•^35 rS ) 
»v-^^ i l^^ I —^ 
34 C ^ ^ 
f ' t * ( r x . 
/ BIHAR 
/ N JHARKHAND 
Total Seats 80 
I I GEN 63 
I |SC 17 
Copyright (c) Election Commission of India 
Figure: 1.4 
12 
Education: 
According to census report 2001 '^^ , out of total population of 166 
million only 57.36% were literate. Male literacy was 70.23% and female 
42.98 percent. The differential between female and male literacy is very 
high. Among Muslims, it is even worse; the total literacy rate is 47.8%). 
Out of which 57.3%o are male and 37.47%) are female, these figures are 
irrespective of the fact that the state boasts of 20 universities, more than 
400 affiliated colleges a number of medical colleges and several institutes 
for specialized studies and research. The scenario for Muslims in 
education is bleak and below average, to say the least. To know the 
reason, It would be pertinent to trace the genesis. 
After the revolt of 1857, Muslims had to contend with the hostility 
of the rulers towards them as well as their own obscurantist attitude to the 
demands of changing times. Sir Sayyid had to struggle hard to overcome 
both. After Independence of India and subsequent Partifion in 1947, the 
period of honeymoon for Muslims, in which their direct confi-ontation 
with Hindus was cushioned by the British as balancer between the two 
communities was over. The situation in the post Partifion India had gone 
drastic metamorphosis, with Hindus at the helm of the state affairs and 
Muslims playing the second fiddle. Though India declared itself a secular 
republic, Muslims had to rely upon the goodwill of the Hindus and in 
practice did not benefit much. Successive governments have failed to 
bring them anywhere near close to Hindus in Education. Owing to 
secularism as state policy, India's census report did not feature 
community wise data, with a result that that there has been a complete 
black-out. 
It was the High Power Panel for Minorities appointed by the 
government of India in 1984 under Dr. Gopal Singh '^' as Chairman that 
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brought to light the extent of Muslim backwardness in education. It 
revealed the following facts: 
Table: 1.3 Education among Muslims and S.C. 
INDICATORS 
a) Enrolment- primary school 
b) Percent of child population 
c) Drop out rate-secondary level 
d) Class X- total % appeared 
e) Pass-percentage 
f) Class xii- % appeared 
g) Graduation % appeared 
h) Pass- percentage 
i) P.G. % appeared 
j) Pass percentage 
Professional degrees 
B.E. 
LL.B 
B.ED 
M.B.B.S 
% MUSLIMS 
12.39 
16.81 
65 
16 
04 
2.49 
6.21 
51.22 
9.11 
75.8 
3.41 
5.36 
45 
low 
% S.C. 
12.50 
20 
67 
7.39 
6.76 
6.91 
35.01 
7.64 
69.83 
14.40 
11.29 
In U.P. 
(a) Success rate of Muslim candidates in B.Sc (Engg) and B.E.- 05 out of 
202. 
(b) P.G.exam for M.A., M.Sc, and M.Com - 830 out of 4688. 
(c) Sevanti Nivan of the 'Express News Service' conducted a survey of 
educational backwardness in the three communally sensitive towns in 
U.P.- Moradabad, Aligarh and Sambhal. 
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She found that -
- The poverty of parents kept the children away from school. 
- Children were made to work to augment family income. 
- Education discouraged as - no guarantee of employment. 
-Government apathy and indifference main cause of educational 
backwardness. 
(d) Prof. Qamar Hasan and M.N.Khan^^  of A.M.U.- did a comparative 
study of the educational and vocational intentions of the Hindu and 
Muslim students on the verge of completing schooling in Aligarh . They 
found-
Table: 1.4 Dropouts of Muslims and Hindus 
CLASS 
MUSLIM 
HINDU 
DROPOUT 
Boys girls 
4.5% 5.7% 
nil nil 
All these studies show that Muslims were unable to take advantage 
of the educational facilities provided by private, local or govt, institutions 
due to acute poverty. 
Historical and Political Background: 
The boundaries of the modem state of U.P. date only from the late 
19"^  century when the British created the united province from the former 
princedom of Oudh or Awadh, and the British province of Agra. It was 
named Uttar Pradesh, 'Uttar' means 'north' and 'Pradesh' means 'state or 
region', after the independence of India in 1947. 
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Pre-History (up to 600 B.C.) 
The earliest recorded name of Uttar Pradesh is Aryavarta or the 
abode of the Aryans. Other ancient names for the region were the Brahma 
Fishi Deshi, the land of sages and saints, and the Madhya Desh, the 
midlands. During Excavations in Bolan valley in Mirzapur district in U.P. 
evidence of early human presence is indicated . Effect of Harrapan 
culture can be seen in Lai Quila in Bulandshahr district in western U.P. 
and Alamgirpur and Hulas in western Uttar Pradesh. Materials from 
excavation in Atranji Khera near Aligarh, show that at the end of the 2nd 
millennium B.C. there were many settlements where inhabitants lived in 
comfortable condition^ .^ The region was inhabited by agricultural people 
who were called Dasas by the Aryans who moved into this area about 
2000 BC and laid the foundation of a Hindu religion. It was in this 
ancient Panchala country, that the great war of the Mahabharata between 
the kaurava and Pandavas was fought, and the Ramayana, the 
Brahamanas and the Puranas were written. 
The Buddhist-Hindu (Brahmanic) Period 
(600BC TO 1200AD) 
Around 6th century B.C. besides the Kurus and the Panchalas, the 
Vatsas, the kosis, the hosalas, the videhas etc. formed the early region of 
U.P. The rule of Magadha Empire brought Buddhism and Jainism into the 
region. The Maury an rule under Ashoka unified the region. After the 
death of Ashoka, his sons split the kingdom. They were followed by a 
succession of petty kings, the most important of which were the Kushanas 
whose inscriptions were found in Mathura-their second capital- and 
Shravasti, Kaushambi and Varansi. On the ruins is the Kushan Empire 
arose Gupta Empire which originally arose from Uttar Pradesh and 
fanned out in different directions till the invasions of the Huns. After the 
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decline of Guptas, the Maukharis of Kannauj gained power. During the 
Harshavardhan period in the early 6* century AD, the region of U.P. was 
prosperous but soon after political chaos ensued as between 900 to 1000 
A.D. -thirty dynasties rose and fell in northern India alone. Amidst this 
confusion when the U.P. was dominated by Rajputs, Jats and other local 
chiefs. In 1016A.D. Mahmud of Ghazni laid his eyes on wealth of 
Kannauj. He was followed by Mohammad Gauri. 
Period from 1200A.D Till Indian Independence 
Movement; 
The period saw zenith and nadir of Muslim rulers of Delhi sultanate 
and the Mughals. In 1206 A.D. first Muslim rule was established in U.P. 
in the form of slave dynasty. There can be no gainsaying the fact that 
throughout the rule of Delhi sultanate and the Mughals, the region of 
Uttar Pradesh progressed. The cities like Agra and Fatepur Sikri became 
the capital city of The Great Akbar. His grandson, Shah Jahan, built one 
of the seven wonders of modem world - the Taj Mahal in Agra and 
several other architecturally important buildings in Delhi .The Mughal 
empire, centered in Uttar Pradesh, promoted the development of a new 
composite culture. The Emperor Akbar, the greatest exponent of 
composite culture, employed in his court men pre-eminent in architecture, 
literature, painting, and music, irrespective of their caste or creed. 
After the decline of the Mughals, a number of kingdoms arose: 
Oudh of the Nawabs, Rohilkhand of Afghans, Bundelkhand by the 
Marathas and Banaras by its own king. With the establishment of 
Lucknow by the Muslim Nawabs of Oudh in the 17th century, the centre 
of composite culture also shifted from Delhi to Lucknow. The area of 
present-day Uttar Pradesh was gradually acquired by the East India 
Company over a period of about 75 years .Territories wrested fi-om a 
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number of northern Indian dynasties- the Nawabs in 1775, 1798, and 
1801, the Sindias of Gwalior in 1803, and the Gurkas in 1816- were first 
placed within the Bengal Presidency, but in 1833 they were separated to 
form the North-Western Provinces (initially called the Agra Presidency). 
The icingdom of Avadh annexed by the company in 1856, was united 
with the North-Western Provinces inl877 under the name United 
Povinces of Agra and Oudh (with borders almost identical with present-
day Uttar Pradesh). 
These forceful annexations of various kingdoms one after another 
under one pretext or another by the company lead to the great mutiny and 
revolt in 1857-59 which was largely confined to the North-Western 
Privinces. Sparked by a mutiny of soldiers at Meerut on May 10, 1857, 
the revoh spread within months to more than 25 cities. In 1858, the revolt 
was ruthlessly crushed, and the administration of North-Westem 
Provinces along with the rest of the India was transferred to the British 
Crown. It undertook the major revamp and truncated the Delhi region and 
gave it to Punjab, and the Ajmar-Merwar region to Rajputana . 
The Rise of Political Consciousness: 
The introduction of English medium of Education in India, 
initiation of various social and religious reform movements within Hindu 
religion, Freedom of press in India and, inter alias, introduction of 
representative government through different 'Government of India Acts' 
especially after assumption of Indian administration by British Crown-
the Political awakening has begun among Hindus who were quick to 
adapt themselves according to changed conditions and soon advanced in 
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education, government jobs, business and economic prosperity from their 
Muslim brethren . 
The Wahabi Movement and the Revolt of 1857- which the British 
blamed principally on the Muslims- denied British patronage to Muslims 
and provoked the British's into adopting active policy of disfavoring 
Muslims from armed services, rejecting Arabic and the Persian language 
for administrative purposes and excluding Muslims from administrative 
posts, legal, medical and other professions. This developed deep 
resentment among Muslims against the new policy of the British 
Government and made them stay further aloof and cut off from modem 
education and national mainstream. As a result, when the Indian National 
Movement was gaining grounds with the United Province in the 
forefront, the Muslims were advised by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to stay 
away from it and concentrate upon acquiring modem education^ .^ 
By 1870, the British had started realizing the need to curb the rising 
tide of nationalism. They espoused the cause of Muslims and came out as 
'champion' of Muslims. In keeping with the age old policy of 'divide and 
rule' and to win over the loyalty of Muslim Zamindars, landlords and the 
newly educated, the British's patronized the Mohammedan Anglo-
oriental college of Sayyid Ahmed khan -thereby fostering not only just 
Muslim cultural renaissance but also encouraging the sense of Muslim 
separatism. Nevertheless, the British attempt to keep the growing Muslim 
Intelligentsia politically passive and loyalist was not wholly successfiil . 
Badruddin Tyyabji presided over the congress session in 1887, and 
the number of Muslim delegates to the congress increased in the 
succeeding years. Even in the North-west Provinces, Sir Syed's 
opposition did not prevail, and to the congress of 1888, held at Allahabad 
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in the teeth of official opposition these provinces sent more MusHms than 
several other provinces put together. 
The establishment of Muslim league in 1906 and Morley-Minto 
Reforms of 1909 were another attempt to misdirect Muslim political 
awakening into communal channel. But the younger Muslim nationalist 
intellectuals were soon dissatisfied with the loyalist, anti-Hindu and 
slavish mentality of the upper class leadership of the Muslim League. 
They were increasingly drawn to modem and radical nationalist ideas. 
The militantly nationlist Ahrar Movement was founded at this time under 
the leadership of Maulana Mohammed Ali, Hakim Ajmal BChan, Hasan 
Imam,Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Mazhar-ul-Haq. In this effort, they 
got support from a section of orthodox ulama especially those belonging 
to the Deoband School. Another orthodox scholar to be attracted to the 
national movement was the young Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who 
propagated his rationalist and nationalist ideas in his newspaper Al Hilal 
which he brought out in 1912 at the age of 24 years . 
After the intense struggle, the nationalist young Muslims came to 
the fore in the Muslim League and from 1912 to 1924 continued to 
overshadow the loyalist in the league which began to move nearer to the 
policies of the congress. It made its adherents anti-imperialist and it 
encouraged the nationalist trend among urban Muslims. The nationalist 
movement, Hindu-Muslim unity and role of Muslims in Indian national 
struggle reached a new height during the agitation against the Rowlatt 
Acts, the Khilafat and the Non Co-operation Movement. The bonhomie 
exchanged during the period between the two communities resulted in 
raising the nationalist and anti-imperialist consciousness of the Muslim 
middle classes and masses. 
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The Khilafat leaders like Mulana Mohammed All and Shaukat All 
supported Gandhiji in Non Co-operation movement, despite the 
intensified activities of communal parties and groups during the 1920s. 
The nationalist muslims like M.A.Ansari, LA.K.Sherwani, Syed Ahmed, 
Maulana Azad etc. who were part of the congress, still represented a 
major political force .The anti-Simon commission protest movement and 
then the second civil disobedience movement from 1930 to 1934 swept 
the entire nation and once again the role of muslims in national 
movement took new heights as the Jamiat-ul-ulama-i-Hind and the 
Kiiudai Khidmadgars and other organizations led thousands of Muslims 
into it. The first elections for the provincial legislative councils under 
the Government of India Act, 1935 were held in 1937. In U.P. the 
Congress party gained an absolute majority. The Muslim voters 
wholeheartedly, voted for the nationalist congress party . 
The Muslim League which purportedly represented Muslims did not 
do well even in the Muslim majority provinces securing 4.8% of the total 
Muslim votes. Even during elections of 1945-46, U.P. voted Congress to 
power. Thus, the trend of Muslim voting in U.P. had been towards the 
secular and nationalist Congress party. During Indian Independence 
Movement, Uttar Pradesh was central to the scheme of things in shaping 
it. Freedom fighters like Mangal Pandey , Chandrashekhar Azad, 
Ashfaqulla Khan, Ram Prasad Bismil, to name a few, gave the movement 
a vigour and life force . The stalwarts like Moti Lai Nehru, Purushottam 
Das Tondon, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Jawahar Lai Nehru, Maulana 
Azad etc gave the movement their sagacity and direction . 
In Eastern Uttar Pradesh, Baba Raghavdas aka 'Poorvanchal 
Gandhi' lit the flame of freedom movement. In Bundelkhand , the two 
Bundelkhand Gandhi's -Dewan Shatrughan Singh, and his wife Rani 
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Rajendra Kumari—led the freedom movement and, later Bhoodaan 
Movement in free India. In Hill areas of U.P. Gobind Vallabh Pant made 
the movement spread to every nook and cranny. These 'Regional 
Gandhi's' made a huge dent in the British rule with their missionary zeal. 
Political Background: After Independence 
The Political life of a new and free India began with an adoption of 
a new constitution, framed by the constituent assembly constituted on 
Dec 9, 1947. Under the provision of the new constitution the strength of 
the U.P. legislative council was fixed to be 72 and that of the assembly 
431. Elections were held to 430 assembly seats as one seat was reserved 
for nomination of an Anglo-Indian member. There were 347 
constituencies of which 264 were single members and 83 were double 
member. The form of Government is Parliamentary consisting of an 
executive, legislature and judicial branch. The 'Executive' consists of the 
Governor who is aided and advised by the council of ministers headed by 
a chief minister. The 'Legislature' consists of two houses: the Legislative 
Council (Vidhan Parishad), which is a permanent body with 1/3 of its 
members retiring every two years, and the Legislative Assembly (Vidhan 
Sabha) whose members are elected for a six years term (Five Years Term, 
44th Amendment, 1978). 
The 'Judiciary' consisted of a High Court, headed by a Chief 
Justice. The state's High Court is located at Allahabad but there is also a 
bench at Lucknow, the state capital. Below the state level there are 
administrative divisions as well as districts for local administration. The 
constitutional provision of state delimitation commission fixing 
boundaries of the state constituency in the light of decadenal census 
report, the number of seats and the number of constituency in Uttar 
Pradesh has undergone change over a period of time. Presently, Uttar 
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Pradesh has 70 districts which are grouped into 17 divisions. It has 404 
members in legislative assembly and 100 members in legislative council. 
It sends 80 members in Lok Sabha and 31 members in Rajya Sabha. The 
first session of the U.P. legislature under the new constitution began on 
Feb 2,1950 when Governor administer the oath to all members as 
required by the constitution .The Speaker of the House Sri P.D. Tandon 
and President of the council Sri Chandra Bal as well took oath in their 
respective chambers. 
An important legislative measure passed in 1950 was the U.P. 
Language (Bill and Acts, 1950) which provided that the language to be 
used in Bills and Acts shall be Hindi in Devanagri script .The year 1952 
opened with millions in India going to the polls to exercise the 
democratic right granted to them by the constitution of India to choose 
the state's legislators for the next five years. In the first ever assembly 
elections after independence, the Nehruvian idealism and promise of 
Secularism and Democracy strengthened the mass base of Indian 
National Congress (INC) which contested 429 seats and won 388 with 
47.93% of the voters overwhelmingly voted for the party. 
The INC nominated 41 Muslims, of whom 40 were elected; 
showing a clear preference for the party. In U.P. the dice of election was 
loaded in favors of INC till the fourth general election and till the 
presence of towering personality of Nehru on the national horizon, but 
with decreasing number of seats in every assembly elections since 1951. 
In the 1957, 1962 and 1967 the backward slide in winning number of 
seats continued except for marginal increase in 1969 and 1974 as can be 
seen in the table on next page-
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Table: 1.5 Performance of Congress and other Major Parties 
YEARS 
Total Seats 
Turn out % 
Congress(won) 
contested 
vote% 
BJS 
(won) 
BJP 
contested 
vote% 
BKD 
LKD 
BSP 
contested 
vote% 
JNP 
JD 
consted 
vote% 
1951 
430 
37.8 
388 
429 
47.9 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1957 
430 
44.7 
286 
430 
42.4 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1962 
430 
51.4 
249 
429 
36.3 
49 
-
377 
16.5 
-
-
-
-
-
1967 
425 
54.5 
199 
425 
32.2 
98 
-
401 
21.1 
-
-
-
-
-
1969 
425 
54.0 
211 
424 
33.7 
49 
-
397 
18 
98 
-
-
402 
21.29 
-
-
1974 1977 
424 425 
56.9 46.1 
215 47 
403 395 
32.2 31.9 
61 
-
401 -
17.1 
106 -
-
-
396 
21.22 
352 
-
422 
47.7 
1980 
425 
44.9 
309 
424 
37.6 
11 
-
400 
10.8 
-
-
-
59 
-
399 
21.5 
1985 
425 
45.6 
269 
425 
39.2 
-
16 
347 
9.8 
-
84 
-
385 
21.43 
-
20 
311 
5.6 
1989 
425 
51.4 
94 
410 
27.9 
-
57 
275 
11.6 
-
-
13 
372 
9.41 
-
208 
356 
29.7 
sources: CSDS Data unit. 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS;-
The First Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh led to the formation 
of Congress party govt, with Chief Minister Govind Vallabh Pant at its 
head. He was succeeded by Dr. Sampoornanand in 1954, when Govind 
Pant became Home Minister in Nehru Govt, in Centre. 
Dr.Sampoornanand was a university professor and classicist, and he 
remained in office till 1957.The Second elections brought Congress back 
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to power and with it Dr.Sampoomanand also became Chief Minister for 
the second time and remained in chair till 1960. After a short tenure of 
Shri Chandrabhanu Gupta lasting up to September, 1963, The Uttar 
Pradesh had its first Indian woman Chief Minister Smt. Sucheta ICripalani 
in October, 1963 until a two-month long strike by state employees in 
March, 1967 caused her to step down. 
The Fourth assembly elections in 1967 started an era of coaHtion 
politics in Uttar Pradesh. The confusion and chaos created by coalition 
politics ended only with the defection of Ch. Charan Singh from 
Congress with a small set of legislators. He set-up a party called the 'Jana 
Congress' which formed the first non-Congress Government in Uttar 
Pradesh and ruled for over a year. Fellow Socialist 'Hemveti Nandan 
Bahuguna' of the 'Bharatiya Lok Dal' was the Chief Minister for part of 
the 1970's and was dismissed as several other Non-Congress Chief 
Ministers till Shri Narain Dutt Tiwari became C.M.of Uttar Pradesh 
Government shortly after Emergency was declared by Congress led 
Indira Gandhi Government in the centre. 
In 1977Assembly Election, Congress Party lost heavily paving the 
way for Non-Congress Government in centre and state assemblies across 
the country. Nevertheless, In 1980 Congress Party roared back to power 
in centre and Uttar Pradesh assembly along with various other 
state assemblies, and Sri V.P. Singh became the chief minister of Uttar 
Pradesh. In 1985, assembly election Congress Party won 296 seats but 
that was far below the expectations especially keeping in view the 
Congress sympathy wave Post Indira Gandhi assassination. It was rightly 
believed, then, that the days of Congress domination was over. The 
subsequent elections post 1989 has proved the worst fears of 
congressmen correct. 
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Muslims in the Aftermath of Partition 
In the aftermath of Partition, the position of Muslims had been that 
of a defeated Germany in the First World War, who were exposed to 
insults and humiliations at every given opportunity. The people like 
Meher Chand Khanna, a minister in Nehru cabinet, Gobind Ballabh Pant, 
CM. of Uttar Pradesh, Mohanlal Sukhadia, C.M..of Rajasthan and Iron 
man of India, Sardar Patel, pushed out as many Muslims as they could, on 
one pretext or another . This was done through the 'Evacuee Property 
Law' (EPL). 
According to EPL, if the authorities suspected that a particular 
Muslim intended to go to Pakistan, his assets were taken over, a mere 
police report to the effect was sufficient to deprive him of all his movable 
and immovable belongings. Similarly, an Indian Muslim who had gone to 
Karachi, Lahore or Dacca, for instance, on the eve of Partition, a casual 
visit or to meet friends and could not return in time was promptly 
deprived of citizenship. The Indian Muslims were made to pay the prize 
for the Partition, and it had just begun^ '*. 
Meanwhile, the constituent assembly was busy fashioning the new 
constitution. On the question of separate electorate, the recommendations 
of the advisory committee on Minorities and fiindamental Rights were 
overhauled by Sardar Patel led sub-committee, this was another 
major price Indians Muslims had to pay. Subsequent elections -assembly 
and parliamentary- proved in no unequivocal terms that misgivings of 
Muslims on this account were true. Muslims were deprived of adequate 
representation, while Hindus showed no desire to accommodate them. 
The old hostility between the two communities persisted; it was reflected 
in almost every electoral contest .As shown in the table . 
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Table: 1.6 Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly 
Years 
1952 
1957 
1962 
1967 
1969 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1985 
1989 
Total 
Members 
430 
430 
430 
425 
425 
424 
425 
425 
425 
425 
Muslim 
Members 
41 
37 
30 
23 
23 
25 
49 
47 
49 
38 
Percentage 
9.53 
8.84 
6.98 
5.41 
5.41 
5.90 
11.53 
11.06 
11.53 
8.94 
Percentage in 
Population 
14.48 
14.28 
14.63 
14.63 
14.63 
15.48 
15.48 
15.48 
15.93 
15.93 
Expected 
61 
61 
63 
62 
62 
66 
66 
66 
68 
68 
Source: Jqbal A.Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India. 
Table: 1.7 Party-wise Muslim Members in U.P. Assembly 
1952 
INC 
SOC 
Total 
1957 
INC 
PSP 
IND 
Total 
40 
1 
41 
27 
2 
8 
37 
1962 
INC 
CPI 
RPL 
Total 
24 
3 
3 
30 
1967 
INC 
CPM 
SWA 
RPI 
SSP 
Total 
16 
1 
3 
2 
1 
23 
1969 
INC 9 
BKD 7 
SWA 2 
RPI 1 
SSP 1 
PSP 1 
IND 2 
Total 23 
27 
1974 
INC 15 
BKD 6 
NCO 1 
BJS 3 
Total 25 
1977 
INC 
JNP 
CPI 
IND 
Total 
6 
38 
1 
4 
49 
1980 
INC 29 
INCU 4 
JNPSC 10 
JNPSR 1 
CPI 1 
IND 2 
Total 47 
1985 
INCI 
CPM 
LKD 
IND 
JNP 
Total 
28 
1 
17 
1 
2 
49 
1989 
INCI 
CPI 
CPM 
BSP 
JD 
LKD 
IND 
Total 
10 
2 
1 
4 
18 
1 
2 
38 
Source: Iqbal A.Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India. 
In the first assembly elections in U.P. in 1952, the Muslims voted 
almost en bloc for the congress which was returned to power by an 
overwhelming majority. Despite the favourable atmosphere that the 
reaction to Gandhi's assassination had created for Hindu-Muslim amity, 
the number of Muslims elected to the Lok Sabha - out of 489 directly 
elected members, 21 Muslims got elected while their 9.91% share in the 
country's population should have ensured them 49 seats under the 
formula of reservation of seats on the basis of population that 'Draft 
Article 292' of the Indian Constitution had sought to guarantee. The 
Muslims thus suffered a deprivation of 57 % in the very first general 
elections to the Lok Sabha. In the 1952 U.P. assembly elections the 
picture was not any different - out of 430 total members, 41 Muslims got 
elected while 14.28% share in population should have ensured them 61 
seats. 
In the very first test, therefore, the claim made by the Hindu 
Nationalist during the freedom struggle that the abolition of separate 
electorate for the minorities would usher in a brand of non-communal 
political environment and that the provision of separate electorate for 
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Muslims in Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 led to the partition of the 
country-proved decisively wrong. The cause of Muslims under-
representation and deprivation, as the pattern of voter behavior revealed, 
was not the communalization of Hindu voters but the under nomination 
of candidates by the Political parties, especially by the Indian National 
Congress, which nominated 21 out of 479 candidates fielded by it for as 
many seats of the Lok Sabha and in U.P. Vidhan Sabha, it nominated 41 
out of 430 candidates. 
This under nomination got faithfully represented in under 
representation i.e. 4.29% in Lok Sabha and 9.53% in U.P. Assembly 
elections. The trend of under nomination and under representation started 
by congress party in formative years of Indian Republic continued 
unabated since then. Such under nomination constitute a serious breach of 
faith on the part of Indian National Congress to honour the solemn pledge 
given to Muslims . 
Table: 1.8 Muslim Representation in Lok Sabha- U.P. 
Year Seats % Muslim 
1952 
1957 
1962 
1967 
1971 
1977 
1980 
1984 
1989 
86 
86 
86 
85 
85 
85 
85 
85 
85 
14.28 
14.28 
14.63 
14.63 
15.48 
15.48 
15.48 
15.93 
15.93 
Expected 
12 
12 
12 
12 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
Nominated 
11 
12 
21 
23 
15 
24 
46 
34 
48 
Elected 
7 
6 
5 
5 
6 
10* 
18 
12 
8 
Independent 
nil 
nil 
nil 
nil 
nil 
nil 
nil 
nil 
1 
Source: Iqbal A. Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India. 
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Table: 1.9 Muslim Representation in Lok Sabha—India 
Year Total Muslims %i in lok Percentage 
Members Members Sabha Deprivation 
1952 
1957 
1962 
1967 
1971 
1977 
1980 
1984 
1989 
489 
494 
494 
520 
518 
542 
529 
542 
529 
21 
24 
23 
29 
30 
34 
49 
46 
33 
4.29 
4.86 
4.66 
5.58 
5.79 
6.27 
9.26 
8.49 
6.24 
57.14 
51.02 
56.60 
48.21 
48.28 
44.26 
16.95 
25.81 
45.00 
%in 
Population 
9.91 
9.91 
10.69 
10.69 
11.21 
11.21 
11.21 
11.35 
11.35 
Expected 
49 
49 
53 
56 
58 
61 
59 
62 
60 
Source: Iqbal A. Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India. 
As can be seen from the Tables: 1.8 and 1.9 the position of 
Muslims in representative bodies across the state and the nation 
deteriorated, The first Prime Minister and the ambassador of secularism 
did try to rest the ride by reminding party managers of the promise to 
minorities regarding their fair share but to no avail .Neither the persistent 
pattern of under nomination by major political parties nor a 
corresponding under representation in Lok Sabha or Vidhan Sabha was 
ever analyzed or discussed in any party forums. 
In the U.P. State Politics, right from the days of partition the 
Congress Party was in a belligerent mood. It wanted to settle score with 
Muslims for their role in partition. However, the presence of Secular, 
Socialist-Leftist and Gandhians in the Congress leadership and the 
presence of nationalist Muslims brought about an unstable equilibrium. 
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The Congress party dominated the political scene in the state from 1952 
to 1974. Owing to unsympathetic minority perspective of the successive 
Congress Chief Ministers the Muslim membership in state assembly 
ranged between 30 to 41 from 1952 to 1962. 
The uneasy equation led to the Muslim lending support in 1967 to 
anti-congressism which resulted in getting their own representation 
reduced to 23, of which the largest chunk of 16 was still returned on the 
congress ticket. This vicious circle of mutual distrust led to the congress 
further reducing nomination of Muslims from 48 (1957) to 26 in 1969, 
and Muslim votes getting distributed among six parties and two 
independents, totaling again to no more than 23. The Congress slightly 
improved its position in 1974 having bagged 15 Muslim seats out of a 
total of 25. However it was the Emergency, which turned Muslim masses, 
though not their leaders, into rebels whose massive support of the Janata 
Party raised their own representation to the peak of 49 members. 
In the mid-term elections in 1980, Congress returned to power. 
Muslims, by and large, voted for it as they felt that the Janata Party 
government had let them down. Under the leadership of Indira Gandhi in 
1980 and again in 1984 Muslims helped the congress recover, but the 
Janata formation was not ditched. They had success to the extent of 11 
members in 1980 and 20 in 1985. 
The elections of 1989 saw reversal of fortunes for congress. Once 
again the distrust got the better of Muslims and with 18 members it was 
JD that secured largest number of Muslims in 1989, as against 10 of the 
INCI. 
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Following pattern showed that the monopoly of congress was over:-
Table: 1.10 Parties Position Over Years 
1980: INC: 29; INCU:4; JNPSC:10; JNPSRil; CPI:1; IND:2; TOTAL 47 
1985: INCI:28; LKD:17; JNP:2; CPI(M):1; IND:1; TOTAL 49 
1989:INCI:10; JD:18; BSP:4;CPL2;LKD:1; CPI(M):1; IND:2;TOTAL38 
From the analysis of the trend of Muslim representation in the state 
assembly and parliament, it is clear that under a general electorate with 
first past-the-post system, the Muslims do not stand a fair chance of 
representation. As can be seen through the Table 1.10 above, with every 
election, their position has gone from bad to worse. It is one thing to 
denounce communalism and quite another to deprive representation to a 
large chunk of the Muslim population. Proportional Representation under 
a list system needs serious reckoning if representative democracy is to 
survive in Indian nationhood. 
It is also a need of the hour and the essence of modem democracy. 
That was the very reason why Dr.Ambedkar had insisted on separate 
electorate for Schedule Caste during the deliberations of the 'Round 
Table Conference' and the British P.M. Ramsay MacDonald granted it to 
him in his communal award. Mahatma Gandhi had to fast unto death to 
force the schedule caste leader to give up the demand for separate 
electorate, but even Gandhi had to concede reservation of seats for 
schedule castes. Since then this reservation has become a permanent 
feature which no political party dare challenge. 
The Economic Condition 
The condition of Muslim's political deprivation can not be fully 
comprehended without delineating upon the economic condition of 
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Muslim masses. After Independence the free India progressed on the 
economic front, with successive five-year plans reducing the poverty line 
of its people and improving agriculture and industrial development, the 
economic condition of Indian Muslims deteriorated . This is noticeable 
not only in the private sector but also in all departments of government 
whether at the centre or in the states. According to minority commission: 
(a) The share of Muslims in govt, jobs even at the lowest levels has 
never gone beyond 6% which is half of their population ratio. 
(b) In the allotment of quotas, grants and licenses, the figures are 
abysmal. 
(c) Their share in government constructed houses is as low as 2.86%. 
In the early 1980, Mrs.Gandhi appointed a 'High Power Panel' for 
minorities and schedule caste to study the economic condition of Muslims 
with Dr.Gopal Singh as its Chairman .What was reported was an eye-
opener. The economic condition of Indian Muslims in general with bulk 
of the population residing in Uttar Pradesh, was worse than that of the 
schedule caste who are considered to be at the bottom of the social ladder. 
According to the report on 1 Jan, 1980, the percentage of Muslims-
Table: 1.11 Minority Report. 
(a) In the IAS has come down to 3.27% as compared to that of the 
schedule caste's 9.9%. 
(b) In the IPS it was 2.1% as compared to schedule caste's 9.87%o 
(c) In the IPS it was 3.37% as compared to schedule caste's 16.48% 
(d) In the central subordinate services it was 1.56% Muslims to 13.1%) 
schedule caste 
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(e) Muslims employment through employment exchange - 2% and 
schedule caste- 13.25%. 
(f) Various govt, departments -Muslims 6.01% and schedule caste 
13.29%. 
(g) Public Sector employment-Muslims - 10.85% and schedule caste 
18.71% 
Muslims - 3.19% of total employee 
Muslims- 4.30% 
Muslims-12.14% 
Executive cadre -
Supervisory category-
Supervisory (non-tech)-
Class iv(subordinates)- Muslims-10.46%) 
(h)Private Sector employment-Muslims- 8.16% and S.C-11.50% 
Muslims- 1.5% and S.C- 1% 
Muslims- 8.28% and S.C-12.3% 
Muslims- 7.98% and S.C-12.39% 
Muslims- 15% and S.C.-6.14% 
Executive cadre-
Clerical class-
Workers-
(i) Small Scale Sector-
(Ownership) 
Bank credit, Raw material- Muslim- 8.14% 
Handicraft production- Muslims- 4.40% and S.C-16.21 % 
Muslims- 2.04% and S.C-15.70% 
Muslims-2.52% 
Muslims-54.32% & S.C-6.07% 
Muslims-49.34% & S.C-4.11% 
Muslims-65% 
(1) Khadi and Village Industries Program 
Ownership- Muslims-2.76% & S.C-20.3% 
Financial assistance- Muslims-2.7% & S.C-20.25%) 
(m) Grant of loan from bank- Muslims-9.41% & S.C-20.7% 
(j)Co-operative Sector-
Finances-
(k)Handloom Sector-
Financial assistance-
Work force-
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(n) Disbursement -
Long tenn Loan-
Flow of Credit-
(o) Housing Scheme-
Benefit 
Muslims-3.73% & S.C-12.7% 
Muslims-7% & S.C-74% 
Muslims-6.97% & S.C-3.45% 
Muslims-2.81% & S.C-7.65% 
The economic plight of Indian Muslims as compared to that of 
schedule caste's presented in no uncertain terms that future of 
common Muslims look as bleak as ever. 
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A C09fOE(PrVM (F(RAM<EW(mi 
CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR-
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The study of political behaviour is concerned with the action of 
men and group of men in politics. It is concerned, at the minimum with 
the activities of governments, political parties, interest groups, and voters. 
It attempts to discover the extent and nature of uniformities in the actual 
behavior of men and groups of men in the political process. Lester 
Milbrath (1975) emphasizes it as those, "behavior which affects or is 
intended to affects the decisional outcomes of government". According 
to Gorden Marshall (1998), "Political Behavior refers to any form of 
(individual or collective) involvement in the political process, or any 
activity which has political consequences in relation to government and 
policy" This broad definition embraces both legitimate forms of political 
participation such as voting in elections, activism in interest groups, or 
social movements etc, and illegitimate political activities including coups 
d'e'tat, terrorism, and revolution. While formal participation aims at 
containing social conflict within the extent political system, so that the 
political order remains stable. Dissent, which cannot be channeled via 
existing political structures, is likely-not only to pursue changes in 
policy-but also to challenge the political order itself. 
The study of political behavior also embraces the study of inactivity 
and apathy, as well as the analysis of political ideologies, values, and 
attitudes as the basis of participation and non-participation in the political 
sphere. According to Verba and Nie (1972)^, "it includes only activities 
by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the 
selection of governmental personnel and / or the actions they take.". This 
definition may be apt for western countries where the emphasis is on 
purpose, instrumental behaviour relevant to public policy making or 
decisions but may not be adequate for all societies. In Indian context, the 
public participation may be 'passive' as well as 'expressive' 
demonstrating general support or opposition, or merely demonstrating 
interest and attention to politics without seeking to, or expecting to 
influence decision at least not specific decisional outcomes. 
Political participation is defined here not in the narrow sense of 
voting behavior only. The term is used with broader implications, 
including many behavioural activities such as working in campaigns, 
discussing politics, contacting public officials, financial contribution to a 
political party, or a letter to an M.P or an ML A. Its emphasis is on the 
role and place of the individual in the political system, as demonstrated 
by the nature of his political activities. Political participation is only one 
aspect of political behaviour. Leadership behaviour, Decision-making, 
Administrative behaviour- are some other aspects which have a decided 
impact on individual behaviour. 
The Political Behaviour of an individual or a group can be 
comprehended in at least eight levels and contexts: 
1) Acts or expressions of allegiance or non allegiance for the system 
or the regime and its political institutions. 
2) Voting in the Schumpeterian sense of participation in the selection 
of political leaders. 
3) Information seeking and knowledge acquiring behaviour exposure 
to politics and 'paying attention' to politics. 
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4) Leadership contacts for a variety of purposes - help on a personal 
problem, maintenance of a personal social relationship, or a desire 
to influence a governmental action. 
5) Mass protests and demonstrations aimed at opposing or 
supporting governmental leadership or decisions. 
6) Acts of associating with others in a social-political context which 
may or may not be designed to influence governmental personnel 
or policy. 
7) Campaign participation which may result from many types of 
motivations. It may be concerned with decisional outcomes or 
relevant to procuring immediate support for party and / or 
candidates. 
8) Potential participation, or an indication of a willingness or 
readiness to be involved under certain conditions in the future. 
Typology: 
Milbrath (1975) indicates three types of political involvements 
in a hierarchical order, namely: 
Gladiatorial Activities-
a) Holding public and party office. 
b) Being a candidate for the office. 
c) Soliciting political funds. 
d) Attending a caucus or strategy meeting. 
e) Becoming an active member of a party. 
f) Contributing time in a political campaign. 
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Transitional Activities -
a) Attending political meeting or rally. 
b) Making monetary contribution to a party or a candidate. 
c) Keeping contact with a political official or leader. 
Spectator Activities -
a) Wearing a button or putting a sticker on the car. 
b) Attempting to talk to another to vote in a certain way. 
c) Initiating political discussion. 
d) Voting. 
e) Exposing one self to political stimuli. 
According to Rush and Althoff^  set of types of political 
participation in hierarchical order includes -
a) Holding political or administrative office. 
b) Seeking political or administrative office. 
c) Active membership of a political organization. 
d) Active membership of a quasi-political organization. 
e) Passive membership of a political organization. 
f) Participation in public meeting, demonstrations. 
g) Participation in formal political discussion, 
h) General interest in politics. 
i) Voting 
j) Total apathy. 
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Path Models of Political Participation 
Nie et al. (1969)^  and Burnstein (1972)^  drew upon the classic 
verbal theories of political behaviour (notably, Lane, 1959 ; Lipset, 
1960^ Campbell, 1964*"; Almond and Verba, 1965)" to develop their 
causal models. But they take markedly different approaches to the 
problem. Nie et al. attempt to fill in the causal links between macro-
socioeconomic processes and citizen participation by examining socio 
psychological variables such as resources, attitudes, and needs of 
individuals (see Figure 2.1). 
PATH MODEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Figure 1 , Nie etal. (1969) Model Of Political Participation 
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The five hypothesized intervening variables which they consider 
(sense of citizen duty, information about poHtics, perceived stake in 
political outcomes, sense of political efficacy, and attentiveness to 
political communications in the mass media) do mediate some of the 
effects of the social variables on political participation, but 
organizational involvements such as labour force participation and 
club memberships continue to show a strong independent effect on 
participation even when the socio-psychological variables are included 
in the model. 
Burstein (1972) focuses, instead on the social processes which 
determine the Nie et al. (1969) study's exogenous variables (see Figure 
2.2). 
Figure 2: Burstein's(1972) Model Of Poical Participatioii 
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He attempts to examine the, "process by which an individual 
comes to occupy a given social position in the first place and the 
consequences of his position for his political participation". These 
social indicators will be related to political participation, Burstein 
argues, because they measure the extent to which individuals are 
integrated into social networks and are tied into larger society. The 
ascribed characteristics (e.g.race,age) are exogenous since they are 
determined at birth. Burstein finds empirical confirmation of most of 
his ideas and explains the same amount of variance (41%) in the 
political participation scale as Nie et al. (who use the same data). 
Different Orientations to Political Behaviour: 
Political behaviour of an individual is consequent upon the three 
types of orientations which are shaped by the political culture of that 
political system. These orientations are as follows -
a) Cognitive Orientation - It prepares individuals to participate 
in political culture by means of subjective interests or knowledge. 
b) Affective Orientation - It determines individuals participation, 
alienation, likes, dislikes , interests and acceptance in a political 
system by directly appealing to individual's emotions. 
c) Evaluative Orientation - It provides meaning to political 
problems and political questions of the day. It helps an individual 
in evaluating various problems in the light of his belief, values 
acquired from the system over a period of time and, determine his 
actions and behaviour towards day to day political challenges. 
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Aspects: 
There are three aspects of political participation -
a) Conventional participation -
It includes such participation as - registering to vote, voting and 
contesting in elections, discussing issues and joining party etc. 
b) Unconventional participation -
It includes - organizing and participating in sit-ins, marches and 
demonstrations, riots, social movement, boycotts etc. 
c) Communication of support and protests-
It includes - sending messages to leaders, writing letter of 
protests, letter to editor of newspapers and magazines, signing 
petitions etc. 
In the present thesis, the Following aspects of political behaviour 
will be investigated: 
(a) Voting in the elections. 
(b) Attending public meetings. 
(c) Having interest in Politics. 
(d) Discussing Politics. 
(e) Attempting to influence political decisions. 
(f) Making a monetary contribution. 
(g) Meeting or Sending messages to leaders, 
(h) Signing of petition. 
(i) Organizing or participating in marches and demonstrations. 
(j) Participation in boycotts, riots and destruction of property. 
(k) Political Efficacy 
(1) Political Trust 
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Approaches to Political Behaviour: 
While discussing approaches to the study of political 
behaviour, it must be emphasized that the terms 'Political behaviour' 
and 'voting behaviour' are not meant to suggest a behaviour-study 
which is essentially different in a conceptual sense from many other 
types of studies, what is different in studying political behaviour or 
voting behaviour is not the principle of behaviour, or the content of 
behaviour , but rather the context in which the Individual's behaviour 
is being examined (Eldersveld,1956) . Voting, 'the most common 
and important act citizens take in a democracy is one of the most 
studied political behaviours' (Aldrich, 1993)^ '*. 
Rational Choice Approach 
The rational choice model of political behaviour was given by 
Downs in 1957^ .^ According to it, the calculus of voting takes the 
form of the equation R= BP- C, where the net rewards for voting (R) 
are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome 
compared to others (B) and the probability (P) of casting the decisive 
vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed 
and going to the polls (C). The model predicts that rational individuals 
will vote only when BP>C. In this set-up, someone might attach great 
importance to who wins the election, and thus have a very large B 
term, but because the probability of casting the deciding vote is almost 
always extremely small in large electorates, it follows, generally, that 
BP<C. So the model predicts abstention. The fact that large numbers 
of people actually do vote poses an obvious problem for the model, 
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one that has come to be known as the 'paradox of voting' (Mueller, 
J6 1989) . According to it, it is irrational to vote, but most people do so. 
2) Consumption Benefits of Voting Approach: 
Some analysts like Riker and Ordeshook (1968)*^ tried to 
remove the deficiency of rational choice model by incorporating 
'citizen duty'—as act of voting affirm one's allegiance to the political 
system. Thus, the revised calculus of voting becomes R= BP- C+D. 
According to it, the reward of voting are of two types—instrumental 
(or investment) benefits, captured by the B term, and consumption 
benefits, captured by D. Because investment benefits are contingent 
on the probability of casting the deciding vote (P), they are normally 
bound to be small. Consumption benefits, however, do not depend on 
this contingency. It is not necessary to cast the deciding vote in order 
to feel that one has affirmed one's commitment to the democratic 
system, for example. In fact, the benefits associated with D may not 
even require that one's preferred candidate win; these rewards flow 
entirely from the act of voting itself 
3) Ethical Voting Approach: 
Goodin and Roberts (1975) were the first to introduce ethical 
preferences into the individuals' turnout calculus. According to them, 
people may also serve their self-interest by taking into account 
someone else's welfare. Hence, each voter will have two sets of 
preferences. A first set - selfish preferences and second - ethical or 
altruistic preferences. The selfish preference includes only the 
individual's own utility. The ethical preference contains (the 
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individual's perception of) the utility of others. Hence, an individual's 
utility function is written as:-
w i = ui + a E Uj 
Where a is the weight we attach to other's happiness ( with 0< a < 1) 
experimental evidence supports the view that people often behave in 
altruistic ways—often even bearing a cost to improve the welfare of 
others. (Andreoni and Miller, 2002^ ;^ Camerer,2003f ^  
Goodwin and Roberts (1975) stated that ethical preferences 
are likely to dominate the individual's electoral decisions as the 
probability of affecting the election outcome is negligible. They argue 
that ethical behaviour occurs when the stakes are low and / or when 
any individual has little effect on the outcome (that is, low efficiency). 
Only when the stakes and personal efficacy are high, egoistic 
preferences are most important. Jankowski (2002 , 2004) more 
specifically distinguishes between 'pure' and 'warm glow' altruism. In 
the 'pure altruism', individual's happiness from altruistic behaviour is 
dependent upon the recipient's increased happiness, while in the 
'warm glow altruism', people experience a personal satisfaction 
independent of the outcome of that action. 
Fowler (2005) recently extended this model by arguing that, when 
political activity is redistributive, only those with different preferences 
with regard to the benefits of some groups within the population 
(discriminating altruists) are motivated to vote by altruism. People caring 
equally about the benefit of all others (unconditional altruists) in the case 
refrain from voting because there is no net gain from pure redistributive 
activity (as a zero sum game). 
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4) Minimax Regret Approach: 
Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) asserted that rule in this 
approach is to choose the action that yields a minimal regret in a 
worst-case scenario. The regret (Rij) the individual feels after some 
action (ai) in state of the world (Sj) can be defined as the difference 
between what the decision maker could have attained had he known 
the true state of the world before he choose his action and what he 
actually gets by choosing ai. 
Tideman (1985) extends the model by introducing the concepts of 
'remorse' and 'elation'. These are 'emotions' that arise as a consequence 
of being responsible for one's circumstances by one's own actions. The 
introduction of remorse and elation are intuitively appealing. 
Nonetheless, their inclusion does not change the bottomline, as they must 
again be multiplied by the probability of making a difference (P), making 
them very close to zero. (Struthers and Young, 1989)^ '. Although, as 
pointed out by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) , the minimax regret model 
predicts higher levels of voter turnout then expected utility model. 
Several other predictions are (much) less satisfactory. First, if a voter is 
indifferent between two competing parties, it is rational for him or her to 
abstain. However, if a small third party - which the voter would hate to 
see winning—enters the race, he or she is forced to the polls to avoid the 
unlikely event that this party wins the race by a single vote (Mueller, 
serious methodological criticism is leveled by Goodin and 
-ifk 
Roberts (1975) by pointing out that people often rationalize a wrong 
decision by the reflection that it seemed a good idea at the time. Regret 
avoidance might thus not be an element in a voter's decision. 
49 
(5) Game Theory Approach: 
Proposed by Ledyard (1984)^ ^ and Palfrey and Rosenthal 
(1983'^ ,^ 1985)^ ^ - the approach holds that people take the decisions 
made by others into explicit account. The reasoning is as follows. If 
everybody votes, the chance of having an effect on the outcome of the 
election is very small. Because this holds for everyone, it would be 
rational for all to abstain; in which case one vote would become 
decisive. If everybody came to this conclusion, all would vote—once 
again making it useless to vote. This line of reasoning can be repeated 
endlessly. Hence, the probability of being decisive is not fixed and 
determined—as assumed under the expected utility and minimax 
regret models—but is instead determined through the strategic 
interaction between all potential voters. As such, P becomes 
endogenous to the model. A voter does not face a decision theoretic 
problem, but rather a strategic game with other voters. 
This approach shows that there is often multiple (mixed-
strategy) equilibrium. Some of these involve substantial turnout rates. 
However, the finding of positive turnout rests critically upon the 
assumption that all voters are certain about the voting costs and 
preferences of other voters (perfect information). This assumption is 
not very realistic, still, when it is abandoned , the rafional individual 
once again abstains when he or she has positive net voting costs 
(Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985) . Moreover, as the strategic 
interaction between voters weaken in large electorates; the game 
theoretic approach can only perform well when considering small 
electorates (Aldrich, 1993)^ .^ All in all, the attempt to explain voter 
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turnout by resorting to game theory does not succeed (Mueller, 
2003)^^ 
(6) Group Based Models: 
The Aristotelian idea that man is a social animal has led a 
number of scholars to look at social network to explain turnout at the 
polls. (Morton, 1987^ ;^ Schwartz, 1987^ *; Uhlanes, 1989^^ Morton, 
1991^^ Schram, 1991^^ Schram and Van Winder, 1991)^ 1 The 
argument is that voting might be rational for the group of individuals 
because the expected benefits may exceed the voting costs at the 
group level (Filer et al, 1993^ ;^ Grossman & Heipman, 200l/^ 
First, groups are likely to have larger benefits than individuals from 
political participation. The reasoning is that politicians may provide 
groups with extra benefits—in terms of policies that come closer to 
the group's optimum—to win the support of the group. (Lapp, 
1999)'*^ . Second, as the political influence of a social group can be 
assumed to be proportional to its size. (Scliram & Van Winden, 
1991)'*^ , the group as a whole is more likely to have a non-negligible 
impact on the election outcome. 
Models of turnout incorporating group behaviour show that positive 
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turnout can be optimal for the group as a whole. Schram (1991) 
developed a theoretical model concerning an individual's decision within 
a group . He divided group members into producers and consumers of 
social pressure. Both have different reasons for turning out. Producers of 
social pressure try to induce other group members to turn out, and need 
credibility to obtain this goal. This can be obtained by voting. Non-
producing individual may be induced to vote by the social pressure 
generated by other members of their group (that is, the leader) 
51 
(Overbye's 1995)''^ . Bufacchi (2001)'*^  likewise differentiated between 
opinion leaders and other voters. While the former vote to increase or 
enhance their credibility, the latter turnout to invest in their reputation as 
trustworthy people in the eyes of the opinion leaders. 
Grossman and Heipman (2001)^ ** argue that turnout is stimulated by 
the enforcement of a social norm at the group level, whereby in contrast 
to Schram's(1991)^ ^ and Bufacchi's (2001)^ ^ models, every individual is 
both a producer and a consumer of social pressure. These elements affect 
the voting norms enforcement (Grossman and Heipman, 2001)^ '^ . First, 
the frequency of interaction: more frequent interactions increase the 
opportunity to reward desirable behaviour and punish non-co-operation. 
This is also supported by experimental evidence indicating that within 
group communication tends to increase co-operation in participation 
games (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996^ ;^ Goren and Bernstein, 
2000)^ .^ Second, enforcement is more effective (and turnout higher) if the 
'deterrent effect from social isolation is larger' (Grossman and 
Heipman, 2001)^ .^ Finally, enforcement is easier if group members can 
observe the action of other members without much effort. 
Coate and Conlin (2004)^ ^—building on the works of 
Harsanyi(1977)^ * and Feddersen and Sandroni (2002)^ ^ argue that 
people are 'rule utilitarian' that receive a (warm glow) pay-off for 
following the rule that maximizes the aggregate utility of their group if it 
were followed by everybody in the group. Individuals may, thus, turn out 
because of the inclusion of other group members' welfare in their utility 
function. Turnout is, thus, regulated by wanting to do what is best for the 
group. 
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In the final analysis, it can be said that the Group-based model has 
several important advantage. First, by embedding individuals into social 
groups, the group based model is more realistic than the standard model 
in which voters are treated as isolated individuals (Lapp, 1999)^ .^ 
Second, it is shown that turning out may well be rational in a group 
context in order to build a reputation of trustiness towards other group 
members(and/or opinion leaders) or because of the benefits from 
(discriminating) altruistic or rule-utilitarian behaviour. Turnout increases 
significantly with group identity (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996)^ * and 
one observes 'allies' voting (Grober and Schram, 2004)^ .^ 
7) Behaviour Decision Theory: 
Until a few decades ago, the study of decision making was limited 
almost entirely to economists, statisticians, and philosophers who 
developed chiefly normative models of how decisions ought to be made. 
According to the normative model, decision makers should carefully 
define the problem and clarify their own preferences, gather as much 
information as possible (given time constraints) about alternative course 
of action, consider the possible consequences of each alternative and their 
relative probabilities of occurrence, evaluate those consequences in terms 
of their underlying preferences, and choose among the alternatives 
according to some value-maximizing decision rule that takes into account 
value trade-offs among their different goals (Luce and Raiffa, 1957 ; 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944)^ *^. 
With this normative model as a benchmark, scores of studies in 
the diverse fields of decision making have recognized that most 
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decisions, whether mundane or earthshaking, fall short of the 
prescriptive ideal in a number of ways. People do not make optimal 
use of available information; they do not follow the guidelines of 
statistical theory in responding to uncertainties and probabilities; they 
do not always make reasonable trade-offs among conflicting values; 
and they do not always follow value-maximizing decision rules 
(Edwards, 1954^ ;^ Simon, 1978)^ .^ These experimental and empirical 
findings have led to the development of the field of behavioural 
decision theory, or the study of how people actually make decisions. 
Decision theory approach is context specific. It is highly 
contingent on such factors as, 
First, the complexity of the decision. 
Second, the nature and the structure of information. 
Third, the expertise of the decision maker. 
Fourth, the amount of time available and incentive for careful 
information processing and so on (Beach and Mitchell, 1978) . 
Further, the decision theory is based on number of postulates, that is, 
People lack both the knowledge and the computational skill necessary 
to achieve the degree of rationality prescribed by normative models of 
choice, and basically humans are cognitively limited information 
processors (Simon, 1978) . So, people develop a number of cognitive 
'heuristics' or shortcuts that allow them to act and make decisions that 
are generally quite reasonable (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 
1982)^ .^ People behaviour is not random or unpredictable (Jacoby et 
al. 1987)^ ^ They select information about alternatives and combine it 
into choices in systematic ways (Hogath, 1987)^\ Thus, the human 
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behaviour is still purposeful, but it is characterized by 'bounded 
rationality' rather than the ideal type rationality postulated by 
economic theories of decision making (Simon, 1955)'^ . 
8) Learning Theory Approach: 
The learning approach of political behaviour is based on the 
assumption that people have the ability to learn 'good' strategies from 
observing what worked well in the past. There are two learning 
sources-- First, people can learn from their own past actions— 
consistent with processes known from reinforcement learning (Sutton 
and Barto, 1998)^ "'. Secondly, people can learn from the behaviour of 
others. They observe the strategies followed by others and imitate 
these strategies if they prove successfril (Sieg and Schulz, 1995) . It 
is, however, important to note that not all learning models link action 
to outcome. Plutzer (2002)^ ^ and Gerber et al., (2003)^ ^ for 
example, argue that voting (abstaining) in a given election in and of 
itself makes people more likely to vote (abstain) in fixture elections, 
independent of rewards / punishments origination from the election 
outcome. 'Voting and abstention, in other words, are habit forming'. 
It has been argued that learning mainly affects the D— t^erm from 
the calculus of voting model (Kanazawa, 2000) . Citizens who are 
rewarded for their vote (via the election of their preferred candidate) 
or punished for their abstention (through the election of a less -
preferred candidate) acquire an increased preference for voting. In 
contrast, if their voting is punished or their abstention is rewarded, 
they lose some of their preference for voting. Still, this reliance on the 
D-term does not make the approach vulnerable to the criticism of 
tautology leveled at the 'consumption' models discussed previously. 
However, given the variance in the costs oPvQ'tiilg^ over different 
groups in the population and different types of elections, learning 
model is also compatible with the observed differences in turnout 
levels across groups (and type of elections). The only deficiency 
leveled against it is that the approach mainly concentrates on voter 
turnout as such and makes no claims concerning which candidate one 
votes for. Nothing, however, prevents an individual casting a strategic 
vote. 
9) Public Choice Theory: 
Public choice theory borrows the basic assumption of 
neoclassical economics about the nature of human rationality and 
applies them to the explanation and prediction of behaviour in the 
political domain (Downs 1957) . An attractive, and seductive, feature 
of the theory is a very strong rationality assumption (maximization of 
subjective expected utility) that appears to permit a great deal of 
explanation and prediction without the painful necessity of first 
constructing an empirically based theory of human behaviour, in 
particular, a theory of the nature and limits of human rationality . To 
an important extent, deductive reasoning from the theory's basic 
postulates of rationality substitutes for a great deal of costly empirical 
inquiry. 
10) Information Models: 
The masses in general suffer from twin problems, they lack 
knowledge about the different consequences of their decision and 
secondly, they have limited intellectual capacity to analyze all 
available options. Simon's (1957)^ ^ pioneered this view initially in his 
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theory of 'bounded rationality'. What he implied was that people are 
not-and can not be-utility maximisers, but can be described as 
'satisficers'. They cannot choose the best alternative, but they have to 
content themselves with the most satisfactory alternative. 
Another effort at incorporating information in the turnout model 
was made by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996*", 1997)*\ They 
employed a game-theoretic, rather than a decision-theoretic, 
reasoning. Nonetheless, in line with Matsusaks (1995)*^ and 
Larcinese (2000) , they found that uninformed voters have an 
incentive to abstain and -as such- to delegate their vote to those who 
are better informed. This holds even when voting is costless and is 
explained by the 'swing-voters curse'. As informed voters are 
assumed to vote for what they see as the best option, uninformed 
voters are only able to affect the outcome by voting for the 'wrong' 
candidate. As such, uninformed voters are better off abstaining 
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996*^ 199lf\ Extending the model 
by Feddersen and Pesendorfer, Caillaud and Tirole (1997) found 
that these information effects become much weaker in a setting where 
allowance is made for heterogeneous populations. 
Recently, Degan and Merlo (2004) provided yet another 
attempt to incorporate information in a model of voter turnout. Indeed, 
from a perspective resembling that of the minimax approach, they 
stated that uninformed voters are more uncertain about the optional 
candidate. This increases their expected regret from voting (as the 
probability of choosing the 'wrong' candidate is higher), and thus 
implies a positive relation between information and turnout. 
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(11) An Opportunity Model (Motivated Approach) 
Matthew B. Piatt (2008)^ ^ offered an opportunity model of 
participation that begins to study liow policy goals shape individual 
participation and how aggregate participation shapes policymaking. 
The central argument is that individuals' policy goals allow them to 
recognize those moments when it is most efficient and / or effective to 
take action. It is based on the simple assumption that individuals 
engage in political action because they want to influence policy. Given 
this assumption, we should expect individuals to strategically 
participate when it is relatively more effective and / or efficient to do 
so; when the ratio of benefits to costs is higher. Opportunities are 
those contextual features that set the cost / benefit constraints within 
which participation decisions are made. More broadly, 'constraints' 
can also be thought of as the individual-level attributes highlighted by 
the civic voluntarism model— r^esources, political engagement, and / or 
high levels of recruitment activity. 
Factors Influencing Trends in Political Participation 
The number of factors influencing Trends in political participation 
are divided into following category (Listhang and Gronflaten, 2007) 
1) Individual Resources 
This model involves those capacities and motivations of 
individuals' that stimulates participation. It can be divided into two 
broad groups: 
(A) Socio-economic or Demographic Variables. 
(B) Psychological or Attitudinal Variables. 
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(A) (B) (C) 
DISTANT FACTORS IMMEDIATE FACTORS 
Socio-economic attributes + Individual attitudes & —political par-
beliefs ~ ticipation 
Fig. 2.3 
Fig . 2.3 a diagrammatic representation of the interrelationships between 
these two groups of variables (Mathews and Prathro,1966)^ . The box 
on the extreme right C represents the dependent variable, political 
participation. Boxes A and B represent socio-economic and psychological 
variables respectively. In terms of time sequence, the set of variables at 
the right B haive a more immediate impact than those toward the left A 
.These two types of variables affect not only the dependent variable but 
also one another . In socio-economic variables factors like - (1) place of 
residence , (2) education, (3) occupation, (4) income, (5) age, (6) marital 
status, (7) sex, (8) religion, (9) caste, (10) mass media exposure, 
(11) geographical mobility are included; and in Psychological variables 
factors like - (1) Political information, (2) Attitudes towards political 
recruitment, (3) Party preferences , (4) party evaluation, and (5) the 
feelings of civic competence are included. 
An important point to remember is that the effect of socio-economic 
factors on political participation is never direct. It is always mediated by 
individual personality. Education, income level, and the place of 
residence affect political participation only because they have impact on 
the personality and the belief system of the political participant. Fig 2.3 
therefore includes no direct causal links between A and C; the direct 
causal link is only from B to C, individual belief system to political 
participation .Thus, for example, the level of an individual's political 
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activity is a function of his political information and knowledge, which in 
turn are affected by the level and quality of his formal education, and 
which in turn are a function of the economic level of the respondent. 
Individual resources are the most commonly used factor to explain 
variations in political participation. Citizens with higher socio-economic 
status are more active in politics than those at lower status levels. In the 
classic Verba and Nie model, 1972^ * (Verba et al. 1978)^ ,^ the resource 
concept is framed within a modernization model where economic growth, 
increase in education levels, and the elimination of normative and other 
barriers that make it difficult to participate are key factors that will work 
to increase participation levels in societies. Among resources, formal 
education stands out as a key element in the individual's capacity to 
collect political information and to make use of information for political 
purposes. The steadily increasing levels of education that we see in most 
societies would lead us to expect that participation would increase 
gradually. 
Martinussen (1977)^ ^ argues that participation in Norway is limited 
and skewed along social and economic lines. This conclusion triggered a 
tierce response by Lafferty (1981)^ '' who painted a more positive picture 
of political participation in Norway. The debate has been evaluated by 
Stromsnes (1993)^ ,^ partly using new data, staking out a middle position 
between the two contestants. In a major study of political participation in 
Norway, Stromsnes (2003)^ ^ gives a broad presentation of participation 
using new survey data from 2001, but she does not systematically analyze 
trends in participation. 
Research has emphasized the removal of normative barriers that 
prohibit women from being equally active as men . Using data from 1969, 
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Listhang and Kindseth (1979)^ ^ show that men are more active than 
women in electoral campaigning and that most of this effect is mediated 
through education, organizational membership and political involvement 
(political interest, political information and political efficacy).Using time 
series data until around 1990, Raaum (1995) shows that the difference 
between men and women is disappearing on a number of participation 
indicators. In a multivariate model applied to the results of eleven 
elections from 1957 to 2001, Listhang (2006)^ ^ demonstrates that 
political efficacy differences in favour of men recorded in all elections 
1957-1985, disappeared in 1989 and have not shown up again in the 
elections that followed. 
The central tenet of the Socio-Economic Status (SES) model is that 
people of higher socio-economic status— t^hose with higher education, 
higher income and higher status jobs—are more active in politics. SES 
has been found in many contexts to be a powerful predictor of political 
activity. (Verba et al. 1995)^ *^ ". The citizen audit (based on a 
representative sample of over 12,000) confirms the link between SES and 
political participation in contemporary Britain. The researchers conclude 
that: political engagement is very much dominated by the already well-
resourced; in other words, the most highly educated, the rich, and those 
from the top educational echelons. 
2) Mobilization: 
The mobilization model of trend study emphasizes on how political 
elites and organizations work to activate their supporters in various forms 
of participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993)^ ''\ Some authors 
conclude that mobilization works, but that the effects of these variables 
pales in comparison to the power of Socio-Economic Status (Verba, 
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Schlozman, and Brady, 1995)*"^  Wrinkle, Stewart, Polinard, Meier, 
and Arvizu, (1996) find that mobilization is a more powerful predictor 
of political involvement than SES. While the focus of the resource model 
is on how the capacities and motivations of the individual stimulate 
participation, the mobilization model emphasizes the influence from the 
outside: how elected officials, parties and interest organizations affiliated 
with parties work to recruit voters. Activity is often associated with the 
election cycle as parties and MPs mobilize their supporters to vote and 
participate in political campaigns. Diaz (1996)'"'' finds that Latino turnout 
is significantly affected by organizational affiliation. Hritzuk and Park 
(2000)'"^ find that "integration in politically active social networks, 
exposure to mobilization efforts, and affiliation with at least one 
organization significantly increase the likelihood that Latinos will 
participate at higher levels". De la Garza has been arguing for some time 
that mobilization is critical to Latino voter turnout. Most recently, De la 
Garza and Abrajano (2002)*^ ^^  found that Latino-on-Latino mobilization 
efforts during the 2000 presidential election worked in some states, but 
not in others. 
Observational (survey-based) studies of voter mobilization of the 
general population (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993^ °^ ; Kramer, 1970)'"* 
and of Latinos in particular (De la Garza and Louis, 1999'"^ ; Diaz, 
1996*'"; Garcia, 1997'''; Shaw et al, 2000"^ Verba et al, 1995" •^ 
Wrinkle et al, 1996"^ ; Hritzuk and Park, 2000"^)examine the 
correlation between voting and contact with campaigns and political 
organizations. Factors like — (1) Cleavage-based parties with mass 
membership, (2) Strong party organizations, and (3) well developed 
linkages between parties and interest groups are important determinants 
of political mobilization. However, in recent decades, electoral politics in 
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Norway has been characterized by de-alignment and volatility. The 
impact of cleavage on the vote has weakened (Listhang 1989^ ^^ , 2006" ;^ 
Franklin et al. 1992"^ Ringdal and Hines 1995" )^, party identification 
and party membership began a marked and continuous decline in the mid-
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1980s (Jenssen 1999) and individual voter mobility has increased 
(Aardal 1999) . Larger studies conducted in various major cities have 
recently been conducted by Gerber and Green (2000) and by Green, 
Gerber, and Nickerson (2002)^ '^^ . These efforts find strong evidence of 
the effectiveness of mobilization . 
3) Events And Issues: 
In studying trends, participation can also be modeled as a 
reaction to events and issues. Issue Importance mediates the impact of 
public policy issues on electoral decisions. Individuals who consider 
that an issue is important are more likely to rely on their attitudes 
towards that issue when evaluating candidates and deciding for whom 
to vote. 
Incumbent performance evaluation regarding an issue has a 
stronger impact on the vote choice of individuals who find that issue 
important. The analysis (Fournier. et al, 2003)^ '^* demonstrates that 
there is a significant interaction between performance evaluation and 
issue importance. People concerned about an issue assign more weight 
to their evaluations of the government's or candidate's views and 
performance on that issue when making up their mind. An important 
contribufion to issue importance is the Krosnick's (1988) work on 
the mediating role of issue importance in political behaviour. The 
impact of various policy attitudes on candidate appraisal and vote 
choice is stronger among those individuals who feel that the issue in 
question is important. For example, those who believe that anti-
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muslim riots is a very important issue should pay greater attention to 
the party's or candidate's performance and policy on riots than those 
who think otherwise. 
Krosnick (1990)^ ^^  defines policy attitude importance as, "the 
degree to which a person is passionately concerned about and 
personally invested in an attitude". Surveys often ask respondents to 
rate the performance of political dispensation in office. Performance 
ratings are sometimes used as dependent variables capturing approval 
of a political actor's job handling (Brody, 1991^ '^'; Edwards, 1990^ *^; 
Mueller, 1973^ ^^ ; Neustadt, 1960*^^ They are also included in 
models of candidate appraisal and vote choice as measures of 
retrospective judgment on the incumbent's accomplishments 
(Abramson et al, 1999^ '^; Butler and Stokes, 1969^ ^^ ; Downs, 
1957^ ^^  Fiorina, 1981^ ^^  Flanigan and Zingale, 1994^ ^^  Rose and 
McAllister, 1990^ ^^ ). 
Issues and Events have often been linked to activity in direct 
forms of participation like the signing of petitions, demonstrations, 
boycotts, and, in some cases, rioting and destruction of property. 
Research findings from Olsen and Satren (1980)^ ^ ,^ and Goul and 
Hoff (2001)^ ^^  show that political action has a diverse political origin, 
with environment, local and regional policy issues, the European 
Union (EU) and economic issues important categories. In Norway, the 
EU referendums in 1972 and 1994 were key events that led to an 
increase in political action. 
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(4) Learning: 
Participation may also be the result of political learning. The 
learning mechanism is especially important for new forms of political 
action that are used first by small groups who demonstrate that they can 
be useful in achieving political goals. After some time, other groups 
might engage in the same forms of action and participation rates will 
increase. Following a resurgence of interest in the role of political culture 
in shaping political behavior, social learning theories have pointed to the 
importance of cultural factors as influence on political participation. In 
this approach, citizens absorb certain values from the political culture 
within which they are socialized and these, in turn, influence political 
behavior. 
Such a theory builds on the 'law of effect', and assumes that people 
have the ability to learn 'good' strategies from observing what worked 
well in the past. Two sources of learning successfiil behavior are 
available. 
First, people can learn from the own past actions. They perceive a 
relation between their action (vote or abstention) and the outcome of the 
election (win or loss of the candidate voted for) in the previous period 
and interpret this as a reinforcer or a punisher. The satisfactory actions 
are repeated while unsatisfactory ones are avoided. (Cyr, 1975 ; 
Grafstein, 1991^ "^; Geys, 2006^ ^^ ) . The result is a so-called'win-stay, 
lose-shift' strategy (Kanazawa, 2000 '^* )^—consistent with processes 
1 A'X 
known from reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998 ). 
Second, people can learn from the behaviour of others. They 
observe the strategies followed by others and imitate these strategies if 
they prove successful (Sieg and Schulz, 1995)*'*^  Sniderman, one of the 
first advocates of social learning theory, argues that political tolerance in 
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the United States is the result of sociahzation to democratic norms. 
Recent research conducted in the United States (Herbert and Alida, 
1983*^ ^ Nunn, Crockett and Williams, 1978" ;^ Sullivan, Pieresen 
and George 1982 ) and in countries as diverse as Israel and New 
Zealand has endorsed Sniderman's emphasis on the importance of 
learned cultural values. A key difference between the original Downsian 
model and the learning models is that the former implicitly assumes a 
causal link between an action and an outcome in the upcoming election, 
whereas a link between an action and an outcome in the past is the central 
issue in most learning models. In other words, whereas Downs' voters are 
utility maximizing and forward looking (that is, 'prospective optimizers'), 
they are backward looking and adaptive in the learning model (that is, 
'adaptive satisficers') (Fowler, 2006) '^'^  
The resource theory of political participation predicts that access to 
socio-economic resources will explain variations in political participation 
among various groups. By contrast, social learning theory predicts that 
variations in political participation will result from the value and beliefs 
about politics gained from childhood and adolescent socialization. Early 
socialization studies by Easton and Dennis(1967)^ ''', and others have 
argued that this pre-adult socialization has important consequences for 
adult political values and may offset negative political experience in later 
life. From the perspective of the political system, the diffiise regime 
support that flows from this socialization acts as "a reservoir upon which 
the system typically draws in times of crises, such as depressions, wars, 
and internecine conflicts, when perceived benefits may recede to their 
lowest ebb." 
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Sniderman (1975)'^ " examines the role of personality and 
motivational factors in shaping political beliefs and, more specifically, 
democratic commitment. His theory rests on two main propositions. First, 
since support for the democratic ideal involves a complex array of beliefs 
and values, its most common source within a society will be the political 
culture. Second, the extent to which individuals acquire this commitment 
from the political culture will depend, at least in part, on their personality, 
and those with high self-esteem will be "more likely to have internalized 
the modal values of the political culture." Socialization, personality and 
the motivation to learn thus interact in a complex way to determine to 
what extent individuals support democratic values. Social learning is a 
variable that links personality and democratic commitment. As 
Sniderman (1975)^ ^^  puts it, " democratic values for a variety of reasons 
are not easy learn, and whatever affects an individual's capacity for social 
learning also affects his chances of learning those values." His model 
therefore implies a causal sequence, with personality as a prior 
independent variable, social learning as an intermediate variable, and 
democratic values as the dependent variable. We can measure learning by 
measuring two sets of variables; first, values and beliefs held by 
individuals and second by the period of time individual has been exposed 
to the political system. In measuring values, three variables are used: 
Political efficacy. Political trust (Dalton, 1988^ ^^ ; Ronald, James, 
Stevens and Barry 1986)^ '^' and Authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 
1950'^ ^ Berry, etal.1977^^^ 
Political Efficacy refers to the belief that an individual's action can 
influence the operation of the political process, that the system within 
which they live is democratic, and that the government is responsive to 
popular demands. Political Trust refers to the belief that the politicians 
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and officials who run the poHtical system can be trusted to look after 
community needs and not to pursue their own individual goals. Both 
efficacy and trust represent important indicators of political culture, and 
among citizens they represent mediating influences between political 
socialization and political participation. Authoritarianism reflects 
personality attributes such as dogmatism and rigidity, which have been 
shown to be important in shaping prejudice and ethnocentrism. (Adorno 
et al., 1950^ ^^  McAllister and Makkai, 1992)^ 1^ 
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY 
Harold D. Lasswell (1948)^  was the pioneer among behavioural 
scientists who picked up where Wallas and Bentley, had left off, and 
made Political behaviour approach stand on its own. He insisted on the 
need for minute inquiry and microscopic studies of the political process 
carried on by scientific methods. His work inaugurated the application of 
dynamic psychology and the concepts of personality to an understanding 
of political interaction. In his paper, 'Power and Personality', he 
summarizes the fundamental elements of his theory of political 
personality and the political process which is grounded in psychoanalytic 
formulation. 
Wood and Roper (1950) charted several aspects of participation 
by means of a national sample survey, chiefly in connection with the 
electoral participation. His findings are pioneering work in functional 
analysis of democratic institutions in U.S. 
Eldersveld (1951) surveys, classifies and evaluates the voting 
behaviour studies in his scholarly paper. His focus is directed towards 
specifying the political, social and psychological correlates of individual 
and group decisions in the electoral arena. 
Bernard Berelson (1952)'* attempts to evaluate the findings of the 
prodigious contemporary public opinion research fi-om the point of view 
of a viable political theory. As a result, description gives way to a 
functional analysis of the political beliefs relevant to the successful 
operation of a democratic political system. 
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Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954)^  constructed an index of 
Political efficacy—a measure of a person's estimate of his own political 
influence. They fmd the close link between this motivational factor and 
political participation. 
Heinz Eulau (1955)^  brings out recent developments like effect of 
class basis of voting behaviour as a crucial dimension of the election 
process, in reference group theory on the classical problem of the 
relationship between social class and political party in the decision 
making behaviour of the electorate. Findings in the 1952 presidential 
elections confirmed that there exist a significant relationship between 
social class position and voting behaviour with a majority of the middle 
class preferring the Republican party and a majority of the working class 
preferring the Democratic party. 
Eldersveld (1956) makes an effective use of controlled experiment 
in a field setting to test the usefulness and efficacy of different 
propaganda techniques. It was found that the activation effect of personal 
contact was greater than that of mail propaganda, but it too was of limited 
success. Overall, there is practically no advantage of one personal contact 
technique over another. Further, that voting was increased by personal 
contact for those only with high school education, those who lived in 
small household or lived alone, and those who moved in the place from 
somewhere else. 
Milbrath (1975) using the survey research centre's 1956 election 
data, presents the relationship between party contact and what he has 
called 'gladiatorial activity'(engaging in at least one type of activity 
beyond voting). He found that in U.S. 20 to 25% contacted or canvassed 
by the party organization are campaign actives, while 10% or less of 
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those not contacted are active. The two patterns of political 
involvement—exposure to party process and involvement go together. 
Personal contact by the party seems similarly efficacious. 
Ahmed and Eldersveld (1976)' analyzed the Indian citizen's 
involvement in the Democratic political process in 1967 and 1971 
national elections and found that Indian masses—apolitical, mainly 
illiterate, poor, rural—had become a politicized citizen committed to 
democratic norms and active participants in democratic practices. Further, 
the study revealed that, inter alia, the linkage between political efficacy 
and activity is most pronounced among those with a small amount of 
education. The major new discovery here is that for lower caste groups, 
particularly the Harijans and Tribals, have extremely high level of 
participation. 
Goel (1974)^ *^  explored the political participation pattern in India 
and how they vary among different social and psychological groups. The 
study revealed that voter participation at the polls and other kinds of 
political activities should be treated separately. For voting is a special 
kind of act, and some people, educated and modernized elite, are likely to 
engage in more demanding forms of participation but at the same time 
they are less likely to exercise their franchise. Contrary to political 
behavioural research—education and mass media exposure (measure of 
modernism)—led to fall in voter turnout. 
Bean (1991) examines a model of political participation and 
political protest using sheaf coefficients method to test the relative 
explanatory power of three sets of determinants of participation and 
protest : social background characteristics, general orientations toward 
politics, and attitudes toward issues, and finds that the connection 
between orthodox participation and protest weakens as the style of protest 
86 
becomes more unorthodox, and that none of the separate modes of 
conventional participation are directly related to 'radical protest'. Also, 
that issues are repeatedly weaker than the other two groups of variables in 
predicting conventional participation but have relatively strong effects on 
political protest, particularly compared with political orientations, while 
social structure is consistently influential. 
McAllister and Makkai (1992)^ ^ use Australia—an established 
liberal democracy with large immigrant population—as a case study to 
evaluate the resource and social learning theories to conclude that these 
theories sufficiently explain the variation in the levels of political 
participation among different social groups, and that the immigrants 
socialized in countries lacking continuous democratic traditions have 
greater political trust, but also display more authoritarian values, and that 
these theories are complementary rather than exclusive explanations for 
political participation. 
Gupta and Singh (1992) developed an expected utility model to 
explain some of the anomalies in the structural theories of collective 
rebellious behaviour as it can explain only why people rebel in the face of 
structural imbalance, and the rational choice theories which can explain 
why they may choose not to rebel. The authors derived the individual and 
aggregate behavioural profiles and established the theoretical connection 
between the proposed micro behavioural theory and the aggregate 
structural theories. 
Achen (1992)^ ^ extends the previous argument that a simple 
prospective model of voting and party identification subsumed much of 
the social-psychological and retrospective voting literatures, in the sense 
that it rigorously implied their key findings and added many new ones as 
well. He showed that the same prospective voting model has drastic 
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implications for conventional statistical specifications in voting research. 
First, linear models should be discarded in favour of a particular 
nonlinear specification. Second, demographics should be dropped from 
the list of independent variables. 
Miller (1992) analyzed the decline in aggregate voting turnout in 
the United States between the 1950s and the 1980s and attributed the 
decline to changes in the generational composition of the electorate. In 
particular, the post-New Deal generation, which continues to grow in 
size, votes at a rate well below that of older generations, Which was 
attributed to generational difference in party identification and social 
connectedness. 
Johnston (1992)^ ^ considers the role of party identification in the 
1988 Canadian General Election campaign and found that they exhibited 
party commitments remarkably like those of U.S. respondents. These 
commitments shaped respondents' reaction to the events of the campaign. 
Issue positions lined up with party identification, as did perceptions of the 
one leader rehabilitated by the campaign. But the campaign also cut 
through party groups. The author concludes by arguing that academic 
observers in the U.S. should take campaigns more seriously than they 
have to date and that they should consider adopting some of the 
measurement and analysis strategies of the 1988 Canadian study. 
Theiss-Morse (1993) uses combination of methods to explore 
relationship between a person's view of citizenship and his or her 
political participation. The author employed Q method study on four 
citizenship perspectives of democratic theory: elitist, pluralist, citizenship 
and participatory, and found striking difference in how people define the 
participatory- responsibilities of a good citizen, and that the four 
citizenship perspectives are significantly related to political behaviour, 
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even when socioeconomic status and attitudinal variables related to 
participation are controlled. 
Sobel (1993) hypothesizes that, other things being equal, 
occupational involvement, such as authority and participation at work , 
generates wider political participation, and that this influence occurs most 
strongly across levels of similar formality between the occupational and 
political spheres. He found that the work participation, in fact, generates 
political participation, and that the connection is strongest along a 
hierarchy of formality connecting participation from the workplace to 
politics. 
Bowler and Donovan (1994)^ ^ examine mobilization and 
conversion perspectives of opinion change during election campaigns, 
and found reflection of mobilization of awareness more than conversion 
on opinion. Further, little support was found for the hypothesis that media 
spending affects opinions, and that many voters are able to use cues other 
then advertising when making decisions. 
Lien (1994) examined ethnicity and its impact on political 
participation among Asians and Mexican Americans in California, and 
found that the two groups, despite a huge socioeconomic gap, bear 
similar ethnicity and participation structures. For both groups, 
acculturation increases participation; attachment to homeland culture 
does not necessarily discourage participation; and the role of group 
consciousness is much more complex than previously conceived. 
Shamir (1994)^ ^ analyzed the general election in Israel to compare 
the relationships between voting preferences and two predictors: voters' 
ideological position and the perceived charisma of political leaders, under 
two conditions: partisan elections and personal elections. Also whether 
these relationships are moderated by the ideological extremity of the 
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parties standing for election and by voters' personal disposition to ascribe 
importance to leadership. It was found that voters' ideological position 
was strongly related to leaders' perceived charisma and to voting 
preferences, but leaders' perceived charisma added significantly to the 
prediction of voting preferences, especially under conditions of personal 
elections. In combination, voters' ideological position and leaders' 
charisma perceptions predicted voting preferences very accurately. These 
relationships were not affected by the two hypothesized moderators. 
Tarn (1995)^ ^ predicted the voting behavior of Asians in U.S., 
treating Asians as a single homogeneous group in line with past studies. 
However, he found that the underlying assumption of homogeneity can 
produce fallacious results when the group Asians is not homogeneous. In 
fact, it is often the case that the separate ethnicities act as separate groups 
with their own unique political perspective and identities. 
Jankowski and John (1995) examined the factor structure of 
indicators used in composite indices of voting and campaign participation 
, confirming the Verba and Nie findings with respect to voting and 
campaign participation that the notion of political participation is not uni-
dimensional, and finds that the structure of participation is stable across 
age groups, cohorts, and periods, confirming that composite indices of 
voting and campaign participation are not confounded by age, cohort, or 
period effects. 
Simon (1995)^ '* examine the assumptions of rationality that the 
public choice theory employs by focusing on three issues: the nature of 
the rationality assumption, the orthogonality of rationality and 
selfishness, and the possibility of altruism. He found that the human 
rationality is much more complex than it is portrayed to be in neoclassical 
and public choice theories, and that much less can be derived by 
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deductive means from the (amended) assumptions of rationality than has 
been supposed by the exponents of those theories. 
Freie (1997)^ ^ assesses the effects of campaign participation on the 
attitudes and opinions of a group of young people, particularly attitudes 
of alienation. By comparing the result with a control group it was 
determined that campaign participation does result in greater attitudinal 
shift for participants than for non participants; however, the change that 
occurred resulted in shifts away from alienation ( as participatory 
democratic theorists have long claimed that political participation 
improves citizen and helps to integrate them into the political 
community). 
Lau and Jack (1998) discussed the application of behavioural 
decision theory (BDT) to two areas of political science research: voting 
behavior and international relations. First, the focus was on decision 
making by the mass public, and in the second on decision making by 
political elites. However, it was found that the mass—elite distinction 
may not be as important as the different situations or contexts in which 
voting and foreign policy decisions are typically made. 
Carlos et al. (2004) examined the voting behaviour of today's 
generation of youth at Indiana State University to determine voting 
attitudes and behaviour. The result showed that youth are interested in the 
democratic process and in voting, but they lack information on absentee 
voting requirements and candidate issue stance. 
Blais, Young and Lapp (2000)^ ^ tested the rational choice model 
with the help of two surveys, conducted during the 1995 Quebec 
referendum and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election, in which 
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very specific questions measured each element of the model. The study 
also included two other factors that can affect the propensity to vote— 
respondents' level of political interest and their sense of duty. It was 
found that, B (instrumental benefits), P (probability), and C (costs of 
becoming informed and going to polls) each matter, but only among those 
with a relatively weak sense of duty. The rational choice model is useful, 
but only in explaining behaviour at the margins of this important norm. 
Bartels (2000)^ ^ assessed the extent of 'partisan voting' in 
American national elections since 1952 against the backdrop of the 
assertion that 'parties in America are on the decline'. He found that the 
impact of partisan loyalties on voting behaviour has increased in each of 
the last six presidential election, reaching a level in 1996 almost 80% 
higher than in 1972—and significantly higher than in any presidential 
election in at least 50 years. 
Green and Shachar (2000) examined the hypothesis whether 
casting a ballot in one election increases the voter's propensity to go to 
the polls in the future. Voter turnout patterns in the 1972-76 and 1992-96 
American National Panel Survey, as well as published experimental 
research, indicated that the effects of past voter turnout on current voting 
propensities are sizeable. 
Crowley (2001)"'^  draws attention to the ethnic problem existing 
within Western liberal democracies. He shows the manner in which 
numerically small ethnic groups are recognized, either positively or 
negatively, promotes specific forms of marginalization in democratic 
system. The author calls attention to the theoretical and empirical 
difficulties of assigning a presumptive capacity for collective 
consciousness and action to ethnic categories. However, the problem was 
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analyzed using the tools appropriate to other instances of unequally 
distributed citizenship rights, and it expresses both the ideal and the 
inherent limits of citizenship rights. 
Goldstein and Ridout (2002) identify and evaluate three possible 
ways in which mobilization might have affected levels of turnout over 
time: (a) aggregate rates of mobilization may have declined, (b) the 
effectiveness of mobilization contacts may have declined, and (c) the 
targeting of mobilization may have changed. No evidence of a decline in 
mobilization activity was found, nor have the mobilization techniques 
become less effective. Further, it was found that the campaigns are less 
likely to target habitual voters in recent years; this pattern of behaviour 
can only explain a small amount of the overall decline in turnout. 
Ainsworth (2002) creates a game theoretic, micro level 
foundation for macro level interest group behaviour to study political 
efficacy which is, traditionally, measured at the individual level and 
studied as an individual level attribute in isolation from macro level 
event. In many studies, political efficacy is viewed as largely static, 
affected primarily by levels of income and education. The author uses a 
simple participation game to model a form of individual level political 
efficacy and detail the empirical implications of the hypothesized 
individual level behaviour for the aggregate levels of group membership. 
The results suggest that empirical studies of the effects of political 
efficacy on collective efforts are susceptible to sampling and 
measurement problems. 
Greene (2002)^ '' undertakes a comprehensive examination of the 
social - psychological theory behind the concept of partisanship and 
addresses how well contemporary measures, especially the ubiquitous 
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NES / Michigan measure, accord with contemporary theories of 
measurement, attitudes, and group identification. After a brief empirical 
demonstration of the utility of these newer measures, recommendations 
are made for using new theory and new measures to improve our 
understanding of the role of partisanship in influencing political 
behaviour. 
Jackson (2003) assesses socio-demographic influences on the 
registration status and turnout of Latino citizens in the U.S, and whether 
and how the influences on electoral participation differ between Anglos 
and Latinos. It was found that Latinos' deficits on socioeconomic status 
and social-connectedness largely account for their lower levels of 
participation. Whereas formal education and marriage demonstrate 
greater influence on the participation of Anglos, Latinos reap greater 
participatory benefits from age. 
-1 / ' 
Michelson (2003) used randomized experimentation to study 
municipal election in central California examining the effects of face-to-
face canvassing on voter turnout. Two kinds of appeals were made to 
potential voters: one emphasized ethnic solidarity; the other emphasized 
civic duty. Canvassing was remarkably successful; voters who were 
contacted were significantly more likely to vote. The mobilization effort 
had a particularly large effect on the turnout of Latino Democrates. 
Fournier et al, (2003) demonstrate that there is a significant 
interaction between performance evaluations and issue importance. 
People concerned about an issue assign more weight to their evaluations 
of the government's performance on that issue when making up their 
mind. Issue importance mediates the impact of public policy issues on 
electoral decisions. Individuals who consider that an issue is important 
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are more likely to rely on their attitudes toward that issue when 
evaluating candidates and deciding for whom to vote. 
Gimpel, Dyck and Shaw (2004) examined the effect of social and 
political context on turnout. The results were that one's neighborhood has 
a relatively minor impact on the decision to vote. However, authors found 
that neighborhoods influence voting by interacting with partisan 
affiliation to dampen turnout among voters we might otherwise expect to 
participate. Most notably, the Republican partisans in enemy territory 
tend to vote less than expected, even after accounting for socioeconomic 
status. Regarding campaign strategy, it is suggested that the campaign 
targeting efforts could be improved by an integration of aggregate-and 
individual-level information about voter. 
Joanne and Krosnick (2004) The research examined here the 
effect of two potential motivators of political activism—Policy change 
threat and Policy change opportunity. Different version of a letter were 
sent by a political lobbying organization to political contributors. One 
version highlighted threat of undesirable policy changes; another version 
highlighted opportunities for desirable policy changes, and the third 
version did neither. Policy change threat increased the number of 
financial contribution made to the interest group, but policy change 
opportunity did not. 
Leigh (2005)'"' what impact do income and other demographic 
factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using the post-election surveys 
of 1400 voters in 10 duration elections between 1996 and 2001, the 
author explored the impact the individual, local and national factors have 
on voters' decisions. The poor, foreign-bom, younger voters, voters bom 
since 1950, men, unmarried are more likely to be left-wing. Over the past 
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35 years the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but on 
three dimensions—between young and old, between rich and poor, and 
between native bom and foreign-bom—it has widened. At 
neighbourhood level voters who live in richer neighborhood are more 
likely to be right-wing. While those in more ethically diverse or unequal 
neighborhoods are likely to be left-wing. 
Hillygus (2005)'*^  tests three competing hypotheses explaining the 
enduring link between higher education and political behaviour. The 
results suggest that the content of higher education is influential in 
shaping participation in American democracy. 
Panagopoulos (2005)'*^  examines the widespread presence of 
compulsory voting and the significant impact these laws appear to have 
on voting behaviour, and how mandatory voting alters the decision 
making calculus of individual voters in this system. The author adapted 
rational choice models of participation in elections for compulsory voting 
system to find that the level of penalties countries impose for non-
compliance and the degree of penalty enforcement impact turnout rates. 
Voters in mandatory voting system abstain least when both the penalties 
and the likelihood of enforcement are high and abstain most when both 
meaningless. 
Samuel and Brian (2005)'*^  test internet as an evaluative technique 
to assess the representativeness of political participation pattems. To 
incorporate it the author drew upon resource theory to inform two-stage 
ordered - logit models of online and offline political participation. The 
result suggests that the factors predicting online participation often differ 
from the factors that predict offline participation. Further, those from 
higher socioeconomic background tend to disproportionately possess 
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these online determinants. The author, further, investigated whether 
online participators' opinions reflect or distort those of the general 
population. Overall, the finding was that online participation tends to 
relate moderately with liberal preferences. However, because offline 
participation relates to political attitudes similarly, the internet only 
marginally advantages the political voices of liberals. 
Yuval and Heme (2005)'*'* address the issue of sincere and 
sophisticated voting under majoritarian and non-majoritarian voting 
procedures. By conducting experimental voting games, a common 
majoritarian procedure-Plurality Voting (PV) with a non majoritarian 
procedure, Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV)—were compared. Two 
different aspects of the subject—the likelihood of sophisticated voting 
under each one of the voting procedures and the conditions that foster 
sincere and sophisticated voting under these procedures—^were focused. 
The results highlighted the significant differences between majoritarian 
and non-majoritarian voting procedures as a key factor in determining the 
tendency of voters to use sincere and sophisticated voting. Clearly, the 
sincere model was dominant in SVV games while sophisticated voting 
dominated the PV games. The extent of sophisticated voting can counter 
to the group size, a tendency that was stronger under SVV than under PV. 
By demonstrating the advantages of the minority principle, when voter 
are small in number, the author hopes to encourage the development of a 
solution that will enable the use of SVV in general elections. 
Chong and Rogers (2005)'*^  analyzed the trend that the racial group 
solidarity which boosted the rates of political participation among African 
Americans in 1960s and 1970s has moderated in 1980s, if not faded 
entirely. The author hypothesized that decline in solidarity was due to 
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dilution of measures of group solidarity in recent studies, which should 
incorporate both psychological 'identification' and the ideological beliefs 
that comprise 'consciousness'. Moreover, the effect of solidarity will vary 
across forms of participation and be greatest on political activities that 
require group co-ordination. The author re-analyzed the 1984 NBES and 
found that recent studies used the more narrowly circumscribed measures 
of the concepts like—identification and consciousness—which might 
have led to underestimating its influence on political participation. It was 
also found that these two concepts had modest effect on voting turnout in 
1984, but a significant influence on participation in several traditional 
campaign activities, petitioning government officials, and especially 
participation in protests and boycotts. 
Harris, Sinclair and Mckenzie (2005)'*^  analyzed the positive 
effects of black political empowerment and the negative effects of 
economic and social distress on black political participation, and 
combined effect of these factors on aggregate-levels of black civic 
activity in the time period from 1973 to 1994. It was found that the 
positive influence of black political empowerment on macro levels of 
black civic activity is countered by economic and social factors that 
swamp the benefits gained from black polifical success. 
Ikeda and Richey (2005)''^  test influence of social networking as 
one of the three aspects of social capital-others being trust, and norms of 
reciprocity—on political behaviour. Also, the effect of involvement in 
formally organized voluntary associations and informal social networks. 
The authors also examine whether hierarchical networks have a different 
impact on participation than equal relafionships. To determine if networks 
with bridging or bonding social capital affect participafion differently. 
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they also measure the openness to outsiders of these networks. It was 
found through negative binomial regression model that there is a strong 
positive relationship between formal and informal social networking— 
including network hierarchy and some forms of openness—and political 
participation. 
Geys and Heyndels (2006)'*^  empirically analyzed the 2000 
Flemish municipal elections showing that a higher number of parties 
competing in the election lowers turnout. The size inequalities between 
the parties exert a positive-though insignificant -influence on voter 
participation. 
Man and Heath (2006/^ analyzed the question about the relative 
influence that husbands and wives have on each other's political 
behaviour. The married women's class identity and political behaviour 
are borrowed from her husband and are primarily influenced by her 
husband's characteristics. 
Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker (2006)^ " argue that political 
participation is shaped by locally distinctive 'rules-in-use', 
notwithstanding the socio-economic status or level of social capital in an 
area. The authors focus on a third factor-the institutional rules that frame 
participation. The institutional determinants of participation are more 
malleable as compared to resources and social capital. The result shows 
how institutional factors have shaped the environment within which 
citizens make their decisions about engagement, resulting in 
demonstrable effects upon levels of participation. 
Hayes, Scheufele and Huge (2006)^ ^ argue that in a polarized 
opinion climate, people may refrain from participating in public 
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observable political activities that make them vulnerable to scrutiny and 
criticism by others who hold opinion that differ from their own. The 
authors test this claim by determining whether people who are relatively 
more influenced by the climate of opinion when choosing whether or not 
to voice an opinion, are also relatively less likely to engage in public 
political activities. The results showed that even after controlling for 
interest in politics, political ideology, ideological extremity, political 
efficacy, attention to political news, dispositional shyness, frequency of 
political discussion, and demographics, dispositional self-censors 
reported having engaged in relatively fewer public political activities over 
the prior 2 years compared to those less willing to censor their own 
opinion expression. 
Killian, Schoen and Dusso (2007)^ ^ analyzed whether citizens 
turnout to vote because of changes in their personal financial situation or 
they are influenced by the nation's economic performance. After analysis 
of data from 1978 to 2004, based on a reference-dependent model of 
voter turnout, it was found that those who perceive that over the last year 
their own financial situation has improved relative to the economy are 
less likely to vote than those who view the economy as outperforming 
their own financial situation. 
Listhang and Gronflaten (2007) analyzed the electoral turnout in 
Norway which has been declining over a long period for local elections 
and, at the four most recent sorting elections. The authors investigated 
whether the fall in turnout generalize to other forms of political 
participation and political involvement. Data from the Norwegian 
Election studies 1965-2001 and the Norwegian Value studies 1982-1996 
are analyzed. In contrast to the decline of turnout, the authors find that the 
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broader political activity of citizen has increased. The rise in political 
involvement and activism is quite widespread, covering dimensions like 
political interest, political discussion, and political action. Education is 
strongly associated with most forms of civic participation and the rise in 
educational levels normally leads to an increase in participation rates. 
Data show that women are now as active as men in most dimensions of 
participation. In Norway, turnout at elections display one pattern over 
time, while other indicators of political participation and involvement 
show different trajectories. There is no general civic decline. 
Adman (2008)^ '* focuses on the hypothesis put forward by Carole 
Pateman and by Sidney Verba and colleagues that state that by practicing 
civic skills and democratic decision-making at the workplace, citizen 
become more active in politics. The findings contradict previous 
empirical research as no impact on political participation was discovered. 
The study points to the importance of using panel models when 
investigating the causes of political participation. 
Claassen (2008)^ ^ explores the relationships between campaign 
participation and three variables typically parameterized as predictors of 
participation: receiving a contact, ideological extremism, and strength of 
party identification. The effect of strength of party identification on 
campaign participation proves robust; however, all of the association 
between contacts and participation and ideological extremism and 
participation appear to extend fi^om, not into, participation and past 
participation. 
Piatt (2008)^ ^ offers an opportunity model of participation to study 
how policy goals shape individual participation and how aggregate 
participation shape policymaking. The central argument is that 
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individuals' policy goals allow them to recognize those moments when it 
is most efficient and / or effective to take action. Examining black 
participation from 1980 to 1994, the author shows that black Americans 
are more likely to participate when they face external threats, are 
embedded in social networks, and have greater access to policymakers. 
Most importantly, the recognition of these opportunities varies according 
to individuals' resources. 
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HYPOTHESES: 
The present research was planned to investigate the 
changing pattern in the Political Behavior of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. 
The change in trend or pattern in political behavior will be seen on 
various factors delineated in foregone pages. In the light of available 
research literature reviewed in this chapter, related directly or indirectly 
with the proposed study, the following research hypotheses are 
formulated. 
Hj : Urban residents will exhibit more political activity than their rural 
counterparts. 
H2: Male Muslims will be more politically active than females. 
H3 : Change in the level of education will lead to commensurate change 
in political participation. 
H4: Voting turnout will be higher among older Muslims. 
H5 : Muslims belonging to high income group will be more involved in 
voting participation. 
Hg: Political Information Index- a dimension of cognitive orientation will 
be higher in urban Muslims than the rural. 
H7 : Political Trust- a dimension of evaluative orientation will be higher 
among urban than the rural Muslims 
Kg: Campaign participation- a dimension of affective orientation will be 
higher among urban Muslims. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The research design of a study is bound up with its purpose and nature of 
the variables to be probed. Research investigators must take utmost care 
on selecting the samples so that sampling errors can be avoided to a 
greater extent. Regarding research some explanations have been made by 
some prominent researchers who suggested how one can pursue a 
scientific investigation in the field of behavioural sciences. 
Lindquist (1956)^ ^ stated that "the researches are designed to 
proceed in a planned manner to control variance and to answer pertinent 
questions". 
Edward (1968) gave his explanation regarding research that "in 
research we don't haphazardly make observation of any and all kinds, but 
rather our attention is directed towards those observations that we believe 
to be relevant to the question we have previously formulated. The 
objective of research, as recognized by all sciences, is to use observation 
as a basis of answering questions of interest". 
The above referred definitions specify very clearly that in every 
scientific investigation the researchers try to describe, explain, predict 
and control the phenomena with which they deal and through these 
processes they enhance the objectivity of research endeavor. 
The purpose of the present research was to ascertain "Changing 
Patterns of Political Behaviour of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh since 
1991". In this study an attempt is being made to map the prevailing trends 
and patterns of political behaviour of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, to 
understand the behavioural patterns of the community, to get an insight 
into the psyche of Muslims mental make-up. In this study some 
independent variables like beliefs and psychological / attitudinal aspects 
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were examined by assessing the joint impact of all these variables on 
political behaviour of Muslims of Uttar Pradesh. Taking into 
consideration the delicacy of the study and paucity of study on the 
subject, the following steps were taken to make this piece of research 
more explicit and purposeful. 
SAMPLE: 
It has always been difficult or rather impossible task for any 
researcher to cover the whole population for the purpose of study , hence, 
sample from a population is used. A sample is a small group of a 
population representing the characteristics of the entire population. 
Mohsin (1984/^ contended that, "sample is a small part of the total 
existing events, objects or the information". Kerlinger (1983)^ " stated 
that "sample is a portion of population or universe as to be representative 
of that population or universe". Thus, sampling is a process of drawing a 
small portion of population representing the characteristics of the entire 
population. The purposive random sampling technique was used to select 
sample for the present research. The appropriate sample makes it possible 
to draw reliable inferences and to make generalizations about the 
population from where samples are drawn. 
The research topic of present study warranted to select the samples 
from amongst the whole of the state of Uttar Pradesh, consisting of 18.5% 
of Muslim population. Although, the western part of the state consists 
some of the Muslim majority areas, but as we go towards eastern part of 
the state the Muslim population in the state starts getting sparse. Even the 
quality of population also starts getting diluted. The level of literacy and 
income status starts falling as we move from west to east in U.P. 
However, this fact did not affect the sampling procedure, as equal 
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representation were given to both western and eastern, and even central 
region was given adequate representation. 
The total number of 1200 samples were drawn from the different 
parts of the state. In all 840 males were sampled, out of which 480 males 
were taken from urban areas-like state capital and district towns and cities 
and 360 males were taken from rural areas- like villages and regions 
around district towns and cities. Similarly, in all 360 females were 
interviewed, out of which 240 were in urban centers and 120 were from 
rural areas. 
Table 3.1 
Break up of the sample 
Group No. of Sample 
Urban Male 
Rural Male 
Total Males 
Urban Females 
Rural Females 
Total Females 
Total Sample 
480 
360 
840 
240 
120 
360 
1200 
Besides, Male-Female, urban-rural characteristics, the total sample 
was further divided into groups based on following characteristics-
Education, Age and income. Thus, in all five Socio-Economic 
independent variables were used. In short, Sex, Region, Education, Age 
and income were the various groups in which the whole sample was 
divided. On the basis of education further two groups- education up to 
high school and education above high school- were made. Similarly, on 
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the basis of age two groups- age from 36 to 50 years and age above 50 
years were made; on the basis of income three groups- lower income, 
middle income and high income- were made. The lower income group 
consisted of those having income up to Rs. 5000/ per month in urban area 
and Rs.3000/ per month in rural area. The middle income consisted of 
those having income up to Rs.20,000/ per month in urban area and 
Rs. 12,000/ per month in rural area. And the high income group consisted 
of those having income above Rs.20,000/ per month in urban and income 
above Rs. 12,000/ per month in rural area. 
Table 3.2 
Sample Characteristics 
Groups Category Range 
Sex Male 
Female 
Region Urban 
Rural 
Education Male - urban / rural l.Upto High School 
2.Above High School 
Female - urban / rural do 
Age Male - urban / rural l.From36to 50yrs 
2. Above 50 yrs 
Female - urban / rural do 
Income Male / Female - urban l.low-upto5000/ 
2.middle-upto 20,000/ 
3.highabove20,000/ 
Male / Female - rural l.lowupto3000/ 
2.middle-uptol2,000/ 
3.high above 12,000/ 
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TOOLS USED; 
Perhaps there is no single psychological test which can tell us 
about all the aspects of behaviour. Since human being is a composite of 
numerous behavioral patterns so, for measuring each behavioural aspect 
an independent psychological test is used. The questionnaire method is 
one of the important psychological test which has been used in the 
present investigation as it is most convenient to administer. A 
questionnaire contains numerous statements and the respondents are 
required to answer each statement according to the instructions given to 
the subjects. It was quite inconvenient to find that there is not a single 
scale of political behaviour as such that is inclusive of all the aspects of 
political behaviour. However, the questionnaire used by centre for studies 
in developing societies (CSDS) in its various pre-poll and post-poll 
surveys for assembly and national election survey (NES) came very 
handy tool in preparing a questionnaire that suited the requirement of the 
thesis. The questions indicating psychological orientation like- cognitive, 
affective and evaluative- and other aspects of political behaviour were 
picked and choose from CSDS questionnaire. 
Political Behavior Questionnaire: 
The questionnaire measuring the behaviour of Muslims political 
aspects was determined by seventeen dimensions. The psychological 
orientations like cognitive- contained four dimensions, the affective 
orientation-contained another set of four dimensions and the evaluative 
orientation- contained another four dimensions. 
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Besides these twelve dimensions, five more dimensions were 
measured to encompass the political behavior in totality. In all it took ten 
pages (appendix-I) and 66 questions in informal language, so worded as 
to be understood by persons with a reading knowledge. However, the 
questions were read aloud to subjects along with the answer options. 
The answers of the respondents were meticulously tick marked in 
the questionnaire sheet itself The answer options ranged from simple 
'Yes' or 'No', 'agree' or 'disagree', to 'fully agree', 'somewhat agree', 
'somewhat disagree', 'fully disagree' and 'a great deal', 'somewhat', 'not 
at air etc. The purpose of such a wide answer options was to record even 
the most minute of detail. 
The following table gives details about the question number and its 
dimensions to which it belonged. 
Table: 3.3 Details of questionnaire 
S.No Dimensions 
1. Cognitive Orientation 
a) Political Interest 
b) Political Information Index 
c) Issue and Problem Awareness 
d) Symbol and Heritage Awareness 
2. Affective Orientation 
a) Voting Turnout/Participation 
b) Campaign Participation 
c) Communal Activity 
d) Political Action 
No. of questions 
24 
06 
06 
08 
04 
15 
03 
03 
06 
03 
109 
3. Evaluative Orientation 16 
a) Attitude towards System 06 
b) Attitude towards Candidate 02 
c) Political Efficacy 05 
d) Political Trust 03 
4. Other Political Aspects 10 
a) Mass Media Exposure 04 
b) Mobilization 03 
c) Party Affiliation 01 
d) Voter Preference 01 
e) Opinion Decider 01 
Biographical Information Blank (BIB) 
For recording background information of respondent's 
Biographical Information Blank (BIB) was prepared that includes 
respondent age, sex, qualification, place of residence and total income. 
(Appendix-II) 
Statistical Analysis: 
For converting the questions on political behaviour into numerals, 
first of all, the various answer options to a question were graded 
according to number of answer options available in a question in a 
descending order, with answer option showing greater political behaviour 
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given more number. For example, if a question reads, 'Are you interested 
in politics?' and answer options are 'Yes' or 'No', the 'Yes' answer 
option showing greater political behaviour will get more marks i.e. 'Yes' 
gets 1 marks and 'No' gets 0 marks. Thus all the questions were graded 
and total marks were obtained. Similarly, individual respondent's marks 
were obtained and tabulated in already categorized groups on the basis of 
region, sex, education, age and income. 
In the First phase, the tables so obtained were combined with the 
dimensions as was required, and thus, various dimensions were permuted 
and combinations were calculated. In this way, percentages of all the 
dimensions were calculated. 
In the second phase. Bar diagrams were made computing these 
tables on the SPSS package. 
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RESULTS DISCUSSION 
CHAPTER IV 
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CHAPTER IV 
CHANGING SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASES OF 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR OF MUSLIMS 
The Socio-Economic Resource level (SERL) plays a very 
important role in measuring the influence; and shaping of the political 
activity in general. Given the social divisions and sub-divisions in India, 
it becomes all the more relevant. Even in the present study of Political 
behaviour in a religious minority group of Muslims of Uttar Pradesh, it 
becomes all the more significant. As here the educational and the income 
differences become a crucial factor in decision making, and the role of 
the sex and the age in political involvement is decisive. In the following 
discussion, five socio-economic resources i.e rural-urban, male-female, 
education, age and income are juxtaposed with various political 
dimensions and modes of political participation to find the level of 
political participation of Muslims. 
Urban-Rural Differences 
The terminology of political participation is replete with terms 
'urban-rural difference'. One of the major mainstays of political 
behaviour research in western countries has been the study of the 
differences in urban and rural conditions and the effect these differences 
have on political behaviour. In comparing urban-rural political 
participation^ contrasted two models of political activity. One was called 
the mobilization model, and the other the decline-of-community model. 
The former predicts more political activity in urban centers than in rural 
communities; the latter predicts the opposite. The argument goes that, 
persons close to the centre occupy an environmental position which 
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naturally links them into the communications network involved in policy 
decisions for the society. Persons near the centre receive more stimuli 
enticing them to participate, and they receive more support from their 
peers when they do participate. ' 
In the decline-of-community model, in "Participation in 
America", the authors, Verba and Nie , concluded that as one moves from 
the smallness and intimacy of town or village to the massive 
impersonality of the city, the participation declines. In the small town, the 
community is a manageable size. Citizens can know the ropes of politics, 
know whom to contact, know each other so that they can form political 
groups. In the larger units, politics is more complicated, impersonal and 
distant. In addition, 'modernization' shatters political units. All these 
changes, according to the decline-of-community model, should reduce the 
level of participation within community. 
When the two-models are applied to see in Indian context which 
one is applicable, it was found that the Muslims of rural part of U.P., 
exhibit a markedly greater interest in anything that is politics. 
The Table.4.1. shows different dimensions of political behaviour 
of urban and rural Muslims. The voting participation (V.P), participation 
in campaign activities (C.P) and level of political interest (P.I) of rural 
Muslims are much greater than that of urban Muslims. The V.P, C.P, and 
P.I of rural Muslims is 56%, 21%, and 22% respectively whereas urban 
Muslims have only 46%, 12%, and 14% V.P, C.P, and P.I respectively. 
Rural Muslims might be backward as compared to their urban 
counterparts in terms of political information index (P.I.I), symbol and 
heritage awareness (SHA) and their exposure to mass media (MME) but 
so far as their involvement in political activities is concerned their 
attitude towards candidate (ATC) and attitude towards democratic system 
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(ATS), political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) - all are much 
higher than that of urban Muslims. As a result, rural Muslims are more 
politically mobilized (M) than those of urban Muslims. Table.4.1 shows 
a difference of double the points on Mobilization M) dimension which 
speaks volumes about rural and urban difference in Muslim political 
activities. 
Table 4.1 Political Behaviour by Urban-Rural Dichotomy. 
Dimensions Urban Rural 
% 
46 
12 
14 
29 
18 
12 
28 
25 
12 
23 
17 
25 
21 
16 
49 
27 
24 
70 
16 
28 
18 
18 
20 
% 
56 
21 
22 
22 
20 
20 
8 
21 
25 
30 
17 
37 
42 
9 
60 
21 
19 
74 
21 
25 
28 
22 
4 
Difference 
-10 
•9 
-8 
7 
-2 
-8 
20 
4 
-13 
-7 
0 
-12 
-21 
7 
-11 
6 
5 
•4 
-5 
3 
-10 
-4 
16 
V.P 
C.P 
P.I 
P.I.I 
IPA 
CA 
SHA 
ATS 
ATC 
PA 
PE 
PT 
M 
MME 
P.aff.S.P 
P.aff.BSP 
P.aff.C 
V.preparty 
ODfm 
ODf 
ODC 
ODcw 
ODS 
Regarding voting preference V.Pre) the overwhelming rural 
majority opted for party (74%) than candidate. In Party Affiliation, rural 
population is more outright and clear cut in making their minds than that 
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of urban. Among urban Muslims' choice of party affiliation (P.aff) the 
Samajwadi Party (49%) has an edge over Bhaujan Samajwadi Party 
(27%) and Congress (24%) but in the rural Muslims' psyche the congress 
still haunting as an initiator of Babri movement. As a result, only 19% 
rural Muslims favour congress, whereas almost 100% consider Bhartiya 
Janata Party (BJ.P) as pariah of Muslim politics. Whereas, Samajwadi 
Party (SP) is considered messiah as majority in both rural and urban 
centers hitch on to the bandwagon of Samajwadi Party's mullah 
mulayam. 
As regard to, the Opinion Deciders (OD), opinions of friends (OD 
f), caste groups (OD c) and co-workers (OD cw) play heavily over the 
minds of Muslim voters in both rural and urban areas. Almost 75% 
voters in rural areas and 64% in urban make up their mind due to these 
factors. 
However, the rural Muslim is more caste conscious in his 
selection of candidates and parties. In urban Muslims spouses' opinion is 
also a deciding factor in 20% of voters which is a meager 4% in rural 
Muslims spouses. It seems spouses in rural homes especially females are 
not taken seriously in their political acumen. 
Figure 4.1 
Urban-Rural Difference 
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It may be argued in Indian Muslims context that the residents of 
urban community as opposed to those of rural communities posses greater 
Political Information Index (PII) and have more Mass Media Exposure 
(MME), but when it comes to taking interest and implementing it through 
activities like voting and attending meetings, the rural residents are more 
active than those of urban dwellers. (Fig: 4.1) 
Table: 4.1 shows that the voter turnout of rural Muslims is 56% 
whereas in case of urban Muslims it is only 46%. Higher turnout of rural 
Muslims is substantiated by the data collected by Centre for Studies in 
Developing Societies (CSDS/ in locality- wise analysis of 2009 poll. 
This Table: 4.2 shows voter turnout of rural, semi-rural and urban in 
Uttar Pradesh. 
Table 4.2 Uttar Pradesh Locality-Wise Analysis-2009 
Region Total seats Turnout 
_ _ 
49.6 
38.1 
47.7 
Source: CSDS Data Unit 
Rural 
Semi-rural 
Urban 
Total 
60 
17 
3 
80 
As can be seen in Table 4.2 the turnout of rural masses (47.7) in 
2009 Lok Sabha Elections in Uttar Pradesh was much higher than urbans 
(38.1). 
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Research studies: 
Just as there are several studies supporting the mobilization 
model, there are a number that find more political activity (in particular, 
higher voting turnout) in a smaller communities. '^ ^ ' ^ ' *' ^ ' ^ "'" 
Nie, et al.(1969) , (ii) in study of six political systems (the U.S., 
the U.K. Germany, Italy, Mexico, and India), found no significant 
correlation between urbanism and the level of political activity. In India 
the correlation coefficient was an insignificant .035, and when controls 
for social status and organizational involvement were introduced, the 
correlation reversed from positive to negative. It was concluded that, 'the 
least expected pattern is the consistent absence of any relationship 
between urban residence and political participation. 
In another study Alex Inkeles (1969), in his work on six 
countries: Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria, and East Pakistan, 
found that urban residence had very little effect on 'participant 
citizenship'. 
Cameron, Hendricks and Hofferbet (1972),^ '* came to a similar 
conclusion regarding the hypothesized effect of urbanization on voter 
turnout. Using election data at the subnational level from five nations, 
France, India, Mexico, Switzerland and the United States, the authors 
reported, 'Perhaps the most interesting finding is that urbanization, when 
isolated fi*om other dimensions, is not positively associated with 
participation'. 
Still another study which contradicts conventional wisdom about 
political behaviour comes from Japan. In this research, the author found 
that the residents of rural areas indicated a somewhat higher level of 
political interest than did urban residents. ' 
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The Indian Gallup surveys also suggested that the rural people 
might be becoming more active as years pass. This is seen from the 
difference in figures from the 1961, 1964 and 1967 polls. From being 
behind by 3% point in 1961, the rural people had higher turnout by 8% 
point in 1967 polls.^ ^ 
Table 4.3 Region-wise turnout in Lok Sabha Elections 
Region 2004 (%) 2009(%) 
Rural 58J 583 
Urban 51.6 51.5 
Total 58 58.4 
Source: CSDS Data Unit 
The study conducted by CSDS in various NES (National Election 
Surveys) in the period from 1991 onwards shows that turnout of rural 
and sub-rural areas are more as compared to those of urban masses 
(Table: 4.3). In 2004 election results, as against total turnout of 58%, the 
turnout for urban masses was 51.6% and rural masses was 58.7%o. 
similarly in 2009 election results, as against total turnout of 58.4%, the 
urban turnout was 51.5% and rural was 58.5%. 
These findings, however, are contrary not only to most research 
conducted in the western nations, but also to conclusions based on an 
analysis of aggregate data, Myron Weiner (1963)/^ had found that in 
general states with higher proportion of urban population recorded higher 
voter turnout. On the basis of this finding, one should not conclude that 
people living in the cities necessarily have higher voting frequency than 
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those living in rural areas; such a conclusion would be subject to criticism 
on the ground of "Ecological fallacy". 
Explanations: 
To account for the trend in urban-rural area and the pattern of no 
change in the political behaviour of Muslims it was found that first, the 
level of attachment to the locality among the rural Muslims was more 
than those of urban Muslims. The probable reason could be the ownership 
of land in rural areas by rural Muslims, and the higher incidence of 
residence changes among the urban Muslims. 
Second, factional rivalries are more rampant in much of rural 
area of U.P. Many research studies have shown that most Indian villages 
are divided into at least two factions. During election times these factions 
align themselves with competing political parties. The factions may 
switch their loyalty, but if one switches one way its opponent is likely to 
go the other way. Factions thus become the vehicle of political 
mobilization and voter turnout. 
In a comparative study of political participation, Verba, Ahmed 
and Bhatt (1978) found that electoral activity among the Harijans in 
India was "externally motivated". That is, voting was the result of 
mobilization by external group, like the political parties or caste 
leadership. Such external mobilization for election purpose was steeper in 
rural area than in urban. 
India is still, even after 60 years, a country of villages. The bulk 
of the Indian voters comes from the villages. For this reason, parties 
organized more public meetings and rallies in the rural areas than in the 
cities. 
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There are evidence to suggest that urban residents in contrast to 
rural are somewhat more alienated from the political system in India. The 
attitude towards system (ATS) dimension in the questionnaire found that 
the rural population was more satisfied with administrative services at all 
levels of the government. 
Rosenthal (1970)^ ^ argues that since independence political 
influence has gradually moved away from urban areas. By 
"deurbanization", he does not mean an actual population migration to the 
villages but 'increased participation in political power by a greater 
number and variety of social segment and individuals'. In a rural Muslim, 
of course, this means power for a wider range of rural interests. 
These then may be the reasons why rural Muslims are more 
politically active than their urban counterparts. This rejects the research 
hypothesis Hj because rural Muslims are exhibiting more political 
activity than urban ones. 
Conclusions: 
There is a strong hint in the data presented here that the 
behavioural pattern of Muslims are not different from other caste and 
religious communities living in rural and urban areas. What holds true for 
others, are also fact for Muslims in rural or urban area. They are equally 
part of the political system, and thus, remain part and parcel of its over all 
impact irrespective of their religious affinity. So what holds true for 
goose, also holds true for gays. Even for Muslims the urbanism and 
political involvement is not as direct as western political scientist 
presume. 
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Male-Female Differences 
Sex Related Political Behaviour 
Most studies have shown that men are more likely to be 
politically active than women. In the United States, although the gap is 
gradually becoming narrower, the voting rate of women is about ten 
percent lower than that of men. The disparity in activity grows greater 
as one moves up from mass political activity such as voting, to more 
difficult political acts such as to occupy political office. Political 
differences based on sex are manifestations of more general role 
differences between male and female. The gap is the widest among low 
status people, and the narrowest among upper status people; that is, at the 
lowest status levels, very few women participate, but among the highest 
status levels, among the college educated women, for example, political 
participation rates are little different from those among men. 
In India the scenario is not too different as compared to that of 
rest of the world. Here as well, what is reflected is that women possess 
fewer socioeconomic resources. Individual's educational level and 
income- as a measure of socioeconomic resources prove that it is low 
among Indian women especially Muslims. Literacy level of female in U.P 
for Muslims was only 37.4% and total worker Muslims female was only 
12.4% according to 2001 census report^ '*. 
Difference in Voting Turnout 
The turnout of men and women voters showed a difference of 
around 10 to 8 percentage points between 1991 and 2004 elections 
(CSDS Data Unit).^ ^ As can be seen from the Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Male-Female Turnout 
Years 
1991 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2004 
Tumout(%) 
Female 
51.34 
53.41 
57.69 
55.63 
53.63 
Tumout(%) 
male 
61.58 
62.06 
69.86 
63.96 
61.98 
Source: CSDS Data Unit 
As regards other political activities, women are way far behind men 
as can be seen from another table. 
Table 4.5 Male-Female Political Behaviour 
Dimensions Male Female 
% Difference 
V.P 
C.P 
p.! 
P.I.I 
IPA 
CA 
SHA 
ATS 
ATC 
PA 
PE 
PT 
M 
MME 
P.aff.S.P 
P.aff.BSP 
P.aff.C 
V.pre c 
V.pre party 
ODfm 
ODf 
ODC 
0 0 cw 
ODS 
51.26 
19.64 
21.84 
35.45 
24.52 
19.25 
12.25 
29.39 
20.71 
29.36 
22.12 
33.01 
20.37 
10.72 
52.02 
25.47 
22.5 
27.5 
72.5 
6.73 
34.28 
29.76 
27.5 
1.66 
47.83 
5.17 
7.55 
7.96 
6.49 
9.3 
9.18 
21.34 
10.64 
18.98 
5.1 
29.03 
5.89 
9.06 
57.5 
23.33 
19.16 
28 
72 
44.16 
10.27 
4.16 
4.16 
41.38 
3.43 
14.47 
14.29 
13.88 
18.03 
9.95 
3.07 
27.05 
10.07 
10.38 
17.02 
3.98 
14.48 
1.66 
-5.48 
2.14 
3.34 
-0.5 
0.5 
-37.43 
24.01 
25.6 
23.34 
-39.72 
Figure 4.2 
Male-Female Difference 
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i lMale 
• Female 
<?•"<?? 
Variables 
It can be seen from the Table: 4.5 that women voted less than 
men by 3.43% points. It is reasonable to expect as women are less active 
politically as compared to their male counterparts as they remain confined 
to domestic chores. The best index of voting turnout by sex is literacy. 
According to census data 2001 , literacy rate among Muslims is 47.8% 
out of which 57.3% males and 37.4%) female literates. By this standard, 
47.83%) of voting percent (VP) for Muslim women is almost equal to 
male voting level of 51.26%). If women lag behind men in terms of voting 
frequency, they would be expected to lag still ftirther behind on other 
forms of political participation (Fig: 4.2). 
Male members in the electorate may themselves pressure their 
womenfolk to vote for the candidate of their (men's) choice, thus 
increasing turnout among women. But no similar positive factors are 
present in affecting female involvement in other acts. This premise is 
borne out by data in Table.3.5. The difference in campaign participation 
(C.P), communal activity (C.A), political action (P.A) and mobilization 
(M) between male and female is quite large. This shows females are 
discouraged from actively participating in politics. Their cognitive 
orientation and evaluative orientation has less different with that of 
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males. That proves males discuss politics with their spouses, and females 
closely follow their males' political affiliations. 
In opinion decider (OD), males are more guided by friends 
(34.2%), caste groups (29.7) and co-workers (27.5) and females are 
dependent on family members (44.1) and spouses (41.3) in deciding 
about whom to vote. On the basis of above findings we can say that 
political behaviour of females are totally different from males because 
males are politically more active than females this proves our research 
hypothesis H2. 
Explanation: 
Differences between men and women in individual and 
institutional resources help explain the gap in participation between the 
sexes. Women appear to be triply disadvantaged when it comes to 
political activity. Some explanations are as follows: 
First of all, it is normally found that women are less educated and 
are less likely to be institutionally affiliated, that can help them in 
realizing their frill political potential. 
Secondly, individual and institutional resources benefit women 
less than men when it comes to political activity. The conversion rate of 
such resources into political activity is greater for men than for women. 
Thirdly, it is a fact that women are less active than men. 
Fourthly, the women are not that backward to men in voting 
aspect of political activity. Their score on the voting activity scale are 
closer to those of men than are their scores on the overall activity scale. 
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Conclusion: 
Male / female differences in political activity are only partially 
explained by differences in the individual and institutional resources 
available to each of the sexes. Even when men and women have 
comparable levels of individual and institutional resources, female 
political activity rates remain well below those than of their male 
counterparts. The participatory disadvantage of being female is only 
partially reduced if resources are equalized. Clearly, such differences in 
participation have other social and cultural roots. 
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Education and Political Behaviour 
Daniel Lerner (1958), regards education as one of the most 
important steps in the poHtical development of the nation. Using 
UNESCO data from 54 countries, Lerner found strong correlation 
between literacy and participation. 
Almond and Verba (1965) ^' believe that education provides the 
shortest route to the creation of a modem political culture. Among the 
demographic variables education has been found to have the greatest 
effect on poHtical behaviour. Clearly, the educated person is a different 
kind of political actor than the person who has only a little education or 
none at all. 
The authors of The Civic Culture ^^ have done the most thorough 
research on the relationship between education and political participation. 
They found a positive relation between education and political 
participation. Persons with higher education are likely to have more 
information about politics; to have opinion on a wide range of subjects; to 
be economically well set in life; to influence the government and consider 
themselves free to engage in political discussions. This set of orientations 
constitutes what one might consider minimum requirement for political 
participation. 
The purpose here is to find whether education determine political 
behaviour of the people to the extent that Almond&Verba'**, Lerner''^  
and others claim it does? Unfortunately, the research conducted in the 
Asian countries does not support the western premise. Different studies 
have shown that in Asian region particularly in India, education is very 
strongly related to cognitive aspects of the political orientation like-
political interest, political information index, issue and problem 
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awareness, symbol and heritage awareness etc. A positive correlation is 
witnessed in these aspects. 
And those political activities where affective orientation aspects 
of the masses are involved like- voting participation, campaign 
participation, communal activity, political activity etc, a negative 
correlation is observed. The study done by Goel (1974)^ ^ on Indian 
Gallup polls on 1961, 1964 and 1967 proves the contention. The 
following Table no. 4.6 regarding the political behaviour of Muslims in 
U.P. further elaborates and proves the above point. 
Table 4.6 Education and Political Behaviour 
Dimensions 
V.P 
C.P 
P.I 
Pll 
IPA 
CA 
SHA 
ATS 
ATC 
P.A 
P.E 
PT 
IVI 
MIVIE 
p.aff.C 
p.aff.S.P 
p.aff.B.S.P 
v.pref.C 
v.pref.P 
O.D.fm 
O.D.f 
O.D.c 
O.D.cw 
O.D.S 
Education 
upto HS 
Urban% 
50.03 
15.23 
12.61 
36.26 
22.23 
20.21 
28.33 
27.29 
12.29 
31.66 
28.37 
34.7 
41.94 
26.14 
30 
46.25 
23.75 
22.5 
77.5 
12.08 
36.25 
29.58 
22.08 
0 
uptoHS 
Rural% 
60 
38.37 
36.28 
43.05 
38.38 
31.51 
21.33 
23.33 
32.98 
38.47 
32.12 
36.19 
57.77 
26.61 
13.75 
61.25 
25 
27.5 
72.5 
2 
37.08 
35 
25.83 
0 
Education 
Above HS 
Urban% 
44.16 
21.48 
31.7 
47.22 
32.81 
19.42 
43.33 
28.12 
19.86 
32.77 
18.78 
29.46 
33.33 
33.07 
28.75 
45.41 
25.83 
29.16 
70.83 
9.58 
34.58 
20 
30 
5.83 
Above HS 
Rural% 
49.83 
22.31 
24.16 
30.13 
39.79 
27.08 
35.83 
30.55 
35.41 
35 
31.28 
37.5 
29.44 
26.77 
12.5 
62.5 
29.16 
50.83 
49.16 
0 
24.16 
39.16 
36.66 
0 
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Figure 4.3 
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On measuring various dimensions of political behaviour, it was 
found that rural Muslims are more politically active than their urban 
counter-parts. Voting participation (60%), campaign participation 
(38.3%) along with political information index (43.0%) and political 
interest (36.2%) all seem to be fairly higher among rural Muslims as 
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compared to those of urban Muslims with literacy level below high 
school. Only in two dimensions -symbol and heritage awareness (SHA) 
and attitude towards system (ATS) -the rural Muslims are lower than 
urban. The mobilization of Muslims in rural area is phenomenal with 
57.7% involved in this activity. (Fig: 4.3). 
The voting preference (V.pref) among urban Muslims is heavily 
loaded in favour of party than in candidate, with 77.5% supporting party 
candidate. The party affiliation (P.aff) in rural Muslims shows a clear 
bias towards Samajwadi party (61.2%)) whereas less than half-percentage 
(46.2%)) of Muslims in urban centers give credence to samajwadi party 
(S.P). What is interesting is that the preference for Congress party shows 
a sort of revival in urban areas. Congress party (30%)) finds favours above 
BSP (23.7%)) in urban area. However, the story in rural area is not so pink 
for Congress as more and more support is forthcoming for SP (61.2%)) 
and less and less support is for Congress party (13.7%)). In opinion 
decider (OD) dimension, family members (fin) play a more meaningfiil 
role in urban area (12.0%)) than in rural whereas in both the places the 
combination of friends, caste and co-workers play a decisive role in make 
up of mind for voting. 
A glance at the political behaviour in rural and urban Muslims 
above high school, we find a lot many surprises in store Table: 4.6). 
Firstly, the polifical interest (PI) level has fallen up to 7%) point. 
Secondly, in general all the political activity nosedived with the 
advent of literacy. 
Thirdly, the mobilization (M) activity fell up to 4% point. 
Fourthly, only attitude towards candidate (ATC) and political 
trust (PT) shows an upward movement. 
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Fifthly, the awareness about issues and problems (IPA) in both 
the rural and urban area has remained untainted by the increase in the 
level of literacy. 
In the category of Muslims' education above high school, urban 
preference for voting to party remains of same higher trajectory but 
among rural preference for candidate over party takes a clear precedence. 
(Fig: 4.4). Nevertheless, the preference for samajwadi party remains 
intact as usual. In opinion decider (OD), yet another new trend is visible, 
in rural Muslims with education above high school, caste group (39.1%) 
plays decisive role in determining voting choice, whereas role of family 
member is almost negligible. Among the urban Muslims, the role of 
friend (34.5%) and co-workers (30.0%) takes an upper hand in opinion 
decider. 
Most polls show a curvilinear relationship; that is turnout rises 
with rise in literacy, but decreases with a fiirther rise in the level of 
education and continues to decrease with college education. In the period 
of study from 1991 onwards the U.P. Muslims have shown the same 
pattern with regard to education and their political behaviour. Thus, the 
Hypothesis (H3) that the change in the level of education will lead to 
commensurate change in the level of political participation rate does not 
prove correct. 
To sum up, we can say that the higher education does not lead to 
higher turnout rates in Muslims of Uttar Pradesh. The relationship 
between education and participation holds for such activities as taking 
interest in political matters, discussing politics, doing something in an 
attempt to influence local or national decisions, but not for such activities 
as voting, attending public meetings or donating money for partisan 
campaign. Unlike the case in the Western democracies, the educated 
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Muslims of India, especially those having higher education, are less likely 
to vote, to attend meetings, or to support partisan campaigns by physical 
participation or monetary contributions. 
Urban-Rural controls 
Before explaining these findings, it will be pertinent to see 
relationship between education and political participation with controls 
for urban-rural division. Since the difference between the less and the 
more educated classes in India with respect to their voting frequency is a 
function of their place of residence and the educated classes are 
concentrated in the cities, and since we know from our previous 
discussions that the urban dwellers are somewhat less likely to turn out at 
the polls than their rural brethren, it may be concluded that educated vote 
less because of their place of residence. 
The Table 4.6 indicates that the place of residence does not 
change the relationship between education and voting. Thus, in urban 
area and in the villages, those with higher education (high school and 
above) have lower turnout than those with less education (illiterates and 
below high school)- the higher voting (60%) is recorded by the less 
educated ones. The general trend is that urban living does not promote 
voter participation. 
Controls for urban-rural dichotomy were also seen in other 
political activities, as given in the table. These controls give mixed result 
both in urban and rural settings. Political interest, political information 
index, campaign participation, political action increases in urban area but 
decreases in rural with increase in education. Here rural local area factors 
and influences come into play as education make the people look for 
employment opportunities elsewhere. Overall education does not lead to 
higher participation in all political activities. 
137 
The evidences suggest that education does prepare an individual 
for higher participation. The educated person is more interested in 
politics, he is more likely to discuss politics with his neighbours, friends 
and co-workers, he is also more likely to do something to try to affect 
decisions. 
Thus, the more educated person does have the basic requirement 
for political involvement. But when it comes to participation in open 
activities like going to the polls or to the publicly organized political 
meetings, the educated person is reluctant. 
Explanations: 
Recent studies point to the conclusion that higher education in 
India is not instrumental in breeding strong love for the country, or 
patriotism or inculcating a belief that voting is a civic obligation. For 
instance, a study by Alex Inkeles "^^  of six developing countries i.e. India, 
Israel, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Chile and Argentina, came to the conclusion 
that in some countries the "participant" or "good" citizens (i.e. persons 
who were informed, knowledgeable, participant and rational) were also 
more hostile and unpatriotic. 
Another study by Eldersveld.SJ, et al./^ found that in their 
survey in 1968 the city of Delhi and the nearby rural areas, that in general 
the upper, more educated classes were much less supportive of public 
authority than were the lower classes. 
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Various Government reports and recently the Sachar Committee 
report (2007) have revealed that there is a significant disparity between 
the educational status of Muslims and that of other socio-religious 
categories. Different and periodical riots have broken the will of the 
Muslim masses. So the educated masses are more concerned with formal 
jobs and struggle for bread and butter than election and turnout. 
In a study of Luckow and Madurai, Joseph Elder also 
discounts the common presumption prevalent in some circles that 
increasing education is the bulwark of parliamentary institutions. The 
parliamentary system based on universal adult suffrage has given rise to 
what Weiner calls "a mass political culture"- which is the bane of all 
the problems in India since it has given rise to parochial ties of caste, 
region, language, religion and community which are misused by hungry 
power seeking petty politicians to further their personal agenda, at the 
cost of nation and development. This may explain why the educated 
people develop disliking for politics. 
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Age and Political Behaviour; 
Age as a socio-economic variable of political behaviour is 
positively related with political involvement. World over it is a well 
documented fact that as people grow old, they vote in greater number. 
There could be several reasons for this trend. As Robert Lane finds that 
in maturity person acquires property, hence one of the most important 
forces politicizing the local citizen comes to bear upon him- the question 
of the assessment and tax on his house. Secondly, Political activity by its 
very nature is habit-forming, it is conceived of as a result of cumulative 
political experience. Hence, longer a person lives, more chances are there 
for him to be politically active. 
Lets have a look at the Table 4.7 about the political behaviour of 
Muslims of U.P. in the 18 year period from 1991 to 2009. For this matter, 
the two age groups were taken. Since voting age in India is 18 years, and 
period of research is also of 18 years (from 1991 to 2009), age categories 
are made from 36 to 50 years (so that each sample's political behaviour 
from 1991 onwards could be encompassed) and above 50 years. Given 
the expected pattern of behaviour, in the past 18 years majority of those 
in 36 to 50 years category said to have higher turnout at the polls than 
those of younger group, as can be seen from the table. A recent turnout 
figure among young and overall turnout from CSDS''^  surveys gives 
following results. 
Table 4.7 LokSabha Elections (1996-2009) 
Turnout 
Young 
Overall 
Source: CSDS Survey 
1996 
54 
57.9 
1998 
60 
62.0 
1999 
57 
60.0 
2004 
55 
58.0 
2009 
54 
58.4 
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Table 4.8 Turnout 
Community 
Muslims 
All 
among 
1996 
56 
57.9 
Muslims- LokSabha Elections (1996-2009) 
1998 1999 2004 
65 67 46 
62.1 60.0 58.4 
2009 average 
59 59 
58.4 59 
Source: CSDS Data Unit 
Table: 4.8 shows voting turnout among Muslims and all communities 
during the period 1996 to 2009 collected by CSDS Data unit ^\ This 
shows that 56% turnout of Muslims in 1996 was almost equal to the 
turnout of all communities (57.9%).These figures are widest confirmation 
of the fact that Muslim turnout in all age categories and in the period of 
study from 1991 to 2009 has remained close to the average voting turnout 
figures. 
Table: 4.9 Age and Political Behaviour 
Dimensions 
V.P 
C.P 
P.I 
P.I.I 
IPA 
CA 
SHA 
ATS 
ATC 
PA 
PE 
PT 
M 
MME 
P.aff.S.P 
P.aff.BSP 
P.aff.C 
V.pre P 
V.pre C 
ODfm 
ODf 
ODC 
ODcw 
ODS 
Age between 36-50yrs. 
Urban % 
50.11 
24 
35 
35 
32 
25 
25 
31 
18 
16 
21 
21 
17.3 
31 
48.3 
27.2 
24.4 
73.6 
26.4 
17.7 
27.7 
15 
17.2 
21.6 
Rural% 
57 
26.7 
36.8 
38.8 
34.4 
27.9 
23.4 
27.5 
23.6 
24.11 
23.18 
26 
34.4 
13 
61 
25 
14 
62.3 
37.7 
15 
25 
29 
28 
3 
Age above 
Urban% 
53.11 
24.3 
33.4 
34 
34.6 
20.4 
31.5 
28.7 
17.31 
15.9 
23.4 
19.7 
25.4 
30 
50 
24.9 
25 
69 
31 
14.5 
30 
20 
17.5 
18 
SOyrs. 
Rural% 
53 
26.23 
37 
38.3 
38 
22 
24 
26.6 
24.8 
27.2 
19.29 
24.7 
41 
16 
59.4 
19.4 
21 
82 
18 
29.4 
24.4 
28.3 
13.8 
3.8 
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Figure 4.5 
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Concerning voting participation (VP) it is discovered from 
Table: 4.9 that overall the turnout remains the same in the two groups. 
On closer observation it was found that there is slight increase in urban 
area Muslims and slight decrease in rural Muslims which is insignificant, 
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Although, it remains close to the national average. Voting participation 
(VP) of urban Muslims increases from 50% to 53.1% with advancing age. 
The positive relationship between advancing age and high voting 
turnout might be explained in several ways. It may be result of 
cumulative political experience- the longer a person lives, the greater the 
likelihood of his becoming engaged in politics. The greater voting turnout 
among the older persons may also be as a result of "faith in parliamentary 
system". As a result, in spite of traumatic experience of demolition of 
secularism belief in the form of demolition of Babri-Masjid in 1992, the 
belief in democratic system has remained intact which is displayed by 
national average turnout in elections one after another till 2009 
(Table:4.8). Positive impact of advancing age on voting turnout accepts 
our research hypothesis H4. 
Turning to other forms of participation, it is found from the 
Table: 4.9 that variation is age is not significantly related to campaign 
participation (CP), political interest (PI), political information index (PII). 
Overall the difference is insignificant but between rural-urban 
comparison, it is found that rural masses are more active in all these 
activities (Fig: 3.5 and Fig: 3.6). One reason could be generational 
effect, i.e. those in their above 50 age group grew up in the hay days 
Nehruvian idealism, support for secularism, and belief in parliamentary 
form of Government. They may constitute a special group of national 
loyalists. However, this special group of patriots, seems to have low 
political efficacy in rural Muslims and low political trust in both the age 
groups of Muslims in rural as well as urban areas. This can be explained 
by an indication of loosening of faith in the system to deliver. The 
Judiciary has failed to bring the culprits of Babri-demolition and scores of 
other communal violence and organized pogroms to justice. 
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Finally, it seems hope is fighting a loosing battle with economic 
deprivation of Muslims and discrimination in jobs. The overall reduction 
in the attitude towards system (ATS) in both the age group and in both 
rural and urban Muslims emphasizes its severity. 
Advancing age is also positively related to mobilization (M) to 
attending meetings, contacting officials to influence decision. The mass 
media exposure (MME) is found to be less with advancement in age, this 
could be as result of elderly being less internet savvy and restricting to 
oral communication of information which is found to be very common 
and much reliable source of information among Muslims of both urban 
and rural area. 
In making voting preference (V.pre.) between party or candidate, 
it was found that party was given precedence over candidate in both the 
age groups of urban and rural Muslims (Fig:4.5&Fig:4.6). It could be 
because party is more reliable than candidate in long run. Moreover, party 
can be made accountable but a candidate cannot. In making choice about 
party affiliation (P.aff) Samajwadi Party (SP) is preferred by majority of 
Muslims cutting across the age divide and rural-urban difference. 
So far as opinion decider (OD) is concerned, family members 
(17.7%) and spouse (21.6%) play a decisive role among the urban 
Muslims between 36 to 50 years age group. Whereas, in above 50 years 
age group rural Muslims- the family members alone play a decisive role 
in 29.4% of Muslims while caste group plays role in 28.3%) of rural 
Muslims. Spouses in rural masses, in both the age groups {3% & 3.8%)), 
play almost second fiddle which verges close to insignificant 
contribution. 
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Income and Political Behaviour: 
In the western countries the literature are replete with the fact that 
the more prosperous are more likely to be involved in politics and to vote 
in proportionately in greater number than the less prosperous. The 
research findings of Tingsten/^ Campbell '*^ , Lane'*'* and others support 
the above contention. The people in the higher income group are more 
likely to come in contact with those who are active in politics; unlike 
those of lower income group who are lacking such contact and are also 
diffident and avoid social contact. Moreover, higher income group people 
possess such qualities as make them capable of comprehending matters 
that are political. They are educated in reputed schools and colleges and 
have received higher educafion. Further, they have more mass media 
exposure and are in a position to subscribe to newspapers and magazines. 
This proposifion becomes all more contradictory in Indian context and 
especially for Indian Muslims who are considered economically lower in 
status than even the lowest schedule caste and schedule tribes (Sachar 
Committee Repert, 2007). ^ ^ 
The Data from National Election Survey (NES)''^  during the 
period 1996, 1999, 2004 and 2009 do not support the research findings in 
the western countries. As given in the table below: 
Table 4.10 Income Class and Political Activity 
Income 
All 
Upper 
Middle 
Lower 
1996 
57.9 
48 
58 
61 
1999 
60.0 
57 
57 
62 
2004 
58.4 
59 
57 
58 
2009 
58.4 
57 
59 
58 
average 
59 
55 
58 
60 
CSDS Data Unit. Source: NES, 96,99,04,09. 
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In Indian scenario it is a commonly shared belief that the lower 
turnout in urban areas is a result of lower turnout among middle class 
voters. The elections held during the period from 1991 to 2009 and 
various national elections surveys held in 1996, 1999, 2004, 2009 
indicate (Table;4.10) that the turnout among the lower class has been 
marginally higher (60%), while turnouts among the middle (58%)and 
upper classes (55%) have been marginally lower than the average turnout. 
But the turnout among middle class voters is not dramatically low, as is 
generally believed. 
The 2009 Lok Sabha election even saw a slight increase (59%) in 
the turnout among middle class voters than turnout in 2004 (Table 3.10). 
This was a classic instance of the democratic upsurge leveling off. For a 
brief in the 1990s, the poor saw vote as a political weapon to promote 
their interest. Later it seems every one has subscribed to the idea. The 
symbolic as well as actual value of the vote as a weapon of the poor thus 
eroded as India moved into the new millennium. 
The churning of the late 1980s and early 1990s brought more of 
the poor into the political arena, but in the later period, this advantage 
was neutralized by two factors. On the one hand, the post-1999 elections 
saw upper and the middle class voter turnouts go up. On the other, there 
was a decline in enthusiasm for voting among lower class voters. Thus 
voting turnout of lower class was declined from 62%) in 1999 to 58% in 
2009. 
Table 4.11 Voting Behavior and Economic Class in U.P 2009 
State 
All India 
Uttar Pradesh 
All 
58.4 
47.8 
Upper 
57 
49 
Middle 
59 
47 
Lower 
58 
48 
CSDS Data Unit NES, 09. 
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-,47 In the 2009 elections, data from CSDS '^ shows that Uttar Pradesh 
voters were completely opposed to the national trends (Table: 4.11). In 
the national election, the middle class voters were highest in turnout 
followed by the lower class and the upper class, and in the U.P upper 
class were the highest in turnout followed by the lower and the middle 
class. What is mind boggling is that unlike the national trend of active 
middle class, the U.P conforms to western standards in making the upper 
class the most politically active class. 
Nevertheless, the Data collected by the author regarding the 
political behaviour of Muslims across the three upper, middle and lower 
classes in U.P conforms to the national trend, as can be seen in the Table 
4.12. 
Table: 4.12 Income and Political Behaviour 
Dimensions 
V.P 
C.P 
P.! 
P.I.I 
IPA 
CA 
SHA 
ATS 
ATC 
PA 
PE 
PT 
M 
MME 
P.aff.S.P 
P.aff.BSP 
P.aff.C 
V.pre P 
V.pre C 
ODfm 
ODf 
ODC 
ODcw 
ODS 
LOWER 
Urban% 
42 
22 
23.7 
45.97 
17.08 
17.81 
20.16 
26.18 
22.22 
25.41 
27.31 
30.23 
31.52 
18.69 
48.75 
28.33 
22.9 
77.5 
22.5 
16.25 
26.25 
17.9 
20 
19.58 
INCOME 
Rural% 
55 
38 
34 
36.77 
26.79 
26.71 
14.75 
31.56 
37.5 
36.25 
32.61 
35 
43.33 
12.5 
62.5 
20.62 
16.87 
72.5 
27.5 
24.37 
29.3 
23.75 
18.75 
3.75 
MIDDLE 
Urban% 
57 
22 
24.62 
46.66 
30.46 
25.36 
33.25 
38.33 
23.61 
37.77 
33.06 
42.85 
30.69 
29.68 
47.9 
25 
27 
72 
28 
18.7 
36.25 
20.41 
11.25 
13.3 
INCOME 
Rural% 
44 
33 
22.15 
37.3 
37.3 
31.56 
30.87 
32.18 
33.68 
41.87 
33.75 
34.73 
45 
23.43 
55 
23.12 
21.87 
65 
35 
16.87 
33.12 
30 
33.12 
3.75 
HIGHER 
Urban% 
40 
20 
24.68 
41.18 
31.4 
21.3 
39 
44.86 
26.94 
22.63 
36.25 
38.15 
40.94 
35.26 
51.25 
24.16 
24.5 
64.5 
35.5 
13.75 
23.75 
14.58 
20.83 
27.08 
INCOME 
Rural% 
48 
24 
24.48 
40.72 
31.28 
22.03 
35.37 
38.91 
28.85 
27.7 
28.8 
47.5 
46.25 
27.81 
63.12 
26.25 
10.62 
71.25 
23.75 
20.62 
28.12 
32.5 
14.37 
4.37 
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Figure 4.7 
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The Table no.4.12 depicts the poHtical behaviour of Muslims in 
different income groups- lower, middle and higher. Lower income group 
consists of those having income up to 5000/ rupees in a month in an 
urban area and upto 4000/ rupees monthly in rural area. Middle income 
group consists of those having rupees 20,000/ month in an urban and 
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rupees 15,000/ month in rural. Higher income groups have income above 
20,000/ rupees in an urban and 15,000/ month in rural area. 
If we compare the voting participation (VP) of the three income 
groups of Muslims, it was found that the data are very irregular. Muslims 
who are in the highest economic status classification in urban area vote 
somewhat less than those who have a lower and middle income status 
(Fig: 4.7). But Muslims in the middle income group (57%) in urban area 
vote 15% more than lower income group (42%) which clearly shows a 
curvilinear relation between voting frequency and rise in income. 
The only conclusion drawn from this evidence is that beyond a 
threshold impact, rise in income is not significantly related to voter 
participation, however, in the rural area voting participation (VP) shown a 
negative correlation with income level (Fig: 4.8). The immediate impact 
of rise in income level is a fall of 11% point in voting participation 
between middle and lower income group Muslim voters. This trend in 
voting participation does not prove research hypothesis H5 as Muslims 
belonging to high income group are not more involved in voting 
participation. 
Other Forms of Electoral Participation: 
Increase in income among the Muslims of U.P is giving 
contradictory results in both urban and rural areas. Only in cognitive 
activities like- symbol and heritage awareness (SHA), attitude towards 
system (ATS), and mass media exposure (MME) the people of both rural 
and urban areas show a positive relationship with income, i.e, with 
increase in income, these cognitive activities also increases (Fig: 
4.7&4.8). So far other forms of political participation are concerned there 
is no symmetrical impact of increase in income on these forms of 
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behaviour. These unexpected trend in the pattern can be because of 
different local needs and requirements of rural and urban masses. 
Urban-rural controls: 
It was found that in urban area the activities like- political interest 
(PI), issue and problem awareness (IPA), attitude towards system (ATS), 
attitude towards candidate (ATC), political efficacy (PE) shows positive 
correlation with income whereas other activities like- communal activity 
(CA), political action (PA), and political trust (PT) indicate that there is 
an economic tlireshold of political involvement in the sense that above a 
certain economic level very little political activity can be expected. It can 
be concluded about the Muslims in urban area that the prosperous 
Muslims are less active in other forms of political involvement as 
compared to middle income group Muslims. 
In the rural area the economic threshold is found on activities 
like- communal activity (CA), political activity (PA), and political 
efficacy (PE), that is, the rise in income reduces the prosperous Muslims' 
political involvement at the community level. These results are very 
irregular and unexpected. It needs further research for satisfactory 
explanation. 
Mobilization of rural Muslims in all the three income groups is 
much higher than those of urban Muslims, one reason that could be cited 
for this trend is that the urban mass can do without getting involved into 
political activities as urban life style gives them a fair amount of 
seclusion and privacy whereas, their brethren in rural area just can not 
think of life cut-off from village life style. 
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Regarding voting preference (V.pre.) and party affiliation (P.aff) 
the following Table 4.13 gives the trend in U.P towards the elections in 
2009. 
Table 4.13 Party preference by class U.P 2009 
Income 
Rich 
Middle 
Lower 
Poor 
Very poor 
congress 
19 
21 
15 
19 
18 
BJP+ 
26 
22 
25 
12 
10 
BSP 
19 
22 
27 
39 
42 
SP 
22 
22 
25 
25 
22 
Others 
9 
12 
8 
6 
8 
Source: NES 2009. 
The above table 4.13 is another way of looking closely at the 
social pattern of voting behaviour. The changes in the electoral outcome 
reflect a meaningful shift in the alignment of social groups to political 
parties. Disaggregating the result by rural and urban areas, it was found 
that the vote share of congress was much more in urban areas. The 
Samajwadi Party (SP) has more rural support base, while the Bahujan 
Samajwadi Party (BSP) has a somewhat balanced base. Thus, while the 
SP won the highest number of seats in rural areas, in urban areas, the 
seats were roughly equally divided among the BSP, the Congress and the 
BJP.( NES 2009) "^  
Table 4.14 Party preference among Muslims since 2007 
Muslims 
Others 
All 
Congress 
25 
18 
18 
BJP 
3 
20 
17 
BSP 
18 
23 
27 
SP 
30 
19 
23 
Others 
24 
20 
14 
Source: CSDS Data Unit. 
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The Table 4.14 makes is ample clear that the first choice of 
Muslims in Uttar Pradesh has been the Samajwadi Party (SP). Although, 
the Congress Party is second in spite of the fact that it is considered the 
perpetrator of Babri- Masjid demolition in Ayodhaya in 1992. (CSDS 
Data Unit 2007)/^ 
As can be seen in the table 4.12 above, The Voting preference 
(V.Pre) for both rural and urban Muslims, in all the three categories is 
Party, not candidate; and Party affiliation (P.Aff), as tables 4.12 and table 
4.14 indicate, is found with Samajwadi Party (SP) to lesser or higher 
extent in all the three income categories. As regard to Opinion Decider 
(OD), urban Muslims find guidance in friends and spouse where as the 
rural Muslims of lower income groups find guidance in friends, caste 
group and co-workers whereas higher income group find friends, caste 
group and family members as ideal combination to help decide about 
whom to vote in elections. 
Concluding Observation: 
This chapter was concerned with the changing socio-economic 
bases of political behaviour of Muslims of Uttar Pradesh since last two 
decade. It was found that the decade of 1990s witnessed considerable 
voter mobilization, based on both issues and social identity. A broadening 
of the political arena and intensification of political compefifion 
contributed to renewed interest of the disadvantaged sections in the 
political process. 
Along with this, it was also the decade when the right wing 
extremism in the form of revival of BJP took place. The slogan of Ram m 
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Mandir and the act of Babri- Masjid demolition changed the 
politics of Muslims for ever, more so in the state of Uttar Pradesh. But the 
Muslim masses never seem to lose faith in the Democratic system of 
government in India. Their political behaviour shows a strong belief in 
Parliamentary form of government and democratic system of governance. 
They remained the part and parcel of the mainstream politics and never 
showed the signs of alienation. Their political efficacy and political trust 
remained as high as that of any other community. 
The series of surveys conducted as a part of the NES (National 
Election Surveys)^ " in different years indicate towards it. The data given 
in this thesis does not show any dramatic trends in terms of a sharp rise or 
fall in political participation of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. The same 
trends have more or less continued over the last two decades especially 
after the demolition of Babri- Masjid. While the turnout has been in close 
consonance with the national level, the election-related activity shows a 
stable trend. 
However, political parties are successful in connecting to the 
voters during election time. The data also shows that the trend of political 
participation has a weak social bias in favour of the more privileged 
sections. If anything, active participation is high among the poor and the 
middle class. The democratic participation of Muslims were traced from 
1991 onwards, and it was found that even as a religious minority, 
depressed and deprived-economically and politically- Muslims have 
accepted the popular confines of representative democracy in the form of 
electoral participation, and made themselves available to political activity 
as a democratic resource and participated in it as a legitimate means of 
democratic demand. This may not be a great achievement but it is only 
such limited transformations that representative democracy allows. 
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CHAPTER V 
CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS OF MUSLIMS 
In this chapter various dimensions of the political behaviour of 
Muslims of Uttar Pradesh will be brought to fore. 
Here, an attempt is being made to understand the manner and 
extent of the Indian Muslims exposure to the political system through the 
campaigning activities of candidates as well as inter-election political 
exposure are the primary stimulants for involvement, reinforced by social 
group contact, caste, and other associations. Such exposures have led to a 
gradual awakening of political self-interest. 
As the parties expanded and deepened their organizational efforts 
to contact the public, the Indian Muslims in general and Muslims of U.P 
in particular became more aware of politics and its direct impact on them, 
became more knowledgeable about political matters and more attentive to 
political activities, voted with greater frequency, adopted more definite 
attitudes toward the solution of India's incredible social and economic 
problems, developed strong attachments to the political parties, and 
generally became more sophisticated in evaluations of the performance of 
political leaders. To a certain extent this also led to system support, but 
there was a strong element of skepticism about politics, pessimism about 
the Indian Muslims capacity for efficacy in the system, and an emerging 
radicalism about political solutions. 
These developments, of course, did not occur simultaneously. 
The development of Muslim politics in post-independent India has been 
described variously-often mired in conflicting claims and polemical 
assertions. Up until 1960, the Muslim community in India was said to 
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have been aloof from active politics and electoral processes as well, 
(Harvani 1968)'. 
Gradually, especially towards the end of the 1960's the 
community was seen to be coming out of its political shell and beginning 
to be assertive of its rights, leading to increased participation in electoral 
processes (Krishna 1967)^ , even to the extent of voting in larger numbers 
than others. There are many who have argued that Muslims continue to 
live in the past. What happened in the past persists into the present and 
plays a crucial role in the mental restructuring of MusHms. The 
community leadership lies in the hand of clergy which invokes unity of 
Islam (Karandikar 1968)^ 
Nevertheless, throughout this development process the 
politicization of Muslims was linked to the achievement of a gradual 
integration of the polity and the acquisition of legitimacy for the Indian 
democracy. Here the main attempt is to find the extent to which Muslims 
have acquired the "modem" culture. For this, the attitude of Muslims 
towards the political processes needs to be investigated. 
Gabriel Almond'* (1956) said long ago, "Every political system 
is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political actions." 
And Sidney Verba^ has classified these 'polifically relevant orientafions' 
as being of three type: "cognitive, evaluative, and expressive." To these 
writers these orientations comprise the 'political culture'. A society has a 
set of beliefs and behaviours towards political objects which are learned 
and shared. Individuals presumably have attitudes and beliefs about the 
actual nature of values and goals they prefer for the political system. 
These orientations constitute the focus of my presentation. 
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To measure these orientations, Sidney Verba^ used questions of 
different types, falling into the three classifications: 
1. Cognitive-perceptual questions: included here are questions showing 
knowledge of the system, especially accurate information about 
elected representatives, caste voting, and so on. In addition, there 
were questions about what problems confront the country, what the 
key election issues were, who the leaders in the community were, 
including a probing of the respondent's awareness of and contact 
with influential leaders at the local level. 
2. Evaluative-normative questions: Respondents were asked their view 
of the party system, the election system (how necessary, how 
effective in making the government responsive, and so on), what the 
role of the government should be in dealing with economic (as well 
as other) problems, and what types of political action (direct and 
legislative) were proper, did the respondent have a feeling of 
subjective competence or efficacy in acting in the system. 
3. Expressive-affective questions: such as the extent of the individual's 
interest in politics at the local, state, or national level; to what extent 
there was a feeling of closeness or loyalty to a party; and whether 
there was faith and confidence in the national and state governments. 
These types of questions were very usefiil in previous empirical 
studies: firstly, Peter Mayer (1972) tested in two cities in Tamil Nadu 
and Madhya Pradesh to find the support for democracy at the mass level 
and found no evidence of antidemocratic orientations. Secondly, 
Bashiruddin Ahmed and EIdersveld,SamueI (1976) found the 
orientations of Indian masses through the data derived from both the 1967 
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and 1971 studies to find very high level of political orientations towards 
the system. Similarly, Goel (1974)^  investigated the political involvement 
of Indian masses in all India polls from 1961, 1964,1967. 
Present thesis as well investigates the political orientations of 
Muslims through the same sets of questions as given in the questionnaire 
(see appendix I and II). In all questions different types of orientations 
were asked. In Cognitive orientation 24 questions, in Affective 
orientation 15 questions and in Evaluative orientation 16 questions were 
included. 
Cognitive Orientation 
Cognitive orientation is a very potent determinant of Political behaviour 
in which dimensions like -political information index (PII), issue and 
problem awareness (IPA), political interest (PI) and symbol and heritage 
awareness (SHA) are included. 
Table: 5.1 Cognitive Orientation Of Muslims. 
URBAN 
RURAL 
COGNITIVE 
PII 
29 
22 
ORIENTATION 
IPA 
18 
20 
PI 
14 
22 
SHA 
28 
8 
Table 5.1 shows cognitive orientation of urban and rural Muslims. 
Since urban people are more literate as compared to rural people, and 
their exposure to mass media in urban centers are more than that of rural 
ones, so PII of urban Muslim is 29% and rural Muslims only 22%. The 
political information index is much higher among urban in comparison to 
rural Muslims. This finding accepts our research hypothesis H6. Political 
161 
information is directly related to the people's social connectivity and 
availability and exposure to mass media resources. Both these factors 
depend upon education of the masses and economic means to subscribe to 
them, and in these resources the urban areas are considered to be the hub. 
So, urban Muslims have more political information. It has been seen in 
previous chapter on socio-economic resources that rural masses are 
backward in both attainment of education level and availability of 
economic resources (Table 4.6 and Table 4.12). 
Another dimension measuring cognitive orientation and which is 
directly influenced and determined by the level of education is symbol 
and heritage awareness (SHA), the Table 3.16 shows very clearly that the 
urban Muslims have SHA of 28% and rural Muslims have SHA of only 
8% which is abysmally low. Nevertheless, the rural Muslims have high 
issue and problem awareness (IPA) of 20% and high level of political 
interest (PI) of 22% as compared to issue and problem awareness (IPA) 
of 18% and political interest (PI) of 14% of urban Muslims. 
The trend and the pattern of cognitive orientation of rural Muslims 
with regard to IPA and PI indicates that they might be poor in terms of 
level of education and economic resources to subscribe to newspapers, 
cable television and internet connections but they are very well connected 
with local and oral means of communication. This habit makes them 
prone to unscrupulous elements in politics, who spread misinformation to 
influence the electoral outcome. It also shows how well the Muslim 
community in rural area is grounded in local issues and local politics. 
This bespeaks volumes about the community life and community activity 
of rural masses and their practicability and realistic approach. 
Yet another trend which is visible in the table above is that the level 
of political interest is high among the rural Muslims than the urban. It 
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contradicts our earlier findings in previous chapter that political interest 
increases with the increase in education and increase in the level of 
income. It seems when it comes to interest in politics, Muslims in both 
the region defy the western findings that education and income are 
directly related to political interest. 
Figure: 5.1 Cognitive Orientation - Urban Rural Difference 
: • URBAN 
D RURAL 
IPA I PI 
cognitive orientation 
Overall, the Muslims seem to be average in 'knowledge' when it 
comes to politics (Table: 5.1). Less than average can correctly identify 
political candidate and election winners. Their knowledge of candidate at 
the state level is limited to main party leaders. The political information 
index-involving question on recognizing MLA of your area, questions on 
naming P.M and CM, and the party they belong to- close to or more than 
one quarter can correctly identify them. Issue and problem awareness is 
below high. It is particularly notable that majority of those Muslims in 
urban area ventured to identify problems in front of the nation and most 
of them could identify a specific party that could do some thing to solve 
the problem.(Figure 5.1) 
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From a comparative perspective, the cognitive awareness of 
Muslims seems average. The abihty of the pubHc to identify the leaders 
to the main parties, their opinion on the performance of the state and 
central government, speaks about their cognitive awareness. 
Table: 5.2 Satisfaction with Performance of UPA and BSP 
Governments 
Fully Satisfied 
Somewhat Satisfied 
Somewhat dissatisfied 
Fully dissatisfied 
Do not know 
Source: NES 2009 
UPA Govt. 
23 
42 
6 
10 
19 
BSP state Govt. 
22 
33 
11 
22 
12 
In the above Table: 5.2 about close to majority are somewhat 
satisfied with the performance of central government. The issue and 
problem awareness (IP A) of Muslims does not seem to be far behind with 
28% of urban Muslims giving their opinion on the issues and problems in 
front of nation and those problems faced by the Muslims as a community. 
Regarding preferred choice of Party leaders for chief ministership, 28% 
preferred Mayawati and 27% named Mulayam singh (NES 2009).*" 
Another comparative analysis of the Muslims with regard to other 
communities of India in U.P is given in the following table 4.3.(CSDS) 
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Table: 5.3 Pol itical interest and Participation in election meetings 
Community 
All 
Upper caste 
OBC 
Dalits 
Muslims 
Adivasi 
1996 
25 
27 
24 
27 
30 
22 
1999 
23 
24 
22 
26 
22 
19 
2004 
20 
20 
20 
19 
20 
22 
2009 
19 
20 
19 
18 
22 
16 
Average 
22 
23 
21 
23 
24 
20 
CSDS Data Unit 
The Table: 5.3 above clearly shows that over the last decade, there has 
been a steady decline in the participation of people in election meetings 
and their level of political interest. While nearly a quarter of the voters 
attended election meetings in 1996, only 19% did so in 2009 (Table: 5.3). 
The decline in participation was more or less equally distributed among 
all castes, though generally it was marginally higher among Muslims. The 
level of political interest of various social communities does not show 
remarkable difference. There is no sharp fall or rise in this part of the 
cognitive variable across communities. On the whole the average of 
political interest and participation in election meetings among the 
Muslims is highest (24%) in comparison to other communities. This trend 
shows that Muslims cognitive orientation is not less than any other. Our 
data does show an average and below average cognitive orientation but 
that is not below the interest level of other communities. 
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Evaluative Orientation 
In this category, to measure effective orientation another set of four 
dimensions like- attitude towards system (ATS), attitude towards 
candidate (ATC), political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) are 
measured in both urban and rural areas. 
Table: 5.4 Evaluative Orientation of Muslims. 
URBAN 
RURAL 
EVALUATIVE ORIENTATION 
ATS ATC PE 
25 
21 
12 
25 
17 
17 
PT 
25 
37 
Figure : 5.2 Evaluative Orientation -Urban Rural Difference 
• URBAN! 
D RURAL I 
Table 5.4 and figure 5.2 show that the urban Muslims have more 
positive and supportive attitude towards the democratic system of 
representation and governance as compared to rural Muslims which is 
25% in urban and 21% in rural area respectively. The increase of 4% 
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point in urban area could be due to the positive and more visible fruits of 
system in the form of better development and availability of economic 
opportunities. The questions based on attitude towards system (ATS), 
were responded very positively by the Muslims. Their answers exuded 
their deep confidence in secular structure of Indian political system. 
In the second dimension of evaluative orientation i.e. attitude towards 
candidate (ATC), rural Muslims seem to take special and personal 
interest which is 25% point in contrast to only 12% of urban Muslims 
(Figure 4.2). It shows that rural Muslims have more positive attitude 
towards candidate and take the capability of candidate to perform into 
reckoning while making voting decision. This increase of 13% point 
among rural Muslims could be owing to the fact that they come more 
frequently in contact with political candidate for swift disposal of their 
day to day agricultural and other problems. 
The political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) both show leaning 
towards higher side. The political efficacy might be same (17%)) in both 
rural and urban areas, but the political trust among the rural Muslims is 
much higher at 37% points than those of urban Muslims of 25% points. 
Higher political trust among rural Muslims rejects our hypothesis Hy. It 
also shows strong commitment of rural Muslims vis-a-vis democratic 
institutions. 
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Table: 5.5 Evaluative Orientation towards system and candidate 
Political parties make government 
responsive to people's demands? 
(a) Disagree 
(b) Agree 
The govt, in the country can not be run 
better if there were no political party. 
(a) Disagree 
(b) Agree 
How satisfied are you with the work of 
M.P in past 15 years? 
(a) Fully satisfied 
(b) Somewhat satisfied 
(c) Somewhat dissatisfied 
(d) Fully dissatisfied 
Urban(%) 
12 
88 
11 
89 
38 
43 
11 
8 
Rural(%) 
13 
87 
15 
85 
39 
40 
16 
5 
It can be seen from the Table: 5.5 that the evaluative orientation of 
Muslims towards the system and towards the candidate shows a similar 
trend and pattern. Only a small minority of Muslims in both the rural and 
the urban areas are dissatisfied with the system and the candidate. The 
overwhelming majority of Muslims show support for democratic 
institutions. Close to 90% in both the rural and urban areas are in favour 
of indispensability of political party in Indian system for the smooth 
functioning of democracy. Similarly, close to 80% of Muslims are fairly 
satisfied with the performance of their representatives. 
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Table: 5.6 Political Efficacy and Political Trust among Muslims 
We common people have no say in what 
government does. Do you agree? 
(a) Fully agree 
(b) Somewhat agree 
(c) Somewhat disagree 
(d) Fully disagree 
The government officials and elected 
representatives don't care much about what 
we think about politics. Do you agree? 
(a) Fully agree 
(b) Somewhat agree 
(c) Somewhat disagree 
(d) Fully disagree 
People in the govt, can be trusted. How far 
do you agree? 
(a) Fully agree 
(b) Somewhat agree 
(c) Somewhat disagree 
(d) Fully disagree 
People in the govt, are competent. Do you 
agree? 
(a) Fully agree 
(b) Somewhat agree 
(c) Somewhat disagree 
(d) Fully disagree 
Urban(%) 
15 
30 
40 
15 
08 
23 
38 
31 
44 
40 
10 
6 
39 
45 
9 
8 
Rural(%) 
10 
23 
37 
30 
05 
28 
40 
28 
48 
45 
7 
-
43 
48 
5 
4 
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The Table: 5.6 presents the poHtical efficacy (PE) and the 
political trust (PT) of the Muslims of U.P. As can be seen from the table, 
in answer to the question whether they agree that common people have no 
say in what govt, does, it was found that majority of Muslims in both the 
urban and rural area somewhat disagree with the statement. The belief of 
Muslim masses on themselves with regard to the system can be clearly 
seen. Common people feel that they can make impact on the government 
and government has to work in accordance with the wishes of the people. 
Otherwise at the next elections they have a fare chance to choose another 
government that can work for the betterment of the people. 
With regard to the answer to the question whether government 
officials and elected representatives care about what we think about 
politics, it was found that again the majority of Muslims in both the rural 
and the urban areas think that elected representatives and the government 
official are responsible to the people for their doings. Most of them are 
favorably deposed towards the demands of the people in general. Even if 
some government official is unwilling to deliver the goods to them, they 
always have an option to make a complaint to the political representative 
of the area. 
Both the questions of political trust (PT) whether the government 
is competent and can it be trusted, it was found that the majority of 
Muslims show a strong and positive relation with it. By any standards, the 
close to 50% show political trust in government and equally the same 
number of those who find it competent shows that democracy and its 
institutions have no fear from the Muslims of India, if it continues to 
remain responsive and responsible to masses in general. 
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If we look at the period of study from 1991 to 2009, and also the 
attitude of Muslims with regard to democracy and democratic institutions 
in general and election and political parties in particular our data on 
evaluative orientation is fully supported by various National Election 
Surveys (NES) conducted in the period of two decade. 
Table: 5.7 Evaluative attitude towards system of Electoral Process 
Election all Muslims 
_ _ _ _ 
1998 62 65 
1999 60 67 
2004 58 46 
2009 58 55 
Source: National Election Study, respective years 
The Muslims' evaluative orientation towards the system of 
electoral process gets fully displayed in the form of various national 
election study, conducted by the Centre for Study of Developing 
Societies (CSDS). In the table: 5.7 one can clearly see that the elections 
which are the basic foundation of representative democracy, and without 
which democracy looses its character, is fully supported by the Muslims. 
If we look the percentage of Muslims who come out to vote in elections, 
we find that in the years 1998 and 1999 which were the most turbulent 
years in the life of the democracy in India, with back to back elections, 
putting the whole legitimacy of electioneering at stake. In this hour of 
national crisis, the Muslims of country showed the great courage and 
character as the true sons of the country and voted above the national 
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average of voting, by 65% turnout in 1998 and 67% turnout in 1999 
elections when the national average was 62% for year 1998 and 60% for 
1999. 
In yet another instance of systemic support, the Muslims showed 
a great liking for parliamentary institutions of the country in every region 
of the Uttar Pradesh, whether their percentage of population was below 
15% or above 45%). Whether they were less in number or more, they gave 
equal support to the system and candidate in a true fashion of democracy 
loyalist. As can be seen from the table below: (CSDS)^ "' 
Table: 5.8 Proportion of Muslim Population and Systemic Support 
Proportion of Muslims 
Up to 15% 
15-30% 
30-45% 
Above 45 
All 
Source; CSDS Data Unit. 
No. of LokSabha 
Constituencies 
418 
86 
24 
15 
543 
Average 
Turnout(%) 
57.8 
56.9 
67.5 
65.0 
58.2 
The table: 5.8 shows the systemic support of Muslims at the 
national level, but we draw a proportional weightage for the state of U.P 
we can conclude with fair deal of rectitude that the support of Muslims, 
in all the regions of the state whether less populous or more, to the 
democratic process of election is complete. Even if we look at the support 
of Muslims to the electioneering in the state of Uttar Pradesh through a 
separate table, we can conclude that the Muslims were there as well 
shoulder to shoulder and neck to neck. (NES) 
172 
Table: 5.9 
All India 
Muslims 
U.P Muslims and Support to Election Process 
Share of Muslims 
Population (%) 
13.4 
18.5 
Turnout Support 
All Muslims 
58 
48 
55 
48 
Source: NES, 2009 
What this suggests is that the participation of Muslims in the 
electioneering process is equal to that of national average and state 
figures. This shows their active support to the process of democracy in 
India. The attitude towards system of Muslims is positive, total and 
complete. 
Affective Orientation 
The third type of orientation concerns the extent of 'attention' to political 
matters, similar to what others called 'affective' or 'expressive' 
orientations. The table 5.10 and figure 5.3 depict about the overall 
affective orientation of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. For the measurement 
of affective orientation, four dimensions namely, voting participation 
(VP), campaign participation (CP), communal activity (CA), political 
activity (PA) among the Muslims residing in urban and rural centers were 
investigated. In all the four categories, the rural Muslims showed higher 
level of affective orientation than that of urban Muslims. Rural Muslims 
look politically awake as their overall affective orientation is high. Urban 
Muslims show less interest in campaigning and communal activities than 
that of rural populace. This could be due to the life-style of urban people 
who remain less interested in affairs of others. 
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Table: 5.10 Affective Orientation of Muslims. 
URBAN 
RURAL 
AFFECTIVE ORIENTATION 
VP 
46 
56 
CP 
12 
21 
CA 
12 
20 
PA 
23 
30 
Political activity among rural Muslims is 30% whereas it is only 
23% in urban Muslims. Rural Muslims are politically more active as 
compared to urban Muslims. In urban areas Muslims are less prone to 
arduous physical activity which campaigning demands, and also they are 
mentally less motivated to work for a party or candidate. Thinking 
probably, how the election of one or other party or candidate impinges on 
his life-style. 
Figure: 5.3 Affective Orientation - Urban Rural Difference 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 :iy J FTh 
VP CP 
• URBAN 
\ D RURAL 
 CA 
affective orientation 
PA 
With regard to political action (PA), it can be said with certain 
degree of certainty that rural Muslims are more forth-coming in bringing 
issues to streets. (Figure 5.3) One reason could be that more and more 
people in village find common cause with a issue and make a concerted 
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effort in drawing the attention of authorities to the problem concerned. 
Democratic and non-violent measures like-demonstrations, strike, ban, 
rallies etc are some of the ways of expressing politically ones grievances 
in which rural masses score 30% which is 7% more than their urban 
counterparts who score only 23%. 
Table: 5.11 Affective Orientation and Muslims in U.P 
In the last 15years, since Babri demolition, 
in how many assembly and parliamentary 
elections did you vote? 
(a) All 
(b) Majority 
(c) Some 
(d)None 
Did you vote this time or did some thing 
keep you from voting? 
(a) Voted 
(b) Did not vote 
During elections people participated in 
various activities. In which did you 
participate? 
(a) Attended election meetings 
(b) Participated in rallies 
(c) Door to door canvassing 
(d) Contributed or collected money 
(e) Distributed leaflets/ put up posters 
Urban(%) 
10 
65 
20 
5 
68 
32 
15 
30 
18 
12 
25 
rural(%) 
15 
70 
10 
5 
75 
25 
20 
38 
25 
7 
30 
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Do you change your voting decision in the 
light of fatwa issued by religious head? 
(a) Yes 8 6 
(b)No 92 94 
Do you know how Muslims voted in last 
elections and how do they normally vote 
in elections? 
(a) Only Muslims 
(b) Only winning party 
(c) Capable of defeating BJP 
One should vote in the same way ones 
community votes? 
(a) No 
(b)Yes 
Do you participate in violent protests like 
arson, sabotage, explosions etc to make 
authority pay attention to public demands 
and grievances? 
(a) No 
(b)Yes 
10 
30 
60 
20 
80 
97 
3 
8 
40 
52 
10 
90 
92 
8 
The Table: 5.11 presents the affective orientation of the Muslims 
of Uttar Pradesh. As one can see in the table that when it comes to voting 
in elections, for most of the period from the demolition of Babri Masjid, 
it was found that the majority of Muslims have voted in majority of 
elections. And, in the last elections as well almost the greater majority 
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said to have voted in elections. The percentage of those in rural areas 
show a greater propensity and liking to turnout then those of the urban 
Muslims. This trend of rural voting has been well documented in the 
studies under taken by CSDS surveys and the National Election Surveys 
(NES) from time to time during the course of the elections in the past two 
decade. 
Regarding another form of affective orientation in the form of 
campaigning activity (CP), it was found that the amount of involvement 
was lower in comparison to those of voting participation (Figure 5.3). 
The involvement in election rallies was more than other forms of 
campaign activity, followed by distribution of election leaflets or putting 
up posters in both the urban as well as the rural Muslims. The door to 
door canvassing was another campaigning activity which was liked by 
both the rural and urban Muslims after attending election rallies and 
distributing leaflets or putting up posters. Here once again the rural 
Muslims take more interest with 25% of them involving in it. Among the 
urban Muslims only 18% spare time for undertaking door to door 
campaigning activity. This rejects our research hypothesis Hs. (Table 
5.10) 
The explanation could be given for such a trend is that rural 
masses have more community consciousness, as village life style make 
them involve themselves into life of one another. As a result, during 
election times factional rivalries come to fore too often in village and 
rural set ups, and it becomes a compulsion to get involved in one or the 
other factional rivalry. 
In answer to the question if one changes one's decision in the 
light of fatwa issued by the religious head, what is found is almost an eye 
opener. The common held belief is that Muslims are highly religious and 
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the clerics are the opinion makers and decision makers in the crisis 
situations. However, what was heartening to find was that above 90% of 
Muslims rejected the concept of accepting the dictate of clerics in 
political decision making. One can analyze to find that the clerics are a 
cleaver lot of people, they issue fatwa sensing the mood of the general 
masses, to avoid getting wrong. It is not the people following fatwa but 
the fatwa following the people's mood- that is correctly framed sentence. 
Regarding the question if you know how Muslims voted in last 
elections and how do they normally vote in elections, it was found that 
Muslims do not go by voting for community member but they prefer first 
the candidate capable of defeating BJP the party known for professed 
non-Muslim stance by its alliance with radical Hindu religious 
extremism. If candidate is found to be incapable of defeating BJP then the 
Muslims prefer the winning candidate irrespective of party and caste or 
religious affiliations. It's only in the failure of first two options that 
Muslims vote for a Muslim candidate. However, in the whole process 
what is of prime importance is that the Muslims know very well how the 
Muslims as a larger community are voting, as majority of them show in 
response to the question if one should vote in the same way ones caste / 
community votes. The majority of Muslims, in both rural and urban areas, 
vote keeping in mind the interest of Muslims as a whole. 
The question whether Muslims participate in violent protests like 
arson, sabotage, explosions etc to make authority pay attention to public 
demands and grievances, it was found that majority of Muslims favour 
non-violent means although may not be the democratic way of protest 
like making petitions or serving memorandum but they are making no 
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greater attempts to make authority pay attention to public demands and 
grievances. 
Research studies: 
The greatest hurdle in the path of quoting research studies has 
been the lack of studies done to understand the political behaviour of 
Muslims in India. There has been no research studies on the Muslims of 
Uttar Pradesh. However, the periodical national election surveys (NES) 
and studies by CSDS are the only source of information giving glimpses 
on the political involvement of Muslims. 
Table: 5.12 Participation in Election rallies-LokSabha (1999-2009) 
Social Communities 
All 
Dalits 
Adivasi 
OBC 
Upper caste 
Muslims 
1999 
13 
16 
13 
12 
13 
11 
2004 
14 
16 
14 
13 
14 
13 
2009 
13 
13 
10 
13 
14 
15 
Avg. 
13 
15 
12 
13 
14 
13 
Source: CSDS Data Unit 
The Table: 5.12 depicts the participation of various communities 
in election related rallies from 1999 onwards to 2009. it can be seen that 
over the last decade, there has been no sharp decline in the participation 
in the election rallies. From 1999 to 2009 the average of all the 
community shows stability in the percentage of participation (13%) in 
rallies, whereas the participation of Muslims shows an increase of 2 
percentage point from 11% to 13%. (CSDS) ^^  
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Table: 5.13 
All India 
U.P 
Interest in ] 
1996 
33 
46 
E l^ection Campaign 
1999 
32 
37 
(1996-2009) 
2004 
40 
33 
2009 
39 
42 
Avg. 
36 
40 
Source: CSDS Data Unit 
The Table; 5.13 shows the interest in election campaign in the 
people of U.P in the years from 1996 to 2009(CSDS). ^^  It was found that 
it presents a steady fall from 1996 to 2004 but in the pervious elections of 
2009 the level of interest shows a rise of 9 percentage Point. From 33% in 
2004 it rose to 42% in 2009. In U.P it has been seen in the various tables 
on voter turnout that the Muslims' average has remained neck to neck 
with that of overall average. If that inference is helpful in that case we 
can safely conclude that the affective orientation of Muslims almost equal 
to those of others in the state. 
We can conclude this discussion of "cultural" orientations of 
Muslims of U.P with a few general observations. On balance there is a 
strong evidence from these data that a large proportion of the Muslims are 
cognitively aware of politics, support parties and the election system, and 
demonstrate considerable personal "psychological involvement" with the 
system. This emergence of a "modem" set of political system orientations 
and attitudes, what might be called the new 'competitive party democracy 
political culture,' may be the most significant aspect of Muslims' political 
development. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR 
This chapter includes analysis of political behaviour among 
Muslims in three phases. In the first phase only the urban males are 
analyzed on seven dimensions of political behaviour. These seven 
dimensions are- voting participation, political information index, political 
trust, attitude towards system, political efficacy, mass media exposure 
and mobilization. In the second phase rural males are examined on 
similar seven dimensions. In the third phase both urban and rural 
Muslims are compared simultaneously on three dimensions of political 
behaviour which are party affiliation, voting preference and opinion 
decider. 
First Phase (Urban Muslims) 
To study the political behaviour of urban male Muslim on seven 
dimensions the whole sample is divided into four groups on the basis of 
residence, age and education. Further these groups are measured across 
high, middle and low income categories. Formation of groups is as 
fol lows-
Group I, includes- males in urban areas / age between 36-50 / education 
up to high school. 
Group II, includes- males in urban areas / age above 50 / education up to 
high school. 
Group III, includes- males in urban areas / age between 36-50 / 
education above high school. 
Group IV, includes- males in urban areas / age above 50 / education 
above high school. 
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Further, these groups are measured among - high, middle and low 
income categories. 
VOTING PARTICIPATION 
Table: 6.1 depicts voting participation of these four above mentioned 
groups among -high, middle and low income categories. 
Table: 6.1 Voting Participation and Income Groups 
Income Group 1 Group II Group III Group IV 
High 40 50 38 39 
Middle 42 48 46 44 
Low 38 42 41 40 
Figure: 6.1 Voting Participation in Different Income Groups 
Middle 
income category 
I • Group 1 
• Group 2 
D Group 3 
D Group 4 
After studying the Table: 6.1, it was found that in all the three 
income categories the general voting participation (VP) remained higher 
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than others forms of political participation. With 38% of VP in lower 
income group, 42% of VP in middle and 40%) of VP in higher income 
group, the general level of voting participation in group I is average. A 
possible reason could be that because of low education level and high 
family responsibility, and exacting and arduous struggle for survival in 
urban areas, people in group I category are more busy in meeting their 
two ends. It seems the light of hustings and elections does not hold much 
promise for them. It could also means that the group I category Muslim is 
convinced about lack of any change in his drugged style that electoral win 
or loss for one or other party can bring in his life. 
The group II category of Urban Muslims on the contrary show 
very encouraging level of voting participation (VP). It consisted of all 
those Muslims in urban area who are above 50 years and educated up to 
high school. As can be seen from the figure: 6.1 that increase in the age 
from 36-50 to above 50 has brought about 4% of increase in the voting 
participation of lower income group, 6% of increase in the voting 
participation of middle income group and about 10% of increase in the 
higher income group. This could be explained by the accepted social 
practice in Indian sub-continent that old age is considered a period of rest 
and retirement, for some, with eldest son shouldering the family 
responsibilities. So it seems fifty plus Muslims have more leisure time at 
their disposal to involve in politics. But for others, the age of above 50 
also brings greater family responsibility, in both the case involvement in 
political activities becomes necessity. 
The group III analysis shows high percent of voting participation 
(VP) 46% for middle income group, 38% for high and 41% for low 
income group. In the group III, urban Muslims with education above high 
school and age between 36-50 years are considered across high, middle 
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and low income groups. What is found is contrary to the accepted behef 
in western countries, that in two situations among the Muslims of U.P, 
the voting participation shows a downward trend. First, when the 
education and the income increase, the voting participation (VP) 
decreases. Second when the level of education increases but the level of 
income remains low, the VP will decrease. However, VP will remain 
higher when education is higher (above high school) and income group is 
of middle category (from 5000-20,000). 
In the group IV of urban Muslims with education above high 
school and age above 50 years in urban area, the results show a high 
voting percentage (VP) of 44% for middle income group and lower 
voting percentage (VP) of 39% for high income group and 40% of voting 
percentage for lower income group. The trend of voting which becomes 
perceptible here is that those Muslims who are in the category of higher 
education and higher age group, for them the increase in income, 
decreases their voting participation (VP). 
Research studies: 
All the attempts to find research studies to support the findings in 
the most of trends and patterns of political behaviour of Muslims of U.P 
have been at best a fruitless effort. The informations provided by the 
national election surveys are at best only general in nature. However, if 
we look at the voting participation of Muslims in the last two decades of 
the study, we find that it has remained close to that of overall voting 
participation of all the people of India. (Table: 6.2) 
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Table: 6.2 
Election year 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2004 
2009 
Trends in Voting Participation 
All 
58 
62 
60 
58 
58 
among Muslims 
Muslims 
56 
65 
67 
46 
55 
Source: NES, Respective Years. 
The table: 6.2 does not give the complete picture of the voter 
participation. It simply gives the general participation level of Muslims, 
however, another table representing voter participation across the income 
groups-like lower, middle and higher- will give some idea of the level of 
voting participation (VP) among these groups. 
Table: 6.3 Voting Participation among Different Economic Classes 
Income groups 
Upper 
Middle 
Lower 
1996 
48 
58 
61 
1999 
57 
57 
62 
2004 
59 
57 
58 
2009 
57 
59 
58 
Avg. 
55 
58 
60 
CSDS: Data Unit. 
The general trend that is exhibited from the above table: 6.3 is 
that in the last two decades, the lower income group has more voting 
participation (60%) in all the election years from 1996 to 2009. The 
middle income group has a voting participation around 58% which is less 
than the lower income group but more than the higher income group. The 
upper income group has the lowest voting participation of only 55% 
.(CSDS)^  
On comparing the tables: 6.2 and 6.3 with those of the table: 6.1, 
it is found that the voting participation of Muslims (table: 6.1) of middle 
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income category and overall voting participation of lower income 
category (table: 6.2) both show higher VP in comparison to other income 
categories. The average of Muslims' middle income category's voting 
participation might be low (45%) but it is still more than lower income 
and upper income category of Muslims (Table: 6.1). 
The changing pattern that is found during the two decades is that 
the overall voting participation of Muslims is lower than the general 
voting participation of all the people (Table: 6.2). Second changing 
pattern found among the Muslims is that the middle income category 
people are more politically active than the lower and the upper income 
category unlike the general pattern wherein the people of lower income 
category are politically more active than those of middle and upper 
income categories. 
POLITICAL INFORMATION INDEX 
In this dimension of political behaviour an attempt is being made to find 
the relationship between the amount of political information a person 
possesses and the level of his political participation. Six identical 
questions asked in the survey were: 
1) .Who is the ML A of your area? 1 Yes 0 No 
2) Who is ,at present, the P.M. of India ? 
1. Correct answer 0. Incorrect answer 
3) Can you say from which party the P.M belongs to ? 
1 .Correct answer 0. Incorrect answer 
4) Who is ,at present, the CM of U.P ? 
1. Correct answer 0. Incorrect answer 
5) What is the party of the CM of U.P ? 
1 .Correct answer O.Incorrect answer 
187 
6) Can you tell who has won from your parliamentary constituency ? 
1 .Correct answer O.Incorrect answer 
The answers to these questions were coded and ' 1 ' mark is 
awarded to correct answer and '0' mark to incorrect answer on all the six 
questions. On the basis of correct answers an index of political 
information was constructed by the author of the thesis. All those who 
could give no correct answer were given '0' marks and all those who 
could give correct answer were given ' 1 ' marks. Respondents with '0' 
marks were classified as having 'no' political information; on the other 
hand, those who gave 1-2 correct answers were given category of 'low' 
information, those who gave 3-4 correct answers were classified as 
'middle' and respondents in the category of 5-6 correct answers were 
classified as possessing 'high' political information. The degree of 
political information is directly related to participation in activities 
designed to affect political outcomes. The more information a person 
commands, the more likely he is to have tried to influence national and 
local decisions. It should be noted that the above questions only 
tangentially tap the political information level of a person. The political 
information index used here is at best only tests an approximation of the 
level of political information of a respondent. 
Table: 6.4 Political Information Index of Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
High 42.4 42 40 37.5 
Middle 44 47 49 41 
Low 39 36 40 45 
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Figure: 6.2 Political Information (PII) Index of Muslims 
Middle 
INCOME 
• Group 1 
• Group 2 
D Group 3 
D Group 4 
Table: 6.4 and figure 6.2 present political information index 
(PII) of urban males across high, middle and low income groups in four 
different groups. Group I represents urban male with education up to high 
school and age up to 50 years. As can be seen the lower income Muslims 
of group I have PII of 39%, which is lowest when we compare it with 
Middle and higher income Muslims. One possible reason could be that 
low level of education, lower age and lower level of income results in 
lowest Political Information Index of 39% only. 
What follows from this inference is that those in the higher 
education, age and higher income category should show higher PII, but 
that is not the case. In fact, those possess higher education, advance age 
and higher income i.e group IV show the lowest PII of 37.5% only. These 
findings should surprise no one. We know that besides factors like 
education, age and income; others factors like media exposure, and social 
status show a linear relationship with political influence but a curvilinear 
relationship with voting turnout. We also know that the level of political 
information follows closely the degree of media exposure and the level of 
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educational attainment. Unfortunately, both are low in Muslims of Uttar 
Pradesh (Table 4.5, 4.6, census 2001 ^  sachar committee report 2007 '*). 
Groups II and III follow almost similar trend as that of group I, 
with one caveat that the middle income category presents a consistently 
increasing trend of 47% in the Group II and 49% in Group III, but the 
lower and the higher income category Muslims show a fluctuating trend, 
However, the Muslims of group IV, representing education above high 
school and age above 50, reverses the trend of previous three groups. In 
the Group IV the lower income group Muslims, with high education level 
and high age (above 50) show highest PII. The reason as we know is that 
the increase in education and increase in age, increases the political 
activity of people in general. 
On the basis of these data, it is therefore fair to conclude that 
generally for the highly educated, the level of political information plays 
little role in determining whether or not they vote; but in the case of less 
educated persons, a rising level of information is accompanied by a rise 
in voting frequency. 
POLITICAL TRUST 
Table: 6.5 depicts political trust of above mentioned four groups across-
low, middle and high - income categories. 
Table: 6.5 Political Trust among Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
High 53 54 51 48 
Middle 49 51 50 46 
Low 32 33 33.5 32 
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Fig: 6.3 Political Trust among Muslims in Different Income Groups 
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Table: 6.5 and figure 6.3 measure the political trust (PT) among 
urban Muslims surveyed in four different groups, on the basis of Age, 
Education and Income levels. The level of political trust (PT) among the 
Muslims of U.P showed a changing trend of increasing confidence on the 
government and political representatives of their respective constituency. 
As the income levels of Muslims living in the urban area, increases from 
the lower income category to higher income category, the political trust 
among them shows a positive effect. In the 1^^ group the percentage of 
political trust (PT) for lower income group was 32%, for the middle 
income category was 49% and for the higher income was 53%, it presents 
a consistently increasing pattern. 
In the group II, III and IV the trend of political trust was almost 
similar to that of group I. This showed that with increase in Income of the 
people the political trust also increases. This trend in the Muslims of U.P 
conforms to the accepted pattern across the globe that increase in level of 
income brings in its fold increase in status and prestige of the people as a 
result people are more satisfied with the system's delivering abilities. 
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On moving from group I to group II, to find the impact of age on 
the pohtical trust with the control of education, we find that, with increase 
in age, the MusUms of lower income group, middle income group and 
higher income group-all exhibit increase in their polifical trust. This 
pattern also agrees with the belief that increase in age leads to increase in 
political trust. Nevertheless, when we investigated the impact of 
education on the political trust of Muslims of U.P, with the control of age, 
as we move from group II to IV, we found that the increase in the level of 
education makes the Muslims of U.P more skeptical about government 
capability to be trusted. The political trust of urban Muslims in the group 
IV shows a decline, thereby displaying a negative impact of educafion on 
the political trust. 
The group IV of the table: 6.5 is a revelation of shorts. It shows 
the impact of both the increase in the level of education and the increase 
in the age of the Muslims of U.P. The conclusion that can be drawn fi"om 
the comparison of group IV to group I is that increase in the level of 
education and the advancement in age keeps the political trust stable for 
the lower income group i.e. 32%, but the level of polifical trust of higher 
and middle income categories shows a decline of almost 3 percentage 
point for middle income category of Muslims and decline to the tune of 5 
percentage point for the higher income category of urban Muslims. 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS SYSTEM 
Table: 6.6 and Figure 6.4 present attitude towards system of Muslim 
masses. It is measured in above menfioned four groups across- low, 
middle and high- income groups. 
Table: 6.6 Muslims' Attitude towards System in U.P 
income 
High 
Middle 
Low 
Group 1 
42 
38 
31 
Group II 
42 
36 
33 
Group III 
42.5 
35 
35 
Group IV 
33 
40 
35 
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Figure: 6.4 Attitude Towards System (ATS) among Muslims 
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Table: 6.6 tries to analyze various groups of urban Muslims on 
their attitude towards system (ATS), It is measured across four groups of 
Muslims classified on the basis of their educational attainment, 
advancement of age, and level of income. To measure the attitude 
towards system the Muslims of U.P are divided into two educational 
groups. One group was of those having attained education up to high 
school, it also included the illiterates. Second group was of those having 
attained education above high school. 
Another categorization was of age, for this the two age groups 
were made. One group consisted of those in the age group of 36 to 50 
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years and another group consisted of those who were above 50 years of 
age. The third categorization was of income. The overall sample was 
divided into three income groups- lower income, middle income and 
higher income groups. The lower income group had an income limit of 
5000 rupees per month, the middle income group was from 5001 to 
20000 rupees per month and the higher income group was of those having 
income above 20000 of rupees per month. 
After investigating the table: 6.6 and figure 6.4 for testing the 
level of attitude of Muslims towards system, it was found that in the 
group 1 of Muslims consisting of those having education up to high 
school and age from 36 to 50 years, as the income level of Muslims 
increased from lower to higher, their attitude towards system as well 
became more and more positive. In the lower income group the attitude 
towards system was 31 percent only which increased to 42 percentage 
point as the level of income increased to the high level. 
The group II of Muslims consisted of those having education up 
to high school and age above 50 years. The second group Muslims as 
well showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The increase in the 
level of income led to the increase in the attitude towards system of the 
urban Muslims of U.P. If we compare the group I and the group II to find 
the ATS among Muslims with control of education, it was found that with 
the increase in age the attitude towards system of Muslims remained 
almost constant for high income group. The 2 percentage point of 
reduction in the level of ATS of middle income group and 2 percentage 
point increase in the ATS of lower income category of Muslims is 
insignificant. 
The group III of Muslims consisted of those Muslims who have 
education above high school and the age is from 36 to 50 years. Here as 
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well the patters of attitude towards system (ATS) remained similar to that 
of group I and group II. On comparing the group III with the groups I 
with the control age, it was found that increase in education among the 
Muslims of similar age group does not lead to any significant change in 
the overall attitude towards system. The ATS remained almost same in 
the high income group. 
In the IV group the trend changed. It showed increase in ATS as 
the income category of Muslims increases from lower to middle, but then 
the attitude towards system shows a steep fall of 7 percentage points in 
the high income group which is quit significant. As this group of Muslims 
represent those group who are having education above high school and 
age above 50 years, it is presumed that such a change in behaviour could 
be due to the nostalgic effect of early days of independence, When the 
Nehruvian era and its after effects held so much promise in the political 
system for all the religious communities unlike in the last two decades 
when the religious extremism has reached at a crescendo. 
POLITICAL EFFICACY 
Table: 6.7 and Figure 6.5 depicts about political efficacy 
dimension of political behaviour among urban Muslims. It is measured in 
above mentioned four groups of Muslims classified across- low, middle 
and high income groups. 
Table: 6.7 Political Efficacy of Muslims of U.P 
Income Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
High 37 55 47 47 
Middle 44 51 43 43 
Low 30 32 31 30 
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Table: 6.7 and Figure 6.5 analyze various groups of urban Muslims 
on their political efficacy (PE) dimension of political behaviour. It is 
measured across four groups of Muslims classified on the basis of their 
educational attainment, advancement of age, and level of income. 
After investigating the table: 6.7 for the testing the level of 
political efficacy of Muslims, it was found that in the I group of Muslims 
consisting of those having education up to high school and age fi-om 36 to 
50 years, as the income level of Muslims increased fi-om lower to higher, 
their political efficacy (PE) showed steep rise irom 30 percentage point to 
44 percentage for the Muslims of middle income category and again it 
showed a steep fall by 7 percentage point and comes to 37 percent. The 
fall of 7% point brings the PE of higher income category of Muslims to 
37% which is still 7% above those of lower income group of Muslims. 
It clearly lays down a pattern that the increase in income does 
mcrease the political efficacy of Muslims steeply but the subsequent fall 
in the level of PE for the high income category Muslims does not bring 
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the level of political efficacy to the below 30% mark. This shows that the 
increase in the level of income increases the political efficacy of 
Muslims. 
The group II of Muslims consisted of those having education up 
to high school and age above 50 years. The II group Muslims as well 
showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The increase in the level of 
income led to the increase in the political efficacy of the Muslims of U.P. 
However, what is noticeable is that in the group II, as the level of income 
increases, there is a consistent increase without any steep fall. If we 
compare the group I and group II to find the effect of age on the political 
efficacy of Muslims with the control of education, it was found that the 
age has a positive effect on the level of polifical efficacy of the Muslims 
of U.P. As the age increases the political efficacy as well increases of all 
the income groups. 
The group III of Muslims consisted of those Muslims who have 
education above high school and the age is from 36 to 50 years. Here as 
well the pattern of polifical efficacy (PE) remained similar to that of 
group I and group II. It showed that the increase in the level of income 
leads to increase in the political efficacy of the urban Muslims of U.P. On 
comparing the group III with the groups I with the age control, it was 
found that increase in education among the Muslims of similar age group 
(36-50 years) the political efficacy decreases for low and middle income 
groups. It is proved that education has negative impact on the political 
efficacy of the low and middle income Muslims. But PE increases for 
high income group with the increase in education. 
The IV group of Muslims consisted of those who have education 
above high school and the age is above 50 years. In this group as well a 
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similar pattern is found wherein with the increase in the level of income, 
the political efficacy of the Muslims increases as well, however, it 
remains similar to that of the group III. It indicates that at a certain age, 
here 50 years, the political efficacy of people increases with the increase 
in level of voting participation. (Table 4.9). 
MASS MEDIA EXPOSURE 
Table: 6.8 and figure 6.6 depict the mass media exposure (MME) 
of urban male Muslims. It is measured in above mentioned four groups of 
Muslims classified across- low, middle and high income groups. 
Table: 6.8 Mass Media Exposure among Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
High 43 35 49 44 
Middle 36 40 50 46.5 
Low 30 32 33 39 
Figure: 6.6 Mass Media Exposure (MME) among Muslims 
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Table: 6.8 analyses various groups of urban Muslims on their 
mass media exposure (MME). It is measured across four groups of 
Muslims classified on the basis of their educational attainment, 
advancement of age, and level of income. 
After examining the table: 6.8 for testing the level of mass media 
exposure (MME) of Muslims, it was found that in the group I of Muslims 
consisting of those having education up to high school and age from 36 to 
50 years, as the income level of Muslims increased from lower to higher, 
their mass media exposure as well became more and more positive. In the 
lower income group the mass media exposure was 30 percent only which 
increased to 43 percentage in high income group. 
The group II of Muslims consisted of those having education up 
to high school and age above 50 years. The second group Muslims as 
well showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The increase in the 
level of income led to the increase in the mass media exposure (MME) of 
the Muslims of U.P. but then just as the level of mass media exposure 
(MME) rose sharply from 32% to 40% as the income level rose from 
lower to the middle, the mass media exposure (MME) fell steeply from 
40% to 35%) as the level of income rose from the middle income to the 
higher income level. If we compare the group I and the group II to find 
the level of MME among Muslims, with the control of education, it is 
found that the advancement in age is positively related with the lower and 
the middle income category of Muslims but negatively related with those 
in higher income category. 
The group III of Muslims consisted of those Muslims who have 
education above high school and the age is from 36 to 50 years. In this 
group, as the level of income increases the MME shows a steep rise of 17 
percentage point from 33% to 50% as the income level rose from lower to 
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middle. But for the higher income category, the level of MME fell to 1 
percentage point from 50% to 49% which is insignificant. On comparing 
the group III with that of group I to see the impact of education on the 
MME of Muslims with the control of age, we find that the level of MME 
is positively related to the education. As the education increases, the mass 
media exposure also increased, for the lower income category from 30%) 
to 33%, and for the middle and high income category from 36%) to 50%o 
and from 43%) to 49% respectively. 
The group IV of Muslims consisted of those who have education 
above high school and the age is above 50 years. In this group as well a 
similar pattern is found wherein with the increase in the level of income 
from lower to the middle income category leads to steep rise in the MME 
from 39%o to 46.5%), but from middle income category to the higher the 
level of MME decreases to 2.5 percent point. In the group IV, we find 
that both the higher level of education and income, leads to higher mass 
media exposure. This pattern about the Muslims conforms to the findings 
made earlier (Tables 4.6, 4.12) that with increase in education, age and 
income level, the mass media exposure also increases and their political 
participation increases. 
MOBILIZATION (M) 
Mobilization emphasizes the influence from the outside: how 
elected officials, parties and interest organizations affiliated with parties 
work to recruit voters. Activity is often associated with the election cycle 
as parties and MPs mobilize their supporters to vote and participate in 
political campaigns. Table: 6.9 and figure 6.7 depict the mass 
mobilization (M) of urban male Muslims. It is measured in above 
mentioned four groups of Muslims classified across- low, middle and 
high income groups. 
Table: 6.9 Mobilization Participation of Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
High 43 40 45 45 
Middle 56 54 57 63 
Low 58 55 59 60 
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Figure: 6.7 Mobilization (M) among Muslims 
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Table: 6.9 tries to analyze various groups of urban Muslims on 
their level of mobilization (M). It is measured across four groups of 
Muslims classified on the basis education, age and income. To measure 
the mobilization, the Muslims of U.P are divided into two educational 
groups. One group was of those having attained education up to high 
school, it also included the illiterates. Second group was of those having 
attained education above high school. 
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Another categorization was of age, for this the two age groups 
were made. One group consisted of those in the age group of 36 to 50 
years and another group consisted of those who were above 50 years of 
age. The third categorization was of income. 
After analyzing the table: 6.9 for the level of mobilization (M) 
of urban Muslims, it was found that in the group I of Muslims consisting 
of those having education up to high school and age from 36 to 50 years, 
as the income level of Muslims increased from lower to higher, their 
mobilization became more and more negative. In the lower income group 
the mobilization level was 58 percent which decreased to 56 percentage 
point as the level of income increased to the middle. 
Further, the increase in the level of income category from middle 
income level to higher income level brought the level of mobilization of 
Muslims ftirther down to 43 percent only. The similar trend of decreasing 
level of mobilization continued even in the group II and group III of 
Muslims. The pattern of decreasing level of mobilization in Muslims of 
U.P shows that increase in income is not positively related to the 
mobilization. 
The group II of Muslims consisted of those having education up 
to high school and age above 50 years. The group II Muslims as well 
showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The lower income category 
of Muslims had the mobilization participation of 55% which reduced to 
40% point as the level of income increased to the high income group. 
If we try to find the impact of age on the level of mobilization 
with the control of education by comparing groups I and II, we find that 
the advancement in age is negatively related with the level of 
mobilizafion participafion as the percentage of mobilizafion come down 
as we move from group I to group II to the impact of age on the level of 
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mobilization. The mobilization reduces from 58% to 55% for the lower 
income category of Muslims, for the middle income category the level of 
mobilization falls to 54% from 56%, and for the higher income category 
the level of mobilization further falls to 40%) from 43%o mark. 
The group III of Muslims consisted of those Muslims who have 
education above high school and the age is from 36 to 50 years. In this 
group, as the level of income increases the mobilization reduces to 45%) 
for the higher income category from 59% for the lower income category. 
Here as well if we try to examine the impact of education on the 
mobilization level of Muslims with the control of age, we find that the 
increase in the level of education had a positive impact on the level of 
mobilization. The group I and group III shows this impact very clearly, as 
we can see that the percentage of mobilization increases from 43%) to 
45% from those Muslims in higher income category, and for the middle 
and lower income the increase is 56% to 57%o and 58%) to 59%) 
respectively. 
The group IV of Muslims consisted of those who have education 
above high school and the age is above 50 years. This group of Muslims 
as well shows a similar pattern of increasing mobilization level except for 
the higher group of Muslims where the total mobilization level remains 
stable at 45%) mark. The pattern that is found is that with increase in age 
and income level the level of mobilization also increases. (Tables 4.9 
and 4.12). 
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Second Phase (Rural Muslims) 
In the second phase a group-wise presentation of poUtical behaviour, 
across various dimensions, of Muslim males in Rural area is made. Three 
groups on the basis of age and education are made which are as follows: 
Group I includes- males in rural areas / age between 36 to 50 years / 
education up-to high school. 
Group II includes- males in rural areas/age above 50 years / education up 
to high school. 
Group III includes- males in rural area/age between 36 to 50 years / 
education above high school. 
Further, these groups are measured across- low, middle and high income 
categories. Because of the a paucity of rural males above 50 years of age 
with education above high school, it is not possible to have group IV in 
rural areas as we have taken in urban area so only three groups have been 
made. 
VOTING PARTICIPATION (VP) 
Table: 6.10 and Figure 6.8 present the voting participation of rural male 
Muslims in three above mentioned groups across low, middle and high 
income groups. 
Table: 6.10 Voting Participation of Rural Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III 
High 59.5 49.5 45 
Middle 50 45.5 38 
Low 61.5 64 66 
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Table: 6.10 tries to analyze various groups of rural Muslims on 
their level of voting participation (VP). It is measured across three groups 
of Muslims classified on the basis of their educational attainment, 
advancement of age, and level of income. To measure the voting 
participation (VP), the Muslims of U.P are divided into two educational 
groups. One group was of those having attained education up to high 
school, it also included the illiterates. Second group was of those having 
attained education above high school. 
Another categorization was of age, for this the two age groups 
were made. One group consisted of those in the age group of 36 to 50 
years and another group consisted of those who were above 50 years of 
age. The third categorization was of income. The overall sample was 
divided into three income groups- lower income, middle income and 
higher income groups. The lower income group had an income limit of 
3000 rupees per month, the middle income group was from 3001 to 
12000 rupees per month and the higher income group was of those having 
income above 12000 of rupees per month. 
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In all the three groups of Muslims categorized on the bases of 
age, education and income; and the income categories whether lower, 
middle or high, the trend of voting participation (VP) shows in the Table 
5.10. In group I consist of those Muslims in rural area who are in the age 
category of 36 to 50 years and possessed education up to high school. 
When the group I of the table examined, it was found that the 
Muslims of lower income group had a higher voting participation 
(61.5%) than the middle (50%) and high income category (59.5%)) of 
rural Muslims of U.P. As the income level of the group I category of 
Muslims increases, the voting participation (VP) shows a steep fall of 
11.5% point and come to 50% for the middle income category of 
Muslims. Again as the level of income further increases from middle to 
higher the level of VP also shows a rise of 9.5%) point. It indicates that 
the level of income plays positive role for those Muslims who are in 
lower and higher income categories. 
The group II consists of those Muslims who have education up 
to high school and are in the age group of above 50 years. On examining 
the table it was found that the lower income category of Muslims have a 
higher voting percentage (64%) than the middle (45.5%)) and high income 
(49.5%o) category. If we find the impact of age on the voting percentage 
in the rural area by comparing the group II with the group I of the table, it 
is found that the advance in age decreases the level of voting participation 
for the middle and higher income category of Muslims but the voting 
participation for the lower Muslims increases with increase in age. 
In the group III which consisted of those Muslims whose age was 
between 36 to 50 years and the education is above high school. On 
examining the group III of the table it was found that the lower income 
group of Muslims had higher voting participation of 66%) and the middle 
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and the higher income category had 38% and 45% of voting participation 
respectively. If we try to find the impact of education on the voting 
participation of rural Muslims, with the control of age, it was found by 
comparing group I and III that the increase in education had a negative 
impact on the overall voting participation of rural Muslims except for the 
Muslims of lower income category. This pattern of voting participation is 
corroborated by the tables 4.6,4.9, 4.12. 
The reasons for lower income group to have more VP, seems to 
be the fact that they have greater expectations from the system, to deliver 
them from the cycle of poverty and misery, or it could be an opportunity 
for making money and having some moments of fun and entertainment. 
The higher VP in higher income group could be because of securing 
one's interest by being part of electoral process and identifying with one 
or other party candidate. The lower VP among the middle income group 
could be because of their pre-occupation with their own struggle for 
livelihood or not having too much expectation from election results. 
POLITICAL INFORMATION INDEX (PII) 
Table: 6.11 and Figure 6.9 present the political information index (PII) 
of rural male Muslims in three groups across - low, middle and high 
income categories. 
Table: 6.11 Political Information Index of Rural Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III 
High 62 56 43 
Middle 40 54.5 37.5 
Low 61 64 59 
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Figure: 6.9 Political Information Index of Rural Muslims 
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Table: 6.11 tries to analyze various groups of rural Muslims on 
their level of political information index (PII). It is measured across three 
groups of Muslims classified on the bases of their education, age, and 
income. 
If we analyze the group I of rural Muslims with education up to 
high school and age from 36 to 50 years. It was found that lower and 
higher income groups have 61% and 62% of political information index 
(PII) respectively and 40% of political information index (PII) for the 
Muslims in the middle income category. As the level of income increases 
from lower to middle the political information index shows a steep fall of 
21% and comes down to 40% mark. Again when the level of income rises 
to higher level from the middle income category, it was found that the 
political information index rises to 22% points and reaches 62%. 
In group II of rural Muslim males with education up to high 
school and age above SOyears, it was found that the higher and the lower 
income category shows higher political information index (PII) of 56% 
and 64%, however unlike group I, in this group the lower income group 
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has highest 64% Political Information Index than those of higher income 
group unlike the case in group I. But the middle group follows the similar 
trend as of group I and continues to remain lowest at 54.5%. If we try to 
find the impact of age on the PII of group II of rural Muslims with the 
control of education, it was found that with increase in age the level of 
PII also increases. But in the higher income category of Muslims, the 
increase in age has a negative influence on the political information 
index. 
The group III consisted of those Muslims with education above 
high school and age from 36 to 50. On examining the table it was found 
that it represented the trend of previous group wherein the lower income 
category of Muslims have 59% of PII which is 16% point more than 
those rural Muslims who are in the higher income category of 43%). 
The middle income category of Muslims continue to have lowest 
PII of 37.5% if we fmd the impact of education on the political 
information index (PII) with the control of age by comparing the two 
groups- group III and group I, it is found that education has a negative 
relation with political information index. 
This pattern is in contravention of accepted norm of political 
behaviour that education increases the information level. The result 
should surprise no one as besides education, the availability of mass 
media resources as well plays a major role in determining the level of 
political information index and we have in previous tables (Table 4.1) 
seen that the mass media exposure of rural Muslims is only 9% which is 
very low. This shows that higher PII results completely in higher voting 
participation (VP) in lower income groups across the education and age 
categories. But this is not the case in higher and middle income groups. 
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ATTITUDE TOWARDS SYSTEM (ATS) 
Table: 6.12 and Figure 6.10 presents attitude towards system 
(ATS) among rural Muslim males in three groups across- low, middle and 
high income categories. 
Table: 6.12 Attitude towards System of Rural Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III 
High 50 54.5 60 
Middle 31 33 37 
Low 37 24.5 40 
Table: 6.12 examines various groups of rural Muslims on their level of 
attitude towards system (ATS). It is measured across three groups of 
Muslims classified on the bases of their educational attainment, 
advancement of age, and level of income. 
The higher income category of Muslims have higher attitude 
towards system (ATS) in all the three groups. The group I of Muslims is 
of those having education up to high school and age from 36 to 50. On 
examining the group I, it was found that the higher income category of 
Muslims showed 50% of ATS, 31% for middle and 37% for lower 
income category. The group II consisted of those Muslims with education 
up to high school and age above 50years. On analyzing the table it was 
found that attitude towards system (ATS) was lowest among lower 
income group unlike the first group wherein it was the middle income 
category of Muslims in rural area that showed the lowest ATS. 
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Figure: 6.10 Attitude towards System (ATS) among Rural Muslims 
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The group III of Muslims with education above high school and age 
from 36 to 50 shows similar trend as that of group I. Higher income 
group with 60% of ATS had the highest attitude towards system, with 
40% lower income group stands 2"^* and the middle income group shows 
lowest ATS. Reason could be that the lower and middle income group 
expects more from the system which probably fails to come up to their 
standards. 
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POLITICAL TRUST (PT) 
Table: 6.13 and Figure 6.11 present the political trust (PT) among rural 
Muslims male in three groups across-low, middle and high income 
categories. 
Table: 6.13 Political Trust among Rural Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III 
High 57.5 54 58 
Middle 38 32.5 34 
Low 46 50 56_ 
If we analyze the group I of rural Muslims with education up to 
high school and age from 36 to 50 years. It was found that lower and 
middle income groups have 46% and 38% of political trust respectively 
and 57.5% of political trust for the Muslims in the higher income 
category. As the level of income increases from lower to middle the 
political trust shows a steep fall of 8% and comes down to 38% mark. 
Again when the level of income rises to higher level from the middle 
income category, it was found that the political trust rises to 19.5% points 
and reaches 57.5%. 
In group II of rural Muslim males with education up to high 
school and age above 50years, it was found that the higher and the lower 
income category shows higher political trust (PT) of 54%) and 50%), and 
like group I, in this group also the high income group has highest 54%) 
Political Trust. The middle group also follows the similar trend as of 
group I and continues to remain lowest at 32.5%. If we try to find the 
impact of age on the PT of group II of rural Muslims with the control of 
education, it was found that with increase in age the level of PT also 
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increases in lower income group. But in the high and middle income 
category of Muslims, the increase in age has a negative influence on the 
political trust. 
Figure: 6.11 Political Trust (PT) among Rural Muslims 
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The group III consisted of those Muslims with education above 
high school and age from 36 to 50. On examining the table it was found 
that it represented the trend of II group wherein the high income category 
of Muslims have 58% of PT which is 24% point more than those rural 
Muslims who are in the middle income category. 
The middle income category of Muslims continues to have lowest 
PT of 34% if we find the impact of education on the political trust (PT) 
with the control of age by comparing the two groups- group III and group 
I, it is found that education has a positive relation with political trust in 
low income category. 
This pattern is in accordance with the accepted norm of political 
behaviour that education increases the political trust. A cursory look at 
the table shows similar trend in all the three groups. In which highest 
political trust (PT) is shown by all the three higher income groups, but it 
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is not the lower but the middle income group which shows the lowest 
political trust. It could be because the middle income group gets 
disillusioned with the system in their day to day dealings 
POLITICAL EFFICACY 
Table: 6.14 and figure 6.12 present political efficacy of rural male 
Muslims in three groups among - low, middle and high income 
categories. 
Table: 6.14 Political Efficacy among Rural Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III 
High 40 43 38 
Middle 25 27 30 
Low 40 48 46 
Figure: 6.12 Political Efficacy (PE) among Rural Muslims 
High Middle 
income 
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Table: 6.14 examines various groups of rural Muslims on their 
level of political efficacy (PE). It is measured across three groups of 
Muslims classified on the bases of their educational attainment, 
advancement of age, and level of income. 
As can be seen from the table that the group I consist of those 
Muslims who are educated up to high school and are in the age from 36 
to 50 years. It shows that the political efficacy of rural Muslims in the 
lower and the higher income category is same at 40% point where as the 
political efficacy of middle income category of Muslims is at 25%. 
The group II consists of those Muslims who are educated up to 
high school and are in the age of above 50 years. As can be seen from the 
table 6.14, the group II also showed the similar pattern as that of the 
group I. As can be seen in the table that lower income category of 
Muslims had 48%) of political efficacy, the middle income category had 
27% of political efficacy and the higher income category had 43% of 
political efficacy among the rural Muslims of U.P. if we compare groups 
1 and II to find the impact of age on the political efficacy with the control 
of education. We find that with the increase in age the political efficacy 
of rural Muslims also increases. Thus, it has a positive influence on 
political efficacy. 
The group III consists of those who are in the age group from 36 
to 50 years and education above high school. As can be seen in the table 
the lower income category of Muslims had higher PE of 46%). And as we 
move from the lower income to the middle income category, we noticed 
that the PE falls from 46% point to 30% point, but it increases to 38% 
from 30% as we move from middle income category to higher income 
category. If we compare the group III with the group I to find the impact 
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of education on the political efficacy, with the control of age, we find that 
education has a positive influence on the political efficacy. 
MASS MEDIA EXPOSURE (MME) 
Table: 6.15 and figure 6.13 present the mass media exposure of rural 
Muslims among three groups across- low, middle and high income 
categories. 
Table: 6.15 Mass Media Exposure of Rural Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III 
High 30 28 26 
Middle 27 25 24 
Low 26 20 22 
Figure: 6.13 Mass Media Exposure (MME) of Rural Muslims 
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Table: 6.15 analyses various groups of rural Muslims on their 
level of mass media exposure (MME). It is measured across three groups 
of Muslims classified on the bases of their education, age, and income. 
To measure the mass media exposure (MME), the Muslims of U.P are 
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divided into two educational groups. One group was of those having 
attained education up to high school, it also included the illiterates. 
Second group was of those having attained education above high school. 
Another categorization was of age, for this the two age groups were 
made. One group consisted of those in the age group of 36 to 50 years 
and another group consisted of those who were above 50 years of age. 
The third categorization was of income. The overall sample was divided 
into three income groups- lower income, middle income and higher 
income groups. 
As can be seen from the table: 6.15, group I shows a positive and 
increasing trend, as we move from lower income category to the higher 
income category. The group I consists of those rural Muslims who are in 
the age group from 36 to 50 years and who have education up to high 
school. It can be seen that lower income category of Muslims have mass 
media exposure of 26%, which increases to 27% as we move from lower 
to middle income group. The level of mass media exposure (MME) 
increases to 30% as we move from middle income to higher income 
category. 
The group II consists of those Muslims who are in the age group 
of above 50 years and have education up to high school. As can be seen 
that the lower income category of Muslims have mass media exposure of 
20%, the middle income category has MME of 25% and the high income 
group has the MME of 28%. In the table as we move from lower income 
group to the higher income we find income has a positive relation with 
mass media exposure. If we try to find the impact of age on the level of 
mass media exposure of the group I and II of rural Muslims with the 
control of educafion, we find that among the rural Muslims the level of 
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MME falls with increase in age. Thus the level of mass media exposure 
shows a negative correlation with age. 
The group III consists of those rural Muslims who are in the age 
group of 36 to 50 years and who have education above high school. As 
can be seen from the table that the level of mass media exposure 
increases with increase in the level of income, for the lower income 
category it was 22 percentage point, in the middle income it increased to 
24 percentage point and in the higher income category it increased to 26 
percentage point. If we compare the groups I and III to find the impact of 
education on the level of mass media exposure with the control of age, we 
find that education has a negafive relation with the MME among the rural 
Muslims but a very strong and positive relafion with the level of income, 
(see Table 4.12). However, one thing has to be accepted that the overall 
mass media exposure (MME) of Muslims is below average. 
MOBILIZATION (M) 
Table: 6.16 and figure 6.14 depict the mass mobilizafion (M) of 
rural male Muslims. It is measured in above mentioned three groups of 
Muslims classified across- low, middle and high- income groups. 
Table: 6.16 Mobilization in Rural Muslims 
Income Group I Group II Group III 
High 46 55 65 
Middle 62 64 66 
Low 60 59 61 
Figure: 6.14 Mobilization (M) in Rural Muslims 
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Table: 6.16 tries to analyze various groups of rural Muslims on 
their level of mobilization (M). It is measured across three groups of 
Muslims classified on the bases of their educational attainment, 
advancement of age, and level of income. 
The group I consists of those Muslims in the rural area who are in 
the age group of 36 to 50 years and who have education below high 
school. It can be seen in the table that the Muslims of lower income 
category have mobilization level of 60 %. The mobilization level of 
Muslims of middle income category is 62%. As it can be seen from the 
table that as we move from lower income category to the middle, the 
mobilization level increases. The level of mobilization shows a positive 
relation with income, but as we move from the middle income category to 
high income category, we find that the level of mobilization in the high 
income category of Muslims shows a steep fall. The high income 
category in the group I show a restraint for political mobilization. 
The group II consists of those Muslims in the rural area who are 
in the age of above 50 years and who have education below high school. 
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As can be seen in the table that the group II as well has a similar trend in 
the level of mobilization as that of the group I, the Muslims of lower 
income category have a mobilization level of 59%, the Muslims of 
middle income category have a mobilization level of 64% and the higher 
income category of Muslims have 55% of level of mobilization. If we try 
to find out the impact of age on the level of mobilization with the control 
of education, we find that as the age of a rural Muslim advances, their 
level of mobilization also increases. It can be seen in the table by 
comparing group II with that of group I. 
The group III consists of those Muslims in the rural area who are 
in the age group from 36 to 50 years and education above high school. As 
compared to the other two groups of table the group III exhibits almost 
similar patterns and trend. As we move fi-om lower income category to 
the high income category, we find that the level of mobilization also 
increases, but unlike the pervious two groups, in the group III, the 
mobilizafion level in the high income category is much higher (65%). In 
the group I, high income category mobilization was 46% and in the group 
II, the high income mobilizafion was 55%. If find the impact of education 
on the level of mobilization with the control of age and compare group III 
and I, we find that the education has a positive correlation with the 
mobilizafion level. 
As can be seen in the table, that education increases the level of 
mobilization from 46% to 65% for the high income category, and for the 
middle income category the level of mobilizafion increases from 62% to 
66% under the influence of education and for the lower income category 
the level of mobilization increases from 60% to 61% when the level of 
education increases. 
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Third Phase (Urban-Rural Muslims) 
In this part of the section an attempt is being made to understand the 
difference between the urban and rural Muslims, in their Party Affiliation 
(P.aff), Voter Preference (V.Pre) and Opinion Decider (OD). To measure 
these dimensions of political behaviour, the whole sample was 
categorized on the basis of level of education, age and level of income. 
First, in education, two groups were made. One group was of below high 
school and the other was of above high school. 
Second, the two divisions of age groups were made. One group was from 
36 to 50 years and the other group was of those above 50 years of age. 
Third, on the basis of income, three categories were made- lower, middle 
and high. All those Muslims with income up to 3000 rupees per month in 
rural area and up to 5000 rupees in urban area were included in lower 
income category, those with income up to 12000 rupees per month and 
20000 per month respectively were kept in middle income category and 
those rural Muslims with income above 12000 rupees per month and 
20000 rupees per month in urban were kept in high income category. 
PARTY AFFILIATION (P.aff) 
Table: 6.17 and figure 6.15 presents the party affiliation of rural 
and urban Muslims in the state of Uttar Pradesh. In it a comprehensive 
analysis across various groups on the basis of education, age and income 
groups is made. In the group I which is based on education up to high 
school, it was found that the overall vote were distributed among the 
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three parties- namely, Samajwadi Party (SP), Bhaujan Samaj Party (BSP) 
and Congress ©. 
Table: 6.17 Party Affiliation among Rural - Urban Muslims 
Below high 
school 
Above high 
school 
Age 38 to 50 yrs 
Age above 50 yrs 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
Samajwadi party 
urban 
46 
45 
44 
48 
47.5 
49 
41 
rural 
61 
58 
60 
61 
69 
54 
57.5 
Bahujan samaj 
urban 
24 
26 
25 
24 
28 
24 
29 
rural 
25 
29 
27 
26 
31 
28 
20 
Congress party 
urban 
30 
29 
31 
28 
24 
27 
37 
Rural 
14 
12.5 
13 
13.3 
0 
17.5 
22.5 
Figure: 6.15 Party Affiliation among Rural - Urban Muslims 
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From the table: 6.17 it is quite clear that Muslims in U.P have 
not much liking for parties like- CPI, CPI(M), BJP etc. As can be seen 
from the data that such parties are not even in the reckoning of the 
Muslims. The Muslims with the level of education up to high school, 
whether living in urban or rural centers, have a strong predilection for 
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Samajwadi Party (SP) as 46% urban and 61% rural Muslims supported it. 
The intensity and amount of support of the urban Muslims in the group is 
15% point less than that of the rural Muslims. The support for Bahujan 
Samajwadi Party (BSP) in both the areas-urban as well as rural- is almost 
VA of the total population, but as can be seen in the table, the Muslim 
supporters for Congress Party are more than double in the urban areas 
than in the rural ones. 
The group II consists of those Muslims who have the level of 
education above high school and who are residing in both the urban and 
the rural areas. Here as well the trend is similar to the one in the previous 
group. In this group the support for both SP and Congress is reduced and 
BSP is the real gainer as seen in the table. 
The group III consists of those Muslims who are in the age from 
36 to 50 years. As we can see in the table, in this category the rural 
support of the Muslims for the Samajwadi Party (SP) marginally 
increases from 58%) to 60%) but the urban support for the Samajwadi 
Party (SP) and along with it the urban Muslims support and the rural 
Muslims support for Bahujan Samajwadi Party BSP) reduces. It seems 
that this group of Muslims who are in the age group from 36 to 50 years, 
have a special liking for Congress party as in both the urban and the rural 
areas the support base for the Congress Party increases from 29 to 31%) in 
the urban area and 12.5 to 13% in the rural area. 
Group IV of above 50 years age, as can be seen in the table, 
consisted of Samajwadi Party (SP) supporter- in both the urban and the 
rural areas. As in the urban area the percentage of support is 48%) and in 
the rural area the support of Muslim masses is to the tune of 61%) for the 
Samajwadi Party (SP). 
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So far as income groups are concerned, we can see in the table 
that in the lower and in the middle groups, in both the rural as well as in 
the urban areas the majority of Muslims are Samajwadi Party (SP) 
supporters in first choice and the Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP) 
supporters in the Second choice. However the trend and pattern of party 
affiliation for those Muslims who are in the high income groups are more 
prone towards Congress, when the Samajwadi Party could not provide a 
strong candidate who can defeat the Bhartia Janata Party (BJP). 
VOTER PREFERENCE (V.Pre.) 
Table: 6.18 and figure 6.16 show the voter preference of Muslims in 
both rural and urban area. 
Table: 6.18 Voter Preference among Urban - Rural Muslims 
Below high 
school 
Above high 
school 
Age 38 to 50 yrs 
Age above 50 yrs 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
URBAN 
Party 
77.5 
61 
79.5 
71 
84 
79 
60 
Candidate 
22.5 
39 
20.5 
29 
16 
21 
40 
1 
Party 
72.5 
66 
67 
77 
68 
53 
69 
RURAL 
Candidate 
27.5 
34 
33 
23 
32 
47 
31 
Figure: 6.16 Voting Preference among Urban Muslims 
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variables 
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I Candidate 
Figure: 6.17 Voting Preference among Rural Muslims 
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Table: 6.18 depicts voting preference (V.Pre.) among the Muslims in 
both the rural and the urban areas. To measure this dimension of political 
behaviour, the respondents were asked to make a choice between party or 
the candidate as their preference while voting in the elections. The whole 
samples, so collected were categorized on the basis of level of education, 
age and level of income. 
In education, two groups were made, one was of below high 
school and other was of above high school, although both the groups 
show preference for party than candidate. However, out of these 77,5% of 
Muslims, with the level of education below high school, in the urban area 
and 72.5% of Muslims in the rural area show preference for party. Group 
II of above high school education show 61% preference for party in urban 
area and 66% in rural area. 
In the two divisions of age groups, one grouped from 36 to 50 
years group III and the other grouped as above 50 years group IV, it was 
found, as can be seen in the table, the most of the Muslims preferred 
'party' than 'candidate' while voting in parliamentary and assembly 
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elections. The 79.5% of Muslims of group III support party in the urban 
area, whereas 67% of Muslims in the rural area support Party. Similarly, 
71% of rural Muslims in the above 50 years age group IV and the 
overwhelming 77% of Muslims in rural area prefer 'party'. 
In the income category, the majority of Muslims in lower income 
group, consisting of 84%) in the urban area support 'party'. In the middle 
income category, it was found that 79% of Muslims living in urban area 
support 'party', in comparison to those Muslims living in the rural area. 
However, in the higher income category of Muslims, it was found that 
69% support 'party' in the rural area, than the 60%o support for 'party' in 
the urban area. 
This trend suggests that 'independent', 'non-party' candidates 
and candidates other than those of major parties stand no chance to win 
the elections from the Muslim majority seats. It indicates very strongly 
that if any reform with regard to elections and representations for 
different communities has to be implemented, it has to start from the 
Party which in an indirect democracy, as in India, has become font of all 
the democratic activities. 
OPINION DECIDER (OD) 
In opinion decider dimension of political behaviour, the 
researcher tries to fmd out the role of others in decision making process. 
Family members, friends, caste groups, co-workers and spouse play very 
crucial role in voting decision process. Tables: 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 
6.23, depicts about the role that various factors like family members (fm), 
friends (f), caste groups ©, co-workers (cw), and spouse (s) play in 
shaping the opinion of the Muslim voters in the urban and the rural areas. 
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To examine the influence of these factors in the decision making process 
of the Mushm voters, the total respondents of MusHm voters were 
divided in various groups according to their level of education, age and 
the level of income. 
T: 6.19 Family Members as OD Fig: 6.18 Family Members as OD 
Family members as opinion decider 
Below high school 
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Table 6.19 and figure 6.18 show role of family members as opinion 
deciders in urban and rural Muslims. It is evident that influence of family 
members is more in all the groups of urbans in comparison to rural 
Muslims. Among urban Muslims this influence is highest in group III 
with age 36 to 50 years. One possible reason could be at this stage of age, 
people are more attached to their family members so they listen to their 
view point very carefully and vote according to their opinions. In rural 
Muslims the impact is negligible in all the categories. 
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T. 6.20 Friends as OD 
Below high school 
Above high school 
Age 36 to 50 yrs 
Age above 50 yrs 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
Friends 
urban 
36 
34.5 
34 
37 
32 
41 
33 
rural 
37 
24 
31 
37 
27 
22 
50 
Fig. 6.19 Friend as OD 
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Influence of friends as opinion decider is depicted in table 6.20 and figure 
6.19. It is found that friends are making high influence in both urban and 
rural Muslims. When we compare urban and rural on the basis of 
education we find that 37% of rural Muslims are listening to the opinion 
of the friends in below high school education group where as it is only 
36% in urban Muslims. In the group of Muslims above high school 
education 34.5% urban Muslims are influenced by friends as compared to 
only 24%) rural Muslims. Comparison of low, middle and high income 
groups show that influence is highest in urban Muslims but in rural areas 
the influence is highest in high income group as 50%o of high income 
Muslims give weightage to the opinion of friends. 
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Table: 6.21 Caste as OD 
Below high school 
Above high school 
Age 36 to 50 yrs 
Age above 50 yrs 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
caste members 
urban 
29.5 
20 
20 
29 
27 
26 
22 
rural 
35 
39 
33 
42 
56 
34 
19 
Fig: 6.20 Caste as Opinion Decider 
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Table 6.21 and figure 6.20 depict role of caste in the decision making 
process. In group I, 29.5% urban and 35% rural Muslims give importance 
to caste while deciding whom to vote. As the education increases from 
below to above high school, influence of caste decreases from 29.5% to 
20%) among urban Muslims whereas the influence is increased from 35%) 
to 39%) with increase in education. With the advancement in age role of 
caste as opinion decider increases from 20% to 29% in urban and 33% to 
42%) in rural Muslims. It might be because of the reason that Muslims 
become more religious with advancement of age and give more 
importance to caste. Among three income groups in both urban and rural 
Muslims low income category Muslims are more influenced by the caste 
factor with 27%) in urban and 36%) in rural Muslims. 
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T: 6.22 Co-Workers as OD 
Below high school 
Above high school 
Age 36 to 50 yrs 
Age above 50 yrs 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
co-workers 
urban 
22 
30 
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26 
30 
17 
31 
rural 
26 
37 
34 
21 
17 
44 
27 
Fig. 6.21 Co-Workers as OD 
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Table 6.22 and figure 6.21 examine the impact of co-workers as opinion 
decider in both urban and rural Muslims. When we compare group I with 
below high school education and group II with above high school 
education it is found that in both the groups rural Muslim are more 
influenced by co-workers in comparison to urban Muslims. A possible 
reason could be in rural areas Muslims are in continuous touch with co-
workers and spend much of their time with them. So they also share 
information about elections and their decisions about voting process are 
influenced by co-workers. Advancement in age has almost negligible 
effect in urban Muslims. But in rural Muslims with advancement of age 
influence of co-workers has decreased drastically from 34% to 21% 
because of the reason that in urban areas Muslims with above 50 years do 
not do any work so they do not interact with co-workers and their voting 
decisions are less influenced by them. In the three groups of income 
highest 31 % Muslims of high income group listen to the opinion of co-
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worker in urban area whereas in rural Muslims highest influence is in 
middle income category. 
T: 6.23 Spouse as OD 
Below high school 
Above high school 
Age 36 to 50 yrs 
Age above 50 yrs 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
Spouse 
urban Rural 
5 
6 
6 
0 
0 
4 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Fig: 6.22 Spouse as Opinion Decider 
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Role of spouse as opinion decider as depicted in table 6,23 and 
figure 6.22. What was found common in all the groups from the table was 
that almost all the groups in the rural areas had no role for spouses in 
voting decision making process. Even in urban areas spouse plays almost 
negligible role in the decision making process. 
COiNVLVSIO^NS 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Analysis of the data in the present research was carried out in two 
phases. In the first phase, the percentages of all the seventeen dimensions 
were obtained to make comparisons of different dimensions of political 
behaviour. In the second phase Bar diagrams were made with the help of 
statistical package for social sciences (SPSS). 
Changing Socio-economic Bases 
It is evident from the table 4.1 and figure 4.1 that both urban and 
rural Muslims differed from each other on different dimensions of 
political behaviour. The political behaviour like - voting participation, 
campaign participation and level of political interest of rural Muslims are 
much greater than that of urban Muslims. It is found that the rural 
Muslims might be backward as compared to their urban counterparts in 
terms of political information level, symbol and heritage awareness and 
their exposure to mass media but as far as their involvement in political 
activities is concerned their attitude towards candidate (ATC) and attitude 
towards democratic system (ATS), political efficacy (PE) and political 
trust (PT) - all are much higher than that of urban Muslims. As a result, 
rural Muslims are more politically mobilized (M) than those of urban 
Muslims. 
Regarding voting preference (V.Pre) the overwhelming rural 
majority opted for party (74%) than candidate. In Party Affiliation, rural 
population is more outright and clear cut in making their minds than that 
of urban. Among urban Muslims' choice of party affiliation (P.aff) the 
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Samajwadi Party (49%) has an edge over Bhaujan Samajwadi Party 
(27%) and Congress (24%) but in the rural MusHms' psyche the congress 
still haunting as an initiator of Babri movement. As a result, only 19%o 
rural Muslims favour congress. As regard to, the Opinion Deciders (OD), 
opinions of friends(OD f), caste groups (OD c) and co-workers (OD cw) 
play heavily over the minds of Muslim voters in both rural and urban 
areas. Almost 75% voters in rural areas and 64%) in urban make up their 
mind due to these factors. 
Table 4.5 and figure 4.2 have shown male-female differences 
among urban and rural Muslims. It can be seen from the Table: 4.5 that 
women voted less than men by 3.43% points. It is reasonable to expect as 
women are less active politically as compared to their male counterparts 
as they remain confined to domestic chores. The difference in campaign 
participation (C.P), communal activity (C.A), political action (P.A) and 
mobilization (M) between male and female is quite large. This shows 
females are discouraged from actively participating in politics. In opinion 
decider (OD), males are more guided by friends (34.2%)), caste groups 
(29.7) and co-workers (27.5) and females are dependent on family 
members (44.1) and spouses (41.3) in deciding about whom to vote. 
Differences in the political behaviour of urban and rural Muslims 
due to education are evident from table 4,6 and figures 4.3 and 4.4. the 
tables show voting participation (60%), campaign participation (38.3%)) 
along with political information index (43.0%)) and political interest 
(36.2%). All seem to be fairly higher among rural Muslims as compared 
to those of urban Muslims, with literacy level below high school. Only in 
two dimensions -symbol and heritage awareness (SHA) and attitude 
towards system (ATS) -the rural Muslims are lower than urban. The 
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mobilization of Muslims in rural area is phenomenal with 57.7% involved 
in this activity. (Fig: 4.3). 
The voting preference (V.pref) among urban Muslims is heavily 
loaded in favour of party than in candidate, with 77.5% supporting party 
candidate. The party affiliation (P.aff.) in rural Muslims shows a clear 
bias towards Samajwadi party. In opinion decider (OD) dimension, 
family members (fm) play a more meaningful role in urban area (12.0%) 
than in rural whereas in both the places the combination of friends, caste 
and co-workers play a decisive role in make up of mind for voting. 
When we analyze the political behaviour in rural and urban 
Muslims above high school, we find a lot many surprises in store, the 
political interest (PI) level has fallen up to 7% point. The mobilization 
(M) activity fell up to 4% point, only attitude towards candidate (ATC) 
and political trust (FT) shows an upward movement. The awareness about 
issues and problems (IFA) in both the rural and urban area has remained 
untainted by the increase in the level of literacy. 
In the category of Muslims' education above high school, urban 
preference for voting to party remains of same higher trajectory but 
among rural preference for candidate over party takes a clear precedence. 
Nevertheless, the preference for Samajwadi party remains intact as usual. 
In opinion decider (OD), yet another new trend is visible, in rural 
Muslims with education above high school, caste group (39.1%) plays 
decisive role in determining voting choice, whereas role of family 
member is almost negligible. Among the urban Muslims, the role of 
friend (34.5%) and co-workers (30.0%) takes an upper hand in opinion 
decider. 
When two groups aged between 36 to 50 years and above 50 
years are compared on the different dimensions of political behaviour. It 
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is evident from table 4.9 and figure 4.5 and 4.6 that both the age groups 
of urban and rural Muslims differed on various dimensions. Voting 
participation (VP) of urban Muslims increases from 50% to 53.1% with 
advancing age. The greater voting turnout among the older persons may 
also be as a result of "faith in parliamentary system", it is found from the 
Table: 3.9 that variation is age is not significantly related to campaign 
participation (CP), political interest (PI), political information index (PII). 
Overall the difference is insignificant but between rural-urban 
comparisons, it is found that rural masses are more active in all these 
activities. 
Advancing age is also positively related to mobilization (M) to 
attending meetings, contacting officials to influence decision. The mass 
media exposure (MME) is found to be less with advancement in age; this 
could be as result of elderly being less internet savvy and restricting to 
oral communication of information. In making voting preference (V.pre.) 
between party and candidate, it was found that party was given 
precedence over candidate in both the age groups of urban and rural 
Muslims. In making choice about party affiliafion (P.aff.), Samajwadi 
Party (SP) is preferred by majority of Muslims cutting across the age 
divide and rural-urban difference. 
So far as opinion decider (OD) is concerned, family members 
(17.7%) and spouse (21.6%) play a decisive role among the urban 
Muslims between 36 to 50 years age group. Whereas, in above 50 years 
age group rural Muslims- the family members alone play a decisive role 
in 29.4% of Muslims while caste group plays role in 28.3% of rural 
Muslims. Spouses in rural masses, in both the age groups (3% & 3.8%), 
play almost second fiddle which verges close to insignificant 
contribution. 
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Table 4.13 and figures 4.7 and 4.8 shows political behaviour of 
urban and rural Muslims across lower, middle and higher income groups. 
If we compare the voting participation (VP) of the three income groups of 
Muslims, it was found that the Muslims who are in the highest economic 
status classification in urban area vote somewhat less than those who 
have a lower and middle income status (Fig: 4.7). But Muslims in the 
middle income group (57%) in urban area vote 15% more than lower 
income group (42%)). 
In cognitive activities like- symbol and heritage awareness (SHA), 
attitude towards system (ATS), and mass media exposure (MME) the 
people of both rural and urban areas show a positive relationship with 
income, i.e, with increase in income, these cognitive activities also 
increases (Fig: 4.7&4.8). So far other forms of political participation are 
concerned there is no symmetrical impact of increase in income on these 
forms of behaviour. It was found that in urban area the activities like-
political interest (PI), issue and problem awareness (IPA), attitude 
towards system (ATS), attitude towards candidate (ATC), political 
efficacy (PE) shows positive correlation with income. 
The Voting preference (V.Pre) for both rural and urban Muslims, 
in all the three categories is Party, not candidate; and Party affiliation 
(P.Aff), as tables 4.12 and table 4.14 indicate, is found with Samajwadi 
Party (SP) to lesser or higher extent in all the three income categories. As 
regard to Opinion Decider (OD), urban Muslims find guidance in friends 
and spouse where as the rural Muslims of lower income groups find 
guidance in friends, caste group and co-workers whereas higher income 
group find friends, caste group and family members as ideal combination 
to help decide about whom to vote in elections. 
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Cultural Orientations 
Cognitive orientation is a very potent determinant of Political 
behiaviour in which dimensions like -political information index (PII), 
issue and problem awareness (IPA), political interest (PI) and symbol and 
heritage awareness (SHA) are included. Table 5.1 shows cognitive 
orientation of urban and rural Muslims. Since urban people are more 
literate as compared to rural people, and their exposure to mass media in 
urban centers are more than that of rural ones, so PII of urban Muslims is 
29% and rural Muslims only 22%. 
Another dimension measuring cognitive orientation and which is 
directly influenced and determined by the level of education is symbol 
and heritage awareness (SHA), the Table 5.1 shows very clearly that the 
urban Muslims have SHA of 28% and rural Muslims have SHA of only 
8%) which is abysmally low. Nevertheless, the rural Muslims have high 
issue and problem awareness (IPA) of 20% and high level of political 
interest (PI) of 11% as compared to issue and problem awareness (IPA) 
of 18% and political interest (PI) of 14% of urban Muslims. 
To measure evaluative orientation another set of four dimensions 
like- attitude towards system (ATS), attitude towards candidate (ATC), 
political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) are measured in both urban 
and rural areas. Table 5.4 and figure 5.2 show that the urban Muslims 
have more positive and supportive attitude towards the democratic system 
of representation and governance as compared to rural Muslims which is 
25% in urban and 21% in rural areas respectively. The increase of 4%) 
point in urban area could be due to the positive and more visible fruits of 
system in the form of better development and availability of economic 
opportunities. 
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In the second dimension of evaluative orientation i.e. attitude 
towards candidate (ATC), rural Muslims seem to take special and 
personal interest which is 25% point in contrast to only 12% of urban 
Muslims (Figure 5.2). It shows that rural Muslims have more positive 
attitude towards candidate and take the capability of candidate to perform 
into reckoning while making voting decision. 
The political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) both show leaning 
towards higher side. The political efficacy might be same (17%)) in both 
rural and urban areas, but the political trust among the rural Muslims is 
much higher at 37%) points than those of urban Muslims of 25%o points, 
which shows strong commitment of Muslims vis-a-vis democratic 
institutions. 
The table 5.10 and figure 5.3 depict about the overall affective 
orientation of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. For the measurement of 
affective orientation, four dimensions namely, voting participation (VP), 
campaign participation (CP), communal activity (CA), political activity 
(PA) among the Muslims residing in urban and rural centers were 
investigated. In all the four categories, the rural Muslims showed higher 
level of affective orientation than that of urban Muslims. Rural Muslims 
look politically awake as their overall affective orientation is high. Urban 
Muslims show less interest in campaigning and communal activities than 
that of rural populace. This could be due to the life-style of urban people 
who remain less interested in affairs of others. 
Types of political participation- Urban 
Table 6.1 and figure 6.1 depicts voting participation of four 
groups of urban Muslim males across high, middle and low income 
groups. It was found that with 38% of VP in lower income group, 42% of 
VP in middle and 40% of VP in higher income group, the general level of 
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voting participation in group I is average. A possible reason could be that 
because of low education level and high family responsibility, and 
exacting and arduous struggle for survival in urban areas, people in group 
I category are more busy in meeting their two ends. 
The group II category of Urban Muslims, on the contrary, show 
very encouraging level of voting participation (VP). It consisted of all 
those Muslims in urban area who are above 50 years and educated up to 
iiigh school. As can be seen from the figure: 5.1 that increase in the age 
from 36-50 to above 50 has brought about 4% of increase in the voting 
participation of lower income group, 6% of increase in the voting 
participation of middle income group and about 10% of increase in the 
higher income group. This could be explained by the accepted social 
practice in Indian sub-continent that old age is considered a period of rest 
and retirement. So it seems fifty plus Muslims have more leisure time at 
their disposal to involve in politics. 
In the group III, urban Muslims with education above high 
school and age between 36-50 years are considered across high, middle 
and low income groups. VP will remain higher when education is higher 
(above high school) and income group is of middle category (from 5000-
20,000). 
In the group IV of urban Muslims with education above high 
school and age above 50 years in urban area, the results show a high 
voting percentage (VP) of 44% for middle income group and lower 
voting percentage (VP) of 39% for high income group and 40% of voting 
percentage for lower income group. The trend of voting which becomes 
perceptible here is that those Muslims who are in the category of higher 
education and higher age group, for them the increase in income, 
decreases their voting participation (VP). 
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The changing pattern that is found during the two decades is that 
the overall voting participation of Muslims is lower than the general 
voting participation of all the people (Table: 6.2). Second changing 
pattern found among the Muslims is that the middle income category 
people are more politically active than the lower and the upper income 
category unlike the general pattern wherein the people of lower income 
category are politically more active than those of middle and upper 
income categories. 
An examination of table 6.4 and figure 6.2 presents political 
information index (PII) of urban males across high, middle and low 
income groups in four different groups. Group I represents urban male 
with education up to high school and age up to 50 years. As can be seen 
the lower income Muslims of group I have PII of 39%, which is lowest 
when we compare it with Middle and higher income Muslims. One 
possible reason could be that low level of education, lower age and lower 
level of income results in lowest Political Information Index of 39% only. 
The middle income category presents a consistently increasing 
trend of 47% in the Group II and 49%) in Group III, but the lower and the 
higher income category Muslims show a fluctuating trend, However, the 
Muslims of group IV, representing education above high school and age 
above 50, reverses the trend of previous three groups. In the Group IV the 
lower income group Muslims, with high education level and high age 
(above 50) show highest PII. The reason as we know is that the increase 
in education and increase in age, increases the political activity of people 
in general. 
Table 6.5 and figure 6.3 measure the political trust (PT) among 
urban Muslims surveyed in four different groups, on the basis of Age, 
Education and Income levels. The level of political trust (PT) among the 
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Muslims of U.P showed a changing trend of increasing confidence on the 
government and poHtical representatives of their respective constituency. 
As the income levels of Muslims living in the urban area, increases from 
the lower income category to higher income category, the political trust 
among them shows a positive effect. In the 1^* group the percentage of 
political trust (PT) for lower income group was 32%, for the middle 
income category was 49% and for the higher income was 53%), it presents 
a consistently increasing pattern. 
In the group II, III and IV the trend of political trust was almost 
similar to that of group I. This showed that with increase in Income of the 
people the political trust also increases. This trend in the Muslims of U.P 
conforms to the accepted pattern across the globe that increase in level of 
income brings in its fold increase in status and prestige of the people as a 
result people are more satisfied with the system's delivering abilities. 
After investigating the table 5.6 and figure 5.4 for testing the 
level of attitude of Muslims towards system, it was found that in the 
group I of Muslims consisting of those having education up to high 
school and age from 36 to 50 years, as the income level of Muslims 
increased from lower to higher, their attitude towards system as well 
became more and more positive. In the lower income group the attitude 
towards system was 31 percent only which increased to 42 percentage 
point as the level of income increased to the high level. 
The group II of Muslims consisted of those having education up 
to high school and age above 50 years. The second group Muslims as 
well showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The increase in the 
level of income led to the increase in the attitude towards system of the 
urban Muslims of U.P. If we compare the group I and the group II to find 
the ATS among Muslims with control of education, it was found that with 
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the increase in age tlie attitude towards system of Muslims remained 
almost constant for high income group. The 2 percentage point of 
reduction in the level of ATS of middle income group and 2 percentage 
point increase in the ATS of lower income category of Muslims is 
insignificant. 
The group III of Muslims consisted of those Muslims who have 
education above high school and the age is from 36 to 50 years. Here as 
well the patterns of attitude towards system (ATS) remained similar to 
that of group I and group II. On comparing the group III with the groups I 
with the control age, it was found that increase in education among the 
Muslims of similar age group does not lead to any significant change in 
the overall attitude towards system. The ATS remained almost same in 
the high income group. 
In the IV group the trend changed. It showed increase in ATS as 
the income category of Muslims increases from lower to middle, but then 
the attitude towards system shows a steep fall of 7 percentage point in the 
high income group. 
After investigating the table: 6.7 for the testing the level of 
political efficacy of Muslims, it was found that in the I group of Muslims 
consisting of those having education up to high school and age from 36 to 
50 years, as the income level of Muslims increased from lower to higher, 
their political efficacy (PE) showed steep rise from 30 percentage point to 
44 percentage for the Muslims of middle income category. 
The II group Muslims as well showed the similar pattern as that 
of the first. The increase in the level of income led to the increase in the 
political efficacy of the Muslims of U.P. However, what is noticeable is 
that in the group II, as the level of income increases, there is a consistent 
increase without any steep fall. In the III group the pattern of political 
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efficacy (PE) remained similar to that of group I and group II. It showed 
that the increase in the level of income leads to increase in the political 
efficacy of the urban Muslims of U.P. The IV group of Muslims consisted 
of those who have education above high school and the age is above 50 
years. In this group as well a similar pattern is found wherein with the 
increase in the level of income, the political efficacy of the Muslims 
increases as well. 
After examining the table: 6.8 for testing the level of mass media 
exposure (MME) of Muslims, it was found that in the group I of Muslims 
consisting of those having education up to high school and age from 36 to 
50 years, as the income level of Muslims increased from lower to higher, 
their mass media exposure as well became more and more positive. In the 
lower income group the mass media exposure was 30 percent only which 
increased to 43 percentage in high income group. 
The group II of Muslims consisted of those having education up 
to high school and age above 50 years. The second group Muslims as 
well showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The increase in the 
level of income led to the increase in the mass media exposure (MME) of 
the Muslims of U.P. but then just as the level of mass media exposure 
(MME) rose sharply from 32% to 40% as the income level rose from 
lower to the middle, the mass media exposure (MME) fell steeply from 
40% to 35%) as the level of income rose from the middle income to the 
higher income level. 
The group III of Muslims consisted of those Muslims who have 
education above high school and the age is from 36 to 50 years. In this 
group, as the level of income increases the MME shows a steep rise of 17 
percentage point from 33%) to 50%o as the income level rose from lower to 
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middle. But for the higher income category, the level of MME fell to 1 
percentage point from 50% to 49% which is insignificant. 
The group IV of Muslims consisted of those who have education 
above high school and the age is above 50 years. In this group as well a 
similar pattern is found wherein with the increase in the level of income 
from lower to the middle income category leads to steep rise in the MME 
from 39% to 46.5%, but from middle income category to the higher the 
level of MME decreases to 2.5 percent point. 
After analyzing the table: 6.9 for the level of mobilization (M) 
of urban Muslims, it was found that as the income level of Muslims 
increased from lower to higher, their mobilization became more and more 
negative. In the lower income group the mobilization level was 58 
percent which decreased to 56 percentage point as the level of income 
increased to the middle. 
Further, the increase in the level of income category from middle 
income level to higher income level brought the level of mobilization of 
Muslims further down to 43 percent only. The group II Muslims as well 
showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The lower income category 
of Muslims had the mobilization participation of 55%) which reduced to 
40% point as the level of income increased to the high income group. 
In the group III, as the level of income increases the mobilization 
reduces to 45%) for the higher income category from 59%) for the lower 
income category. 
Here as well if we try to examine the impact of education on the 
mobilization level of Muslims with the control of age, we find that the 
increase in the level of education had a positive impact on the level of 
mobilization. The group I and group III shows this impact very clearly, as 
we can see that the percentage of mobilization increases from 43%) to 
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45% from those Muslims in higher income category, and for the middle 
and lower income the increase is 56% to 57% and 58%) to 59%) 
respectively. 
The group IV of Muslims consisted of those who have education 
above high school and the age is above 50 years. This group of Muslims 
as well shows a similar pattern of increasing mobilization level except for 
the higher group of Muslims where the total mobilization level remains 
stable at 45% mark. The pattern that is found is that with increase in age, 
income level and education the level of mobilization also increases. 
Types of political participation- rural 
Table 6.10 to table 6.23 revealed the political behaviour of Male 
Muslims in rural areas. 
Table 6.10 and figure 6.8 present the voting participation of 
rural male Muslims in low, middle and high income categories. When the 
group I of the table examined, it was found that the Muslims of lower 
income group had a higher voting participation (61.5%o) than the middle 
(50%) and high income category (59.5%)) of rural Muslims of U.P. As the 
income level of the group I category of Muslims increases, the voting 
participation (VP) shows a steep fall of 11.5%) point and come to 50%o for 
the middle income category of Muslims. Again as the level of income 
further increases from middle to higher the level of VP also shows a rise 
of 9.5%) point. It indicates that the level of income plays positive role for 
those Muslims who are in lower and higher income categories. 
On examining the group II it was found that the lower income 
category of Muslims have a higher voting percentage (64%)) than the 
middle (45.5%)) and high income (49.5%) category. If we find the impact 
of age on the voting percentage in the rural area by comparing the group 
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II with the group I of the table, it is found that the advance in age 
decreases the level of voting participation for the middle and higher 
income category of Muslims but the voting participation for the lower 
Muslims increases with increase in age. 
On examining the group III of the table it was found that the 
lower income group of Muslims had higher voting participation of 66% 
and the middle and the higher income category had 38% and 45% of 
voting participation respectively. 
Table: 6.11 and Figure 6.9 present the political information 
index (PII) of rural male Muslims, If we analyze the group I of rural 
Muslims with education up to high school and age from 36 to 50 years. It 
was found that lower and higher income groups have 61% and 62%) of 
political information index (PII) respectively and 40%) of political 
information index (PII) for the Muslims in the middle income category. 
As the level of income increases from lower to middle the political 
information index shows a steep fall of 21% and comes down to 40% 
mark. Again when the level of income rises to higher level from the 
middle income category, it was found that the political information index 
rises to 22%) points and reaches 62%. 
In group II of rural Muslim males with education up to high 
school and age above 50years, it was found that the higher and the lower 
income category shows higher political information index (PII) of 56%o 
and 64%, however unlike group I, in this group the lower income group 
has highest 64% Political Information Index than those of higher income 
group unlike the case in group I. 
The group III consisted of those Muslims with education above 
high school and age from 36 to 50. On examining the table it was found 
that it represented the trend of previous group wherein the lower income 
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category of Muslims have 59% of PII which is 16% point more than 
those rural Muslims who are in the higher income category of 43%). 
Table: 6.12 and Figure 6.10 presents attitude towards 
system (ATS) among rural Muslim males in three groups across- low, 
middle and high income categories. On examining the group I, it was 
found that the higher income category of Muslims showed 50% of ATS, 
31%) for middle and 37%) for lower income category. The group II 
consisted of those Muslims with education up to high school and age 
above 50years. On analyzing the table it was found that attitude towards 
system (ATS) was lowest among lower income group unlike the first 
group wherein it was the middle income category of Muslims in rural 
area that showed the lowest ATS. 
The group III of Muslims with education above high school and age 
from 36 to 50 shows similar trend as that of group I. Higher income 
group with 60%) of ATS had the highest attitude towards system, with 
40%) lower income group stands 2"*^  and the middle income group shows 
lowest ATS. Reason could be that the lower and middle income group 
expects more from the system which probably fails to come up to their 
standards. 
Table: 6.13 and Figure 6.11 present the political trust (PT) 
among rural Muslims. It was found that lower and middle income groups 
have 46%) and 38%) of political trust respectively and 57.5%) of political 
trust for the Muslims in the higher income category. As the level of 
income increases from lower to middle the political trust shows a steep 
fall of 8%) and comes down to 38%) mark. Again when the level of 
income rises to higher level from the middle income category, it was 
found that the political trust rises to 19.5%) points and reaches 57.5%. 
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In group II of rural Muslim males with education up to high 
school and age above 50years, it was found that the higher and the lower 
income category shows higher political trust (PT) of 54% and 50%, and 
like group I, in this group also the high income group has highest 54%) 
Political Trust. The middle group also follows the similar trend as of 
group I and continues to remain lowest at 32.5%. If we try to find the 
impact of age on the PT of group II of rural Muslims with the control of 
education, it was found that with increase in age the level of PT also 
increases in lower income group. But in the high and middle income 
category of Muslims, the increase in age has a negative influence on the 
political trust. 
The group III consisted of those Muslims with education above 
high school and age from 36 to 50. On examining the table it was found 
that it represented the trend of II group wherein the high income category 
of Muslims have 58% of PT which is 24% point more than those rural 
Muslims who are in the middle income category. 
Table 6.14 and figure 6.12 show that the political efficacy of 
rural Muslims in the lower and the higher income category is same at 
40% point where as the political efficacy of middle income category of 
Muslims is at 25%. The group II also showed the similar pattern as that of 
the group I. As can be seen in the table that lower income category of 
Muslims had 48% of political efficacy, the middle income category had 
27% of political efficacy and the higher income category had 43%) of 
political efficacy among the rural Muslims of U.P. 
As can be seen in the table the lower income category of Muslims 
had higher PE of 46%. And as we move from the lower income to the 
middle income category, we noticed that the PE falls from 46% point to 
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30% point, but it increases to 38% from 30% as we move from middle 
income category to liigher income category. 
. It can be seen that lower income category of Muslims have 
mass media exposure of 26%), which increases to 27% as we move from 
lower to middle income group. The level of mass media exposure (MME) 
increases to 30%) as we move from middle income to higher income 
category. In the group II the lower income category of Muslims have 
mass media exposure of 20%), the middle income category has MME of 
25%) and the high income group has the MME of 28%o. In the table as we 
move from lower income group to the higher income we find income has 
a positive relation with mass media exposure. 
The group III consists of those rural Muslims who are in the age 
group of 36 to 50 years and who have education above high school. As 
can be seen from the table that the level of mass media exposure 
increases with increase in the level of income. 
It can be seen from the table 6.16 and figure 6.14 that the 
Muslims of lower income category have mobilization level of 60 %). The 
mobilization level of Muslims of middle income category is 62%). The 
group II consists of those Muslims in the rural area who are in the age of 
above 50 years and who have education below high school. As can be 
seen in the table that the group II as well has a similar trend in the level of 
mobilization as that of the group I, the Muslims of lower income category 
have a mobilization level of 59%), the Muslims of middle income 
category have a mobilization level of 64%) and the higher income 
category of Muslims have 55% of level of mobilization. If we try to find 
out the impact of age on the level of mobilization with the control of 
education, we find that as the age of a rural Muslim advances, their level 
of mobilization also increases. 
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The group III exhibits almost similar patterns and trend. As we 
move from lower income category to the high income category, we find 
that the level of mobilization also increases. If we find the impact of 
education on the level of mobilization with the control of age and 
compare group III and I, we find that the education has a positive 
correlation with the mobilization level. 
Types of political behaviour- urban / rural 
Table: 6.17 and figure 6.15 presents the party affiliation of rural 
and urban Muslims in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The Muslims with the 
level of education up to high school, whether living in urban or rural 
centers, have a strong predilection for Samajwadi Party (SP) as 46% 
urban and 61% rural Muslims supported it. The intensity and amount of 
support of the urban Muslims in the group is 15%) point less than that of 
the rural Muslims. The support for Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP) in 
both the areas-urban as well as rural- is almost VA of the total population, 
but as can be seen in the table, the Muslim supporters for Congress Party 
are more than double in the urban areas than in the rural ones. 
The group II consists of those Muslims who have the level of 
education above high school and who are residing in both the urban and 
the rural areas. Here as well the trend is similar to the one in the previous 
group. In this group the support for both SP and Congress is reduced and 
BSP is the real gainer as seen in the table. 
The group III consists of those Muslims who are in the age from 
36 to 50 years. As we can see in the table, in this category the rural 
support of the Muslims for the Samajwadi Party (SP) marginally 
increases from 58% to 60%. It seems that this group of Muslims who are 
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in the age group from 36 to 50 years, have a special liking for Congress 
party as in both the urban and the rural areas the support base for the 
Congress Party increases. 
Group IV of above 50 years age, as can be seen in the table, 
consisted of Samajwadi Party (SP) supporter- in both the urban and the 
rural areas. So far as income groups are concerned, w^e can see in the 
table that in the lower and in the middle groups, in both the rural as well 
as in the urban areas the majority of Muslims are Samajwadi Party (SP) 
supporters in first choice and the Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP) 
supporters in the Second choice. However the trend and pattern of party 
affiliation for those Muslims who are in the high income groups are more 
prone towards Congress. 
Table: 6.18 depicts voting preference (V.Pre.) among the 
Muslims in both the rural and the urban areas. To measure this dimension 
of political behaviour, the respondents were asked to make a choice 
between party or the candidate as their preference while voting in the 
elections. In education, both the groups show preference for party than 
candidate. 
In the two divisions of age groups, one grouped from 36 to 50 
years group III and the other grouped as above 50 years group IV, it was 
found, as can be seen in the table, the most of the Muslims preferred 
'party' than 'candidate' while voting in parliamentary and assembly 
elections. 
In the income category, the majority of Muslims in lower income 
group, consisting of 84% in the urban area support 'party'. In the middle 
income category, it was found that 79% of Muslims living in urban area 
support 'party', in comparison to those Muslims living in the rural area. 
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This trend suggests that 'independent', 'non-party' candidates 
and candidates other than those of major parties stand no chance to win 
the elections from the MusHm majority seats. It indicates very strongly 
that if any reform with regard to elections and representations for 
different communities has to be implemented, it has to start from the 
Party which in an indirect democracy, as in India, has become font of all 
the democratic activities. 
Tables 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 6.23 depict about the role that 
various factors like family members, friends, caste groups, co-workers, 
and spouse play in shaping the opinion of the Muslim voters in the urban 
and the rural areas. It was found that friends, caste and co-workers play a 
significant and decisive role in the decision making of both the rural and 
urban Muslims. The role of family members is contributive in decision 
making of Muslims in urban area but not so in the rural area. With regard 
to the spouses it was found that in the urban area, their opinion has some 
role, however in the rural area, the role of spouse in decision making is 
negligible. 
SUGGESTIONS 
The researches carried out in behavioural sciences, inspite of 
taking all precautions, can not be perfect because many things remain 
unexplored either due to time constraints, non availability of resources 
and not getting full co- operation from the respondents. Some times the 
tools used for research work are too lengthy and time consuming, due to 
which respondents hardly co-operate the investigator and many things 
required in the research can not be probed. What ever may be the results 
of a research it does not mean that it blocks the way to fiiture researches. 
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In the same way, present research is not a dead end for further 
explorations. Results of the present investigation could be enhanced by 
taking other important factors of the Indian political culture to find out 
the impact of these factors on the political behaviour of urban and rural 
Muslim voters. 
Researches conducted on the relationship of minorities with 
majority groups may be helpful to the political culture in identifying the 
important factors that favorably or unfavorably influence political 
behaviour. Better results could also be obtained if we could have taken 
into consideration biographical characteristics of the respondents. 
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APPENDIX-1 
Political Behaviour Questionnaire 
(based on Pre- and Post-Poll Surveys conducted by 
CSDS in various National Election Surveys) 
Voting Turnout/Participation 
1) Are you registered as voter in your constituency? 
l.Yes O.No 
2) Did you vote tliis time or did something keep you from voting? 
1. Yes Voted 0. Did not vote 
3) In the last 15 years, since Babri Masjid demolition, In how 
many assembly and parliamentary elections did you vote? 
3. All 2. Majority 1. Some O.None. 
Campaign Participation 
4) During election campaigning parties and candidates stage 
election meetings, take out rallies etc. How many such 
meeting and rallies did you personally attend? 
3. All 2. majority l.some 0. none 
5) During the elections people participated in various activities. In 
the elections, out of the activities stated below, in which did 
you participate? 
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a) Attended election meetings? 
b) Participated in processions/ 
rallies. 
c) Participated in door to door 
canvassing? 
d) Contributed or collected money? 
e) Distributed election leaflets or 
put up posters? 
No 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Yes 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6) Once having decided whom to vote for, do you attempt to 
influence other voters according to your choice? 
lYes ONo 
Political Interest 
7) When did you finally make up your mind about whom to vote? 
1 Day of voting 2 After declaration of candidates 
3 During election campaign 
8) Now I would like to talk with you about the election campaigning 
during these elections. How much interested do you remain? 
2 A great deal 1 somewhat 0 Not at all 
9) Leaving aside the period of elections, how much interest would 
you say you have in politics and public affairs? 
2 A great deal 1 somewhat 0 Not at all 
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10) Are you a member of any political party? 
0 No 1 Yes 
11) Do you interact with the political representative of your 
ward/constituency? 
0 No 1 Yes 
12) Do you discuss about politics/elections with your friends in 
home or office /with family members? 
2 Daily 1 sometimes 0 Never 
Political Information Index 
13) Who is the ML A of your area? 
lYes ONo 
14) Who is ,at present, the P.M. of India ? 
1. Correct answer 0. Incorrect answer 
15) Can you say from which party the P.M belongs to ? 
1 .Correct answer 0. Incorrect answer 
16) Who is ,at present, the CM of U.P ? 
1 .Correct answer 0 .Incorrect answer 
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17) What is the party of the CM of U.P ? 
1 .Correct answer 0.Incorrect answer 
18) Can you tell who has won from your parliamentary constituency ? 
1 .Correct answer O.Incorrect answer 
Issue And Problem Awareness 
19) In these past fifteen years, in centre, was there any thing during 
the congress govt.s in 1991 to 1996 and again in 2004 to 2008 
that you particularly liked ? 
l)Yes O.No 
20) During BJP govt, in centre, from 1999 to2004 was there any 
thing that you particularly liked or disliked ? 
l)Yes O.No 
21) Now talking about U.P state, was there anything during the S.P 
govt, after 1992 Babri-Masjid demolition and 2002 to2007 that 
you liked or disliked? 
l)Yes O.No 
22) During BSP govt, of Mayawati in U.P was there anything that 
you liked or disliked? 
l)Yes O.No 
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23) What are the main issues/problems in front of the nation at present? 
l)Yes 0)No 
24) Which party in your opinion would be most likely to do what you 
want on these issues? 
l)Yes 0)No 
25) What are the main problems of your locality (village/town) ? 
l)Yes 0)No 
26) Have you heard about terrorism, what is the main cause of 
terrorism in India? 
l)Yes 0)No 
Communal Activity 
27) Do you change your voting decision in the light of Fatwa issued by 
the religious head? 
1 Yes 0 No 
28) Other than political parties, are you a member of any 
religious/caste organization or association? 
0)No l)Yes 
29) Aside from caste and religious organizations, do you belong to any 
other associations and organizations like co-operative, farmers' 
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association, trade unions, welfare organizations, cultural and sports 
organizations, etc. 
0)No l)Yes 
30) Do you know how Muslims voted in last elections and how do they 
normally vote in elections? 
3) Only Muslim 1) only winning party 2) capable to defeat BJP 
31) What are the main problems being faced by your community in 
general? 
0)No l)Yes 
32) One should vote in the same way ones caste/community votes. 
0)No l)Yes 
Symbol and Heritage Awareness 
33) Can you name some leaders of Indian national movement? 
0)No l)Yes 
34) Do you know the name of the father of the nation and the first P.M 
of independent India ? 
0)No l)Yes 
35) What are the colours of the national flag and what is its pattern? 
0)No l)Yes 
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36) What do you know about India's national anthem . can you sing a 
few lines ? 
0)No l)Yes 
37) Do you know some thing about the constitution of India? 
0)No l)Yes 
Attitude towards System 
38) The govt, in the country can not be run better if there were no 
political parties. 
0) disagree 1) agree 
39) Political parties make the govt, responsive to people's demands. 
0) disagree 1) agree 
40) Elections held so often makes the govt, responsive to people's needs. 
0) disagree l)agree 
41) The demolition of Babri Masjid was not an act of B.J.P govt. ? 
0)disagree l)agree 
42)The BJP will not succeed in making Gujarat out of U.P. ? 
0)disagree l)agree 
43) Is there any political party which you particularly like? 
0)no l)yes 
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Attitude towards candidate 
44) How satisfied are you with the work of your M.P.in the past fifteen 
years? 
3 ftilly satisfied 2 somewhat satisfied 
1 somewhat dissatisfied 0. fully dissatisfied 
45) Now keeping in view the work done by party MLAs' during the last 
15 years ,are you satisfied ? 
3 fully satisfied 2 somewhat satisfied 
1 somewhat dissatisfied 0. fully dissatisfied 
Political Action 
46) Do you participate in passive protest like wearing black bandage, 
mass band, writing petitions etc to make authority pay attention to 
public demands and grievances? 
0)No l)Yes 
47) Do you participate in rallies, strikes and demonstrations to make 
authority pay attention to public demands and grievances? 
0)No l)Yes 
48) Do you participate in violent protests like arson, sabotage, 
explosions etc to make authority pay attention to public demands 
and grievances? 
0)No l)Yes 
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Mobilization 
49) During election campaigning did any candidate, party worker or 
canvasser visited your house asking for your vote? 
0)No l)Yes 
50) Did any party activist call you up or talk to you about your vote? 
0)No l)Yes 
51) Did any party worker gave you party sticker, poster, leaflets etc? 
0)No l)Yes 
Political Efficacy 
52) Do you think your vote has effect on how things are run in this 
country ? 
0) Has no effect 1) Has effect 
53) Are treated well by the govt, officials where ever you come in 
interaction with them for your work? 
0) No 1) Yes 
54) We common people have no say in what govt. does. Do you agree? 
3) Fully agree 2)Somewhat agree 
1) Somewhat disagree 0)Fully disagree 
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55) The govt, officials and elected representative don't care much about 
what we think about politics.Do you agree? 
3)Fully agree 2)Somewhat agree 
1 )Somewhat disagree 0)Fully disagree 
56) The political and govt, affairs are not too complicated to understand. 
Do you agree? 
3)Fully agree 2)Somewhat agree 
1 )Somewhat disagree 0)Fully disagree 
Political Trust 
57) Are you treated /attended/listened well by political representative? 
0)No l)Yes 
58) People in the government can be trusted. How far do you agree? 
3) Fully agree 2) Somewhat agree 
1) Somewhat disagree 0) Fully disagree 
59) People in government are competent. Do you agree? 
3) Fully agree 2)Somewhat agree 
1) Somewhat disagree 0)Fully disagree 
Mass media exposure 
60) Do you read newspapers? 0. No 1 .Yes 
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61) How often do you read the newspaper? 
3. Daily 2.0ften 1 .Once in a while O.Never 
62) Do you watch television news? 
0)No l)Yes 
63) How often do you access internet? 
3. Daily 2.Often l.Onceinawhile O.Never 
Political Party Affiliation 
64) Thinking of how you or your family have voted in the last fifteen 
years, how would you describe yourself-
1) Congress voter 2) BJP voter 3) SP voter 
4) BSP voter 5) voter of no particular party 
Voting Preference 
65) While voting what is your main concern? 
1) party 2) candidate 
Opinion Decider 
66) In deciding who to vote for whose opinion mattered to you most? 
1) Spouse 2) friends / neighbours 3) co-workers 
4) Caste / community leaders 5) family members 
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APPENDIX-2 
Biographical Information Bank (BIB) 
Socio-Economic information 
65) What is your age?_ 
66) Gender: Male_ Female 
67) Education: 
68) Locality: rural/urban 
69) Total monthly income: 
Lower (up to 5000)-Urban. 
Lower (up to 3000)-Rural 
Middle (5001 -20,000)-Urban 
Middle (3001-12,000)-Rural 
High (20,001 and above)Urban 
High (12001 and Above)Rural 
